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THE
BRIHAD A'RANYAKA UPANISHAD,

BY
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PREFACE.

It was my intention to have accompanied this translation of the Brihad A'ranyaka Upanishad with an introduction in the manner adopted in my translation of the minor Upanishads; but as the state of my health compels me to rest for a time from literary labours, and as I do not wish to delay any longer the publication of a work which has been several years in progress, I am obliged to forego my wishes on the subject, reserving for the future the publication of my views on this Upanishad in a separate form.

I would only add here the reason which induced me to discontinue the translation of S'ankara's commentary. At the commencement of the work I deemed it desirable to anglicise the commentary in order to assist the student in understanding so difficult an author as S'ankara; this, I presume, has been accomplished by the portion I have translated in the first two fasciculi, and it appeared to me useless to continue with the translation of the whole commentary, as it is cumbrous and generally adds nothing to the explanation of the text, an opinion which was held by several of my Oriental friends in Europe. In the latter part of my work, accordingly, I translated only such passages of the commentary as elucidate the text, and gave, generally in my own words, S'ankara's explanatory remarks to the different Bráhmānas, these remarks being interesting for the views expounded therein as well as for the insight which they offer into the connexion of the various parts of this Upanishad.

SANKARA'S INTRODUCTION.

Om! Salutation to Bramha (or Bramhá) and the other Rishis, perfect in the traditional knowledge of Bramha, whose names are enumerated in the lineage from teacher to teacher.* Salutation to the religious instructors.†

This brief‡ commentary of the Vájasanóyi Bramha Upanishad, which commences with the words: "The dawn is the head of the sacrificial horse," is composed for the sake of those who wish to liberate themselves from the world, in order that they may acquire the knowledge, that Bramha§ and the soul || are the same, a knowledge, by which the liberation from the cause of the world¶ is accomplished. This knowledge of Bramha is called Upanishad, because it completely annihilates the world, together with its cause (ignorance) in such as possess the knowledge; for this is the meaning of the word Sad,** preceded by Upa.†† A work which treats on the same knowledge, is also called Upanishad. The above-mentioned

* Brahma, Rishis are the sages, who in continuous succession from Brahma, Bramhá, Paramesti, &c., taught the knowledge of the universal soul, They are enumerated in the Vansa Brahma, a part of the present Upanishad. V. P. 803, &c.

+ The plural is here the plural is majestatis, meaning the preceptor of Sankara Acharya, whose name was Govinda.

‡ Brief it is called, in comparison with the more voluminous commentary, called the Bharti Prapancha Bháshya.

§ Brahma, the universal soul.

|| The individual soul. According to the Vendantists the soul, independent of the body, is the substance which is pure existence, knowledge and bliss, and which must therefore not be confounded with its faculties, the senses, the mind, intellect; &c.

¶ The cause of the world is ignorance.

** Sad means to destroy, or to go.

†† Upa means near, Ni expresses.

Upanishad, which contains 6 chapters, is called Aranyaka, as being spoken in a desert, and Brihad (great) from its extent.*

The connection of this Upanishad with the ceremonial part of the Vêdas will now be mentioned. The whole Vêda has the design to explain by what means objects of desire and aversion that cannot be proved by perception or inference, may be obtained or removed; for every man has naturally the wish to obtain objects of desire, and remove objects of aversion. The Vêda has not to investigate objects of the senses, because the knowledge of what satisfies desires, or removes objects of aversion, is produced by perception and inference.†

Further, unless there is a knowledge of the existence of the soul in another life, there cannot be a wish to obtain and remove objects of desire or aversion in a subsequent life; this is clear from the conduct of those who do not admit any other desires but those, prompted by one's own nature. In consequence the Vêdaic science is founded on the knowledge of the existence of the soul, relative to a former life, and upon the special means by which objects of desire and aversion in another life may be obtained or removed. The existence of the soul as independent of the body, is evident from

* This Upanishad, besides the names of Vajâsaneyi Brahma Upanishad and Brihad Aranyaka Upanishad, bears also the denomination of Kânva Upanishad.

† The Vedas are divided in two parts, the first is the Karma-kânda, the ceremonial part, also Purva-kânda, and treats on ceremonies, the second is the Jnâna-kânda, the part which contains knowledge, also named Uttara-kânda or posterior part, and unfolds the knowledge of Brahma or the universal soul.

‡ The Mimânsakas and Vedântis assert five kinds of evidence, viz., perception, inference, verbal communication, comparison and presumption. Some add also privation. The Chârvâkas recognise but one, viz., perception. The followers of Kanâda and those of Sugata (Buddha) acknowledge two, perception and inference. The Sâncyas reckon three, including affirmation. The Naiyâyicas, or followers of Gotama, count four, viz., the foregoing together with comparison. The Prabhâkaras, as first observed, admit five. And the rest of the Mimamsakas, in both school, prior and later Mimansa, enumerate six. Col. M. E. Vol. I. pp. 303, 304. In our passage perception and inference include the other kinds of evidence.

§ The Lokâyâtikas are here meant according to A'nanda Giri. They do not acknowledge the existence of the soul, independent of the body, and accordingly do not perform any actions relative to a future life.

positive declarations of the Vēlas, as shown by the following passages : " This is the investigation whether after the death of man, *the soul exists* ; some assert the soul exists ; the soul does not exist, assert others." This is the commencement of one *Upanishad*,* and it concludes with the words : it exists †

Another passage says : " Some souls after death are born (again) to obtain a body like animals, others are changed into the condition of a trunk, according to their works, according to their knowledge of the Vedas." ‡

Another passage commences : " *It* (the soul) is itself light, its knowledge and ceremonial works follow it (in another life) ; *man* becomes holy by holy work."

Another passage which commences : " I will declare " § concludes with the words : *the soul is knowledge*.

The assertion, that *the existence of the soul, as independent of the body*, can be proved by perception, is not correct ; for there is a contradictory assertion of such who argue the contrary.

For, if from perception a knowledge of the existence of the soul in connexion with another body, could be derived, we should not be opposed to the Lokāyatikas|| and Bauddhas, ¶ who assert that the

* See Katha Upanishad, I. 20.

† K. U. VI. 13.

‡ K. U. V. 6—7.

§ Brihad Aranyaka U. p. 345.

|| The Chārvākas (or Sunyavādīs) so named from one of their teachers, the Muni Chārvāka. From Vrishaspati they are called also Vārhaspatyas. The appellation Sunyavādīs, implies the asserter of the unreality and emptiness of the universe, and another designation, Lokāyata, expresses their adoption of the tenet, that this being is the Be-all of existence : they were, in short, the advocates of materialism and atheism, and have existed from a very remote period, and still exist, as we shall hereafter see. Wilson's, Sects of the Hindus, p. 15.

They (the Chārvākas) restrict to perception the only means of proof and source of knowledge. Others, however, admit probability and tradition. Col. M. E. Vol I. p. 403. Sadānanda in the Vedānta Sāra, calls up for refutation no less than four followers of Chārvāka ; one maintaining, that the gross corporeal frame is identical with the soul, another that the corporeal organs constitute the soul, a third affirming that, the vital functions do so, a fourth insisting, that the mind and the soul are the same. C. M. E. pp. 403, 404.

¶ Bauddhas. There are four sects among the followers of Buddha : 1. The Mādhyamicas, who maintain, that all is void. 2. Yogachāras, who assert,

soul does not exist. For with regard to objects of the senses, as for instance a pot, no contradiction takes place, as if one would assert the non-existence of a pot, *although it is perceived by the senses*. If you hold, such contradiction may exist by referring to the well known topic of the trunk and the man, if the same object is taken by some for a truth, by others for a man, we remind you of the fact, that all dispute ceases, when the nature of the object has been ascertained. For there is no dispute about the nature of an object of the senses, for instance, of a trunk when it has been ascertained by perception. The Vainasikas* on the other hand although, acknowledging the *I* yet reject the opinion of the existence of the soul, independent of the internal body. Accordingly, since the soul is different from any object of the senses, its existence cannot be proved by perception.

Nor can it be proved by inference. If you say, that the *Sruti* applies arguments in proving the existence of the soul, and that these arguments are based upon perception, we do not admit this on the ground, that there is no perception of the soul, relative to a former birth. When however, the existence of the soul by the *Veda* is acknowledged, and also by common arguments, according to the meaning of the *Veda*, the followers of the *Veda*, the *Mimansâkas* and

that, except internal sensation or intelligence (*Vijnyâna*) all else is void. 3. *Sautrântikas*. They affirm the actual existence of external objects no less than of internal sensations. The exterior objects to be known by immediate perception. 4. *Vaibhâshikas*, who agree with the latter, except that they contend for a mediate apprehension of exterior objects, through images, or resembling forms, represented to the intellect. C. M. E. Vol. I. pp. 390, 391.

* Hence these *Buddhists* (the *Sautrântikas* and *Vaibhâshikas*, who believe, that objects cease to exist, when no longer perceived, they have a brief duration, like the flash of lightning, lasting no longer than the perception of them. Their identity is but momentary) are by their adversaries, the orthodox, *Hindus*, designated as *Purna*—or *Sarva*—*Vainâsikas* arguing total perishableness, while the followers of *Kanâda*, who acknowledge some of their categories to be eternal and invariable, and reckon only others transitory and changeable; and who insist that identity ceases with any variation in the composition of the body and that a corporeal frame, receiving nutriment and discharging excretions, undergoes continual change, and consequent early loss of identity, are for that particular opinion, called *Ardhavainâkas* 'arguing half perishableness.' Col. M. E. Vol. I. pp. 393, 349.

Târikas (or logicians) will substitute the fiction, as if the perception of the I and the arguments in accordance with the Vedas were produced by their own intellect and hence, say, that the soul is proved by perception and inference.

The ceremonial part of the Vedas is intended for the special instruction of him, who with certainty knows that the soul exists, subject to transmigration, and who in consequence is anxious to avail himself of special means to obtain and remove objects of desire and aversion in connexion with another body. The ignorance, however, with regard to the soul, which produces the wish to obtain what is desired, and which by its nature prides itself in the feelings of self dominion and possession, is not annihilated *by ceremonial works*; this can only be effected by the opposite knowledge of the identity of Brahma with the individual soul. For as long as this ignorance is not annihilated, so long the ignorant soul, owing to passion, hatred and other natural faults, resulting from works, and owing to the transgression of commands and prohibitions of the Sastra, continues to accumulate by [thoughts, words and by the body, works which are called unholy, and which are the causes of evil concerning events that fall within the senses as well as that which do not fall within them. All this is the result of the greater power of natural fault. Hence *in proportion to the faults*, transmigration *ensues from the highest state downwards* to the lowest state of inanimate matter.

Sometimes the purification by means of the Sâstra has a greater power. Hence the soul acquires by actions of mind, speech and body a state which is called virtue, and which is the cause of good. This virtue is twofold—virtue resulting from knowledge and mere virtue. The reward of the latter is the obtaining of the world of the manes (Pitris) and of other like worlds. The reward of virtue, resulting from knowledge, is the obtaining of the world of the Dêvas, and of other worlds, upwards to the world of Brahmâ. Thus it is said in the Shâstra : sacrificial works directed to Brahmâ, are preferable to works directed to the Dêvas. Also the Smriti* teaches : work, according to the Vedas, is twofold, (such as concerns active life, and such as refers to contemplation ; the former satisfies desires, the latter abstains from them through knowledge)

* Manu. 12. 88.

If lastly, virtue and vice are equally balanced in a person, he obtains the condition of man. Thus by the power of Ignorance and other innate faults, a soul has to transmigrate, in accordance with its virtue or vice, into worldly forms, different in name, shape and works from the state of the world of Brahmá downwards to the condition of inanimate matter.

Thus this manifested world, subject to the connexion between cause and effect, was not manifested before its creation. "This world which, like a sprout springs from seed, proceeds from ignorance, which is placed as the result from works, for the performer and effects upon the soul, is without beginning, is without end, is without reality." To remove the ignorance of a person who shows by reflections, as just described, his dissatisfaction with the world, the following Upanishad is commenced ; in order that he may obtain the knowledge of Brahma, which is opposite to that ignorance.

The knowledge, however, of the ceremonies regarding the sacrifice of a horse, is required that those who are not fit to perform the horse-sacrifice may obtain by this knowledge the same reward.*

If one by such passage from the Sruti as the following : " By knowledge or by holy actions *the mentioned reward may be obtained.*" and "He who overcomes even this world," would conclude, that the knowledge was only a kind of work, he would be in error, first, because passages as such : "who offer the sacrificial horse," and "who knows† him thus," leave it optional, to *perform that sacrifice either by knowledge or in reality* ; secondly because it (this knowledge) is also mentioned in the second part of the Sruti, which treats on knowledge ; thirdly, because also by other ceremonies a similar representation is made. Hence it follows, that from knowledge alone the reward of the horse sacrifice is derived. The chief of all cere-

* *Viz.*, at the commencement of the Upanishad a description of the Aswamedha or horse-sacrifice, which does not properly belong to it, is given for the object, that Bráhmans and others may obtain by knowledge the reward of this sacrifice, which can in reality only be performed by kings.

† That is to say, who knows the sacrifice of the horse to be an emblem of Prajápati.

monies, however, is the Aswamedha, because its reward includes the universal and special state of Hiranya Garbha.*

Further at this commencement of the knowledge of Brahma, the ceremony of the horse-sacrifice is described for the purpose to show the worldly tendency of all sacrifices; for its reward is shown as the devourer, which is death.

If it be said that the regular ceremonies have no worldly effect we deny this on the authority of the Sruti, which enumerates the effect of all works. For every ceremony requires the assistance of a wife. When by such wishes as the following, "May I have a wife," which are based on our very nature, the connection of all ceremonies with objects of desire,—moreover, as the reward of the ceremonies to be performed by a son, the world of the Rishis or Devas, have been pointed out, the state of Hiranya Garbha will be shown as reward of the Aswamedha at the end of this chapter by the words: "This world is threefold by name, form and work."

Thus the world is the manifest effect from all actions. These three (names, forms and works) then were before the origin of the world not manifested. Again they become manifest from the effect of the works of all living creatures, as a tree springs from seed. This world, which is at the same time manifest and not manifest, the object of ignorance, which is morpheus and amorpheus; is for the sake of the ceremony, the performer and the effect, placed through ignorance upon the soul by its semblance of it. Therefore the soul although it is separate from the world, although in its nature it is without the distinction of name, form and work, although it is without duality, essentially eternal, pure, intelligent and blissful, is yet manifested by the distance of ceremony, performer, effect, and by other distinctions. Therefore as the erroneous conception of a rope as a snake is removed by a correct apprehension, so the knowledge of

* The universal state is Hiranya Garbha as soul of the universe, or Iswara, who rules all; the special state is Hiranya Garbha as present in every individual. Here the special state means of course the state of a special divinity.

† Regular ceremonies are such, which, if not performed, are causes of sin, and if performed are no causes of merit, ceremonies which every Brahman is bound to perform, as for instance the regular ceremonies, called Sandhya-bandana. V. Vedanta Sāra, Calcutta Edition. p 2.

Brahma is commenced to annihilate the ignorance, the cause of desire and other faults, and also of works, of a person who is dissatisfied with this *world*, which naturally represents the distinctions of ceremonial act, of the performer and of the effect, and which naturally applies causes and effects by such sentences, as : this is so or so. In this the part, commencing with : "The dawn is the head," etc., is designed for the knowledge of the horse sacrifice. The sacrifice is represented under the emblem of a horse, on account of the eminence of the horse. The eminence again is derived from the sacrifice bearing its name, and from its being the representation of Prâjapati.

* The Aswamedha and Purushamedha, celebrated in the manner directed by this Veda, (white Yajur Veda) are not really sacrifices of horses and men. In the first mentioned ceremony, six hundred and nine animals of various prescribed kinds, domestic and wild, including birds, fish, and reptile, are made fast, the tame ones, to twenty-one posts, and the wild, in the intervals between the pillars; and after certain prayers have been recited, the victims are let loose without injury.....The mode of performing the Aswamedha and Purushamedha, as emblematic ceremonies, not as real sacrifices, is taught in this Veda and the interpretation is fully confirmed by the rituals, and by commentators on the Samhitâ and Brâhmana.....The horse, which is the subject of the religious ceremony, called Aswamedha, is also avowedly an emblem of Virâj, or the primeval and universal manifested being Col. M. E. Vol I, pp. 61. 62.

BRIHAD A'RANYAKA UPANISHAD.

CHAPTER I.

First Brâmhana.

Om ! The dawn verily is the head of the sacrificial horse. The sun is the eye ; the wind the breath ; the fire, under the name Vaiswânara, the open mouth ; the year the body of the sacrificial horse. The heaven is the back ; the atmosphere the belly ; the earth the footstool (hoof) ; the quarters the sides ; the intermediate quarters the bones of the sides ; the

"The dawn is in truth, etc." The dawn means here the hour of Bramha. "In truth," is said for the sake of reminding, and reminds of a well known time. "Is the head," from its being the principal time ; for the head is the principal part of the body. For the object of purifying, the animal representing in its members the various parts of the ceremonies, time and other conditions of the sacrifice are typified by the head and other parts. It is represented as Prâjapati by giving it the emblems of Prâjapati ; for the representation of the animal by time, the worlds and the divinities is its representation as Prâjapati ; for this is the nature of Prâjapati, as Vishnu and other deities are represented under the form of an image. "The sun is the eye," as nearest to the head, and as being the tutelary deity of the eye.*— "The wind is the breath," from its identity with it. "The mouth is fire, under the name of Vaiswânara ;" Vaiswânara is the special name of Agni, meaning, whose mouth is wide open. Agni is also the deity of the mouth. "The year is the body," viz the year, as containing twelve or thirteen months. The year is the body of the members of time ; for the body is in the midst of the members, as the Sruti says. "Of the sacrificial horse ;" this is here repeated for the sake of connection, "The heaven is the back," both being placed alike above. "The atmosphere the belly," both being hollow. The earth is footstool. The quarters, although four, are the two sides, by

* As the eye is nearest to the head, so the sun nearest to the dawn. This is the point of their resemblance. A'nanda Giri,

seasons the members ; the months, the half months,² are the joints , day and night the feet ; the constellations the bones ; the sky the muscles ; the half digested food the sand ; the rivers arteries and veins ; the liver and spleen the mountains ; the herbs and trees the various kinds of hair. The sun, as long as he rises, is the fore part of the body ; the sun as long as he descends, is the hind part of the body. The lightning is like yawning ; the shaking of the members is like the rolling of the thunder ; the passing of urine is like the rain of the clouds ; its voice is like speech. I.

the similarity of both. This comparison is not improper for the reason, that the number of both is different ; for as the two sides of the horse are turned to all quarters, there is no fault in this comparison. "The intermediate quarters," viz, Agneyi (regent of the south-east), etc., the bones of the sides. "The seasons are the members," from the similarity of the parts of the year with the members of the body. "The months and half months the joints," from their similarity. "Days and nights the feet" in plural number from the difference of days, as days of Prajapati, of the Devas, of the Pitris, and of men. "Feet," because they proceed ; for the time as body proceeds with the days and nights, as with the feet of the horse. "The constellations the bones," from their similar white colour. "The sky," meaning here the clouds of the sky, because the sky was formerly mentioned as the belly, are the muscles, from the similarity of both in oozing either water or blood. "The half digested food the sand," from the similarity of the separate parts. The rivers, "arteries and veins," because both ooze. "The liver and the spleen," the mountains, viz. the two pieces of flesh to the right and left under the heart ; they are called "mountains" from their hardness and height. The herbs, small plants, the hair of the body ; the "trees," the hair of the head, according to their likeness. The sun rising until noon is the forepart of the horse above the navel ; the sun descending from the midst of his course, is the other half, the hips and loins, from their respective similarity. "The lightning is like the yawning," from the likeness of the mouth when it suddenly opens, with the rending of a cloud. "The

The day is the Mahima, placed before the horse; its birth-place is the eastern sea; the night the other Mahima, which is placed behind the horse; its birthplace is the western sea; these Mâhimas are placed around the horse. The horse, under the name of Haya, carried the gods, under the name of Vâji, the Gandharvas, under the name of Arva, Asurs, under the name of Aswa, men. The sea is its companion, the sea its birthplace. 2.

shaking of the members is like the rolling of thunder," from the similarity of the sound. "The passing of the urine" is like the raining of the clouds—both sparkling alike. The voice is like the neighing of the horse; in this there is a natural likeness. I.

"The day," etc., this is said in illustration of the golden and silver cups, called Mahima, which are placed before and behind the horse. The day is the golden cup, from the similar splendour of both. How is the day placed as the cup before the horse? By its being an emblem of Prajâpati; for Prajâpati who is represented by Aditya (the sun), etc., is designed by the day. In naming the horse Prajâpati is meant, as the lightning is manifest by manifesting a tree. The birthplace of the golden cup means here the place where it is kept. Thus the night represents the silver cup, from the likeness of the colour, or of the hind-part of the horse. Behind the horse, the cup, by name Mahima, is placed. Its birthplace is the western sea. Mahima means greatness; for it shows the opulence of the horse, that the golden and silver cups are placed on either side. These cups, under the name of Mahima, are placed around the horse. The repetition is here made for the sake of praise, viz. the Mahimas, which have those distinctions, and the horse gifted with greatness. The same praise is intended by the words: "The horse under the name of Haya." *Haya* is derived from the root Hinoti, the action of going, going in an eminent manner, unless it means a peculiar race: "It carries the gods," means either it gained the condition of a god by its being the representation of Prajâpati, or it became the carrier of the gods. But is not the office of carrying a blame? By no means; for carrying is the nature of the horse, and as by this nature it acquires an eminence, as being connected with the gods and other superior beings, it is rather a praise. In the same manner the

Second Brahmana.

There was not any thing here before : this was indeed enveloped by death, who is voracity ;

word Vāji and the other terms of the horse denote different races. The horse, under the name of Vāji, carried the Gandharvas, under the name of Arva the Āsurs, under the name of Aswa men. The sea, which represents here the universal soul, is its companion ; there is its dwelling place. The sea, its birthplace, the cause of its production. In this way the purified birthplace, or the purified dwelling-place is praised. In the waters is the birth-place of the horse, says the Sruti ; thus the sea is its well known origin (2).

The origin of the fire, required for the performance of the horse-sacrifice, will now be explained. As it is intended to describe the particulars of the fire *with regard to the horse sacrifice*, the birth of the fire is here introduced for its praise.

“ There was not any thing here before.” “ Here,” in this universe there was not anything that could be distinguished by differences of name or shape. “ Before,” viz. before the creation of the mind and other productions.

‘ Then was there not the universal void ?* For this follows from the passage of the Sruti : “ There was not any thing here,” which means there was neither an effect nor a cause. It follows also from the idea of production ; for suppose a pot be produced, consequently there is no existence of the pot before its production.’

But hence does not follow the non-existence of the cause, as is evident from the lump of earth (from which the pot is produced) ; let it be granted, that there is no existence of a thing, that is not perceived ;† let therefore the effect not exist ; this, however, does not effect the existence of the cause, as it can be perceived (before it produces the effect).

‘ No, because before the production there is no perception whatever, either of cause or effect. If then non-perception which is a

* This is the opinion of the Mādhyamikas, one of the four sects of the Buddhas. Vide p. 3.

† As an effect, which is not perceived, before it is produced by its cause.

negation, is the cause of the whole world, neither cause nor effect can be perceived before its creation ; therefore the negation of all (cause and effect) must be admitted.'

We deny this. First, because the Sruti declares: " By death was this indeed enveloped ;" for if there was nothing to envelop, and nothing to be enveloped, the Sruti could not say, this was indeed enveloped ; for there is no such a conception as the son of a barren woman, adorned with a sky-flower. And it is said, by death indeed was this enveloped ; therefore, by the evidence of the Sruti it follows both, that before the creation of the world there was a cause which was enveloping, and that there was an effect which was enveloped. We deny it secondly, by argument ; for we may know by inference existence of cause and effect before the production ; for if a real effect takes place, it must be produced by a real cause, and cannot be produced by an unreal cause.

The existence of a cause of the world before its creation is argued in the same manner as the existence of the cause of a pot and of other productions. If you* argue the non-existence of the cause of the pot, etc., from the reason, that the pot could not be produced, unless the lump of earth† and other similar things disappear,‡ we cannot agree, since earth and other substances are the *real* causes ; for earth, gold, etc., are the cause in the production of a pot, and not the peculiar shape of the lump, since, if there is not the former, (earth) there is not the latter, (the pot.) Namely, even if there is not a peculiar shape of the lump, the production of a pot and similar effects takes place from such substances alone, as earth, gold and similar causes. Therefore not the peculiar shape of the lump is the cause in the production of a pot. On the other hand, if there do not exist earth, gold and similar substances, the production of a pot, etc., does not take place ; consequently, earth, gold, etc., are the causes not the peculiar shape of the lump ; for every cause, when producing an effect, produces this effect only by concealing (making disappear

* The opponent of course.

† From which the pot is produced.

‡ *vis.*, the opponent reasons in this way : If the effect (for instar the pot) has no actual existence, the cause (the lump of earth) does not exist. If the effect has actual existence, the cause (the lump of earth) has disappeared, *i.e.*, exists no more.

its former effects, because it is impossible that from one and the same cause, at one and the same time, many effects should be derived.*

Nor does the cause disappear with its former effect: therefore the production of the pot by the disappearance of the lump, (which you say, is the cause) shows, that the lump is not the cause. If you say, 'that before the production a cause does not exist, because, independent of the lump of earth, earth and other substances have no existence,' we object: for earth and other substances do not disappear with their former effects, but are yet found in the last productions, as in a pot, &c.

If you maintain, 'that without the lump, the pot, &c., earth and other causes are not perceived,' we deny this also, because, when a pot, &c. is produced, the lump, &c., has disappeared, while the earth and other real causes are there still remaining. If you say, 'that the connexion (between cause and effect) depends upon comparison,† and not upon the permanence of the cause (in the effect);' we deny this also, for as the parts of earth that compose a lump, are found in a pot by mere perception, there is only a semblance of inference, and therefore comparison and other similar actions do not take place.

Moreover the different mode of operation in perception and inference is not incompatible, because inference, which is always preceded by perception, would otherwise have nowhere a place to depend upon.

If it be supposed, that 'all has only a momentary existence, and accordingly in a sentence: that is this, both terms refer only to a momentary existence,' it follows, that the notion of that is dependent

* For instance. The shape of a lump of earth, from which a pot is to be made, must disappear in order that the production be possible. This shape, however, is not the cause, but it is merely a former effect of the same cause, earth.

† Sankara has omitted to give the argument of the opponent, which is based upon the supposition that the relation of cause and effect can only be apprehended by comparison. A'nanda Giri supplies this as follows. All that exists is only momentary; but these modes (cause and effect) exist; therefore they are momentary. If thus the momentary existence of all that exist, has been shown, and the relation of cause and effect depends upon comparison, delusion is unavoidable.

On the notion of another that, which is again dependent on another, so that there is no stability. It further follows, that the notion "that is like this," is also impossible, (the term 'this' being dependent on a similar series) hence the conclusion is unavoidable: there is no dependence whatsoever. The connection between the two notions of that and this is also impossible, because there is no subject* to perceive them. If you say, 'there is a connection between them by comparison,' we object, because the mutual connexion of the notions of that and this cannot be understood. And if there be no connection between one object and another object, the idea of comparison cannot take place.

'Granted that all notions have no real object, what then?' You must then admit that true as well as false notions refer to objects which are objects of nothing. If you lastly say, 'this may be so,' we contradict, because, if all notions are without object, you cannot form the idea of a false notion. Hence, your opinion, that the notion of that depends upon comparison, is not true, and we therefore conclude, that the real existence of the cause before the production is proved.

This is also true with regard to the effect, on the ground of its manifestation. 'How is the existence of the effect before its production proved on the ground of its manifestation?'"†

Manifestation is the ground of this (effect)—hence manifestation means a perception dependent on a knowledge which is present; for as in common life a pot and similar things, enveloped by darkness,

* No sentient subject, no responsible being, because it would be involved in the same eternal change.

† The objection of the opponent, according to A'nanda Giri, is, as follows: If you say, that an effect is proved by its manifestation, how does the existence of the effect follow from its manifestation? for from the existence of the effect follows also its manifestation, and again you maintain, that the existence of the effect is based upon its manifestation. This is a false circle—The answer of the Vedantist is: The previous existence of an effect, which is not perceived is proved by its manifestation, which is perceived. There is therefore no false circle. The argument for the previous existence of an effect is based on this premise: All that is manifested, exists before its manifestation, as a pot enveloped by darkness.

become an object of knowledge, when the cause of enveloping has been removed by means of light, &c., and do therefore not disapprove their former existence, so also we argue the existence of this world before its production; for unless a pot exists, it cannot be perceived, even if the sun rises.

‘It certainly is not perceived by you, unless it exists. For if productions, as a pot, &c. do at any time* not exist, they are not perceived by you, if the sun even rises. If the lump of earth is not at hand, and no enveloping causes, as darkness being present, the effect will not be perceived on the ground that it exists.

We do not admit this, because there is a twofold kind of enveloping; for things that envelop an effect, as a pot, &c. are twofold; first, things which screen, as darkness, &c. when the earth and other substances are already manifested; secondly, the modification of the parts of earth and other substances in the earth *in the effect of a pot* &c. Accordingly, the perception of an effect, as a pot, although existing before its production, cannot take place, because it is enveloped (in another effect.) The distinction, however according to the common ideas of destroyed, produced, existing, not existing, is merely the twofold distinction of the ideas of manifestation and disappearance.†

‘This is improper, because the lump, the two halves of the pot,‡ &c. are different from any thing that envelops; for any screen, as darkness, which envelops any production, as a pot, &c., appears something different from the pot and similar things, while the lump or the two halves do not appear different from the pot. Therefore

* Reference is here made to the past and future time; for if, says Ananda Giri, an effect, that is destroyed, or that is to be, did exist like a present effect, it would be also perceived. This, however, is not the case, and therefore the argument is not correct

† By the disappearance of the half, a pot is destroyed; by removing the lump and other enveloping things it is manifested; its manifestation by means of a light, &c. is its existence; its disappearance by means of the lump, &c. is its non-existence.

‡ To understand the following, it is necessary to know that the usual way among the Hindus to make a pot is, first to form two separate parts, the Kapâlas, the halves of the pot, and to join them afterwards in the middle.

your assertion, that a pot, which is in the state of a lump, or of the halves, is not perceived, because it is enveloped, is improper, because it is different from the idea of enveloping.*

We do not agree, for, *on the one hand*, milk and water (when mixed) and similar things, appear in an identical state, although the water and similar things are enveloped by milk, etc. *On the other hand*, if you say, that 'there is nothing which envelops, because the parts of a half that is ground to dust are contained in the pot,' etc., we deny this; for if the different parts are in another effect, there is evidently an enveloping. There must, however, be an effort to remove what envelops, because the pot and other effects, which are in the state of the lump or of the halves, are not perceived in consequence of their being enveloped, and accordingly a person, who is desirous of any production, as of a pot, must direct his effort to destroy what envelops it, and not to the production of the pot. This, however, does not exist, and it is therefore improper to say that there is no perception of a thing which exists, because it is enveloped.' We deny this, because it is against the rule in practice; for the manifestation of a pot, etc., does not take place only by an effort to destroy obstacles, as is evident from the effort to produce a light, if a pot and other productions are enveloped in darkness. If you say, 'that this is done to destroy darkness, viz., that the effort made

* This objection is based upon the supposition, that the thing, which is enveloping, is not identical with the thing, that is enveloped by it, as for instance, darkness is not identical with any thing that is enveloped by it. Therefore, the opponent argues, the lump of earth can not envelop a pot or any other production, because both (the lump and the pot) are identical. The refutation of this is twofold, according to a distinction in the term identical, viz. the assertion that the enveloping thing cannot be identical with the thing enveloped, means either, that it cannot be identical as to its appearance in space, &c or not identical as to its cause. The first is refuted by the fact, that the contrary takes place, for instance when milk and water are mixed, water, which is enveloped by milk, is perceived as one and the same with the milk, which could not be the case, if the thing that envelops must be different from the thing that is enveloped. The second is refuted on the ground, that different effects in one and the same cause are separated from each other, and do therefore not destroy each other.—A. G.

to produce a light, is merely made to let darkness disappear, and if the darkness is destroyed, the pot is* manifested by itself; for there is nothing (no obstacle to the sight) in the pot,† we do not grant this because the perception takes place, when the pot is manifested; for as the manifested pot is perceived by means of a light, so it is not before the light is employed. Therefore the light is not for the means to destroy the darkness, but rather for the means of manifesting the pot, because the perception takes place by manifestation. Sometimes there may be an effort also to destroy what envelops, as in the destruction of a screen,* etc., but on this account it is not the rule. A person who wishes the manifestation of any thing, must make an effort to destroy all that envelops.

This follows also from the success of a work, if done in accordance with its rule. We said, that an effect, which abides in the cause, is an obstacle to another effect. If then an effort is made to destroy an effect, which was before manifested, for instance a lump, or the two halves which were *before* concealed by the lump,† then is produced an effect which is called splitting or grinding, etc. A pot, which is enveloped by such effects, is not perceived, and requires therefore another effort; hence a person who wishes the manifestation of a pot, can only be successful, if the needful action of producing a pot is used by him. Therefore the effect exists even before its production.—This follows also from the distinction of the ideas of past and future. It is only reasonable, that the ideas of “there was a pot” and “there will be a pot,” like the idea of “there is a pot,” do not refer to an object that does not exist.—It also follows from the actions of any one, who is desirous of a future production; for nobody would act with regard to a desire of things that have no existence.—It follows also from the truth of the knowledge of the Yogis, with regard to past and future *events*. If a future pot were not an existing thing, divine knowledge, from immediate perception with regard to a future pot, would be false. We do not take notice here of an effect, which is perceived at the

* That is to say, when the screen, darkness, is removed, there is no obstacle to its manifestation.

† That is to say, which were before in the state of the lump; for this is a previous effect of the same cause (earth).

present time; for we granted *before* inference for the existence of an effect *which has been, or which is to be.*—This also follows from the impossibility of the contrary. When potters are engaged in the fabrication of a pot, it is evident by this proof that the pot is to be; for if with any time the future existence of the pot is connected, then to connect with that time a not existing pot, is a contradiction; for a pot, that is to exist, does not exist, means, it is not to exist; it is the same, as if it be said: This pot now before us does not exist.—Further, let potters be engaged in the fabrication of a pot, and let it be said, the pot does not exist before its production. If then the meaning of the word *not existing*, is, that the pot does not exist in the same manner, as potters and other artisans, who are engaged in their work, exist, then there is no contradiction. Why not? Because the pot exists in its own form, which is to exist; for neither the existence of the lump, nor of the half, is the existence of the pot; nor is their future existence the future existence of the pot. Taken in this view, when potters are engaged *in making a pot*, there is no contradiction in the idea of a pot which does not exist before its production. If you, however, prohibit the idea of the condition of the pot as a future production, there is a contradiction; but you did not prohibit this; for with every action is not only existence or futurity connected (but also the past). Further among the four privations,* the mutual privation with regard to the pot is perceived as something different from the pot, as the negation of the pot may be for example cloth; but it never can become *the negation of a pot* itself; for the negation of a pot for instance, cloth which exists, is never something negative but something positive. If this is the case, then all the other negations, *viz.*, antecedent negation, destruction and absolute negation,

* Negation or privation is of two sorts, universal and mutual. Universal negation comprehends three species, antecedent, emergent and absolute. Antecedent privation is present negation of that which at a future time will be. Emergent negation is destruction, or cessation of an effect. Absolute negation extends through all times, past, present and future. Mutual privation is difference. It is reciprocal negation of identity, essence, or respective peculiarity. (Col. M. E. Vol. I. pp. 288, 289.)

which may take place with regard to the pot, are something positive, different from the pot itself, because they have the same connection with it as the mutual negation. In this manner refer all negations to something positive. If this is the case the antecedent negation of the pot does not mean a negation of the pot itself before its production. Therefore if you say, "the antecedent negation of a pot," you must acknowledge the (existence of the) pot itself, or you could not connect it with the genitive case (of the pot). If you say, 'it is connected with it by a rhetorical figure, as if one speaks of the *body* of a stone figure,' yet, if you pronounce such a sentence as the negation of a pot, the connexion of the rhetorical negation is with the pot, and not with the nature of a pot (then the negation is only artificial negation and not the real negation of the pot.) If you say, 'that the negation of a pot is something different from the pot,' then we must refer you to the answer we have given before.

Further, before the production of a pot, there cannot be a connection of the pot which does not exist with its cause which exists, which is, as if you would give horns to a hare, because the connection is always mutual. If you say, 'there is no fault in our case, because the connexion is only an accidental one,' we object, because even an accidental connexion cannot take place for elements, of which the one exists, the other not exists; for with regard to two elements that exist, either the necessary, or accidental connexion may take place; but it does not take place for elements, of which the one exists, the other does not exist, or for elements, of which either does not exist. It is therefore proved, that the effect exists before its production. The Upanishad now explains the nature of death, by whom this (universe) was enveloped by the words:

For voracity is death. He created this mind, desiring: May I have a soul. He went forth worshipping. From him when worshipping, the waters were produced. He then reflected: To me, when worshipping, water (Ka) was produced. For the same reason fire obtained the name of Arka. Happiness is indeed produced for him, who in this manner knows the nature of Arka. (1)

“Who is voracity.”* The desire to devour is voracity—this is death, for voracity is the true definition of death. By death then whose nature is voracity, *this universe* was enveloped. How is voracity death? The answer is: “For voracity is death.” The meaning of the word “for” is, that [the reason is well known; for he who desires to devour, kills according to his voracity the living creatures. Consequently death is represented* by voracity; Voracity as a desire is a quality of the soul in its modification as intelligence; therefore this Hiranya Garbha, in his modification as intelligence, is called death. By this death was this effect enveloped, as a pot and other productions are enveloped by earth in its modification as a lump. “He created this mind;” the abovementioned death, by the desire to create the productions, afterwards to be specified, made the so-called mind, capable to reflect on his creation, *viz.*, the internal sense, which is possessed with the faculty to ascertain knowledge, and with other faculties. For what purpose did he create the mind? The answer is: “May I have a soul,” may, by the soul, in its modification as mind, I have mind. Prajâpati, possessed with mind by the manifestation of mind, having adored himself, said: I have succeeded. “From him,” from Prajâpati, “when worshipping, the waters,” the element whose quality is taste, “were produced,” as the embodied parts of this devotion, that is to say, he created the water after the production of the sky and the other two elements,† as it accords with the authority of another passage of the S’ruti, and the improbability of a reverse order of the creation. “He then reflected, when worshipping, (Archate) water (Ka) was produced for me.” For the same reason, the death was called Arka, Arka or the fire, in its connection with the sacrifice of As’wamedha, obtained the name of Arka; for the second appellation of fire is Arka. The name of Arka, as derived from Archana, which means to worship for one’s welfare, or as derived from its connection with water, denotes a quality of fire. To him who in this manner, as has been mentioned, knows the nature of Arka, water, or happiness (the word Ka is used for both) is indeed, of a certainty, produced (1.)

* Vid. p. 12.

† Air and fire, Taittareya Upanishad. l. 2.

Or the waters are Arka. The froth of the waters, which was there, became consistent. This became the earth. On *the creation* of this he became fatigued. The splendour, the exudation of him, when he was fatigued, heated, was poured out as fire. (2.)

"Or the waters are Arka." Who is again called Arka? The waters, the embodied part of the devotion, are Arka, as produced from Arka or fire. As it is said in the S'ruti: And in the waters is placed the fire. But they are not directly called Arka, because this is the proper place to describe the fire, but not the water. And afterwards it is also said: This fire is Arka, "The froth of the waters, which was there," like the cream of curdled milk, "became consistent;" the froth of the waters, heated from within and without by the generative splendour, became consistent, "became the earth." The meaning is, that from these waters the *mundane* egg sprung forth. "On this," on the production of the earth, "he," death, Prajâpati "became fatigued;" for every body, after the performance of work, gets fatigued, and it is the great work of Prajâpati to create the earth. What does it mean that he got fatigued? From the body of Prajâpati, when fatigued, heated, distressed, his creative splendour as exudation, his substance was poured out? It is Prajâpati as the Biraj (who is throughout splendour) within the egg, the first-born, containing within himself the whole organism of productions. He is the first embodied soul, as it is said in the Smṛiti (2).

He made himself threefold, A'ditya as the third, Vâyu as the third. This life parted threefold. His eastern quarter is the head. The quarters on either side are the arms. Then his western quarter is the tail, the quarters on either side are the thighs, the south and north the flanks, the sky the back, the atmosphere the belly; this *earth* the breast. This fire is placed in the waters; for whatsoever one repairs, there he is placed. This results from the knowledge of the wise. (3.)

This Prajâpati, when born, divided his own self, the organism of all productions, threefold. How threefold? besides Agni and Vâyu, he made A'ditya as the third to complete the number of three; in the same manner, besides Agni and A'ditya, Vâyu as the third, and also besides Vâyu and A'ditya, Agni as the third, according to their equal power to fill up the number of three. This Prajâpati, the life of every individual in the world, was divided threefold according to the nature of Agni, Vâyu, and A'ditya, especially according to his own nature as death, without giving up the nature of Virâj. This first-born fire, as Arka in its connection with the ceremony of the As'wamedha, this fire as Virâj, which is purified according to holy rite, is also represented under the symbol of a horse; for, we said, the whole origin, as above mentioned, is narrated for his praise. Thus is his sacred origin. "His eastern quarter is the head," both being alike by their excellence. "The quarters on either side," viz., the quarters of Isâ and of A'gnéyi, "are the arms." "Then the western quarter of the fire is the tail," viz., the part of the hip and loins, as being opposite to the front part. "The quarters on either side," viz., Vâyu and the seasons, "are the thighs," being like to the corners of the back; "south and north the flanks," being like by their connexion with the two former quarters. "The heaven the back, the atmosphere the belly, as in the former description; "this earth is the breast," both being alike by their position downwards. "This fire," being like Prajâpati, or the fire as the substance of the worlds and of the other created beings, "is placed in the waters." As another passage of the S'ruti says: thus are all these worlds within the waters. "For wheresoever any body repairs, there he is placed" there he gains his abode. Who? He who thus knows the nature of the fire, which in the manner described is placed in the waters; for this is the fruit of his knowledge. (3)

He desired: Let a second self of me be produced. By his mind he created speech, created union, viz., the devourer, death. The seed which there sprang forth, became the year. For the year was not before him; he was conceived for the space of such time. After the time, which is contained within the space of a year, he created him. When he was born,

he opened his mouth against him. He cried. Thus was speech produced. (4.)

"He desired" who? Death. He by himself, according to the successive order of creation of the water and the other elements, created himself within the egg, as the Virāj, as Agni, containing the organism of all productions. He also made himself threefold, as it was said. How was his activity, while he created? The answer is; "He," death, "desired." What? Let a second self of me," a body, by which I am possessed with a body, "be produced." Having thus desired, he created, by his before created mind, speech viz., speech representing the three Védas; he created the union of speech with the mind, that is to say, he reflected in his mind on the creation of the three Védas in their successive order. Who? Death, represented by voracity, as it is said death is represented by the desire to devour. This is here repeated, in order that it be not connected with another. "The seed," the generative seed both of knowledge and ceremonies, the cause of all productions of Prajâpati, the first embodied soul which (seed he perceived by his contemplation of the Védas, "which there," in that union, "sprung forth, became" (being conceived in the form of an egg, after he had entered with this generative seed the water, which he had created in accordance with his recollection of its (the water's) production in a former birth) "the year." This means, Prajâpati, the framer of the period, called a year, became the year. "For the year was not before him," before Prajâpati, the framer of the annual period. As long as the duration of a year is, so long a time was Prajâpati, the framer of the annual period, conceived. What did he do after the completion of this time? "He created him,"—which means, he broke the egg. When the babe fire, the first embodied soul, was thus born, death in accordance with his voracity, "opened his mouth against him" to devour him, upon which the babe, according to his natural ignorance, afraid and cried. "Thus was speech produced" the sound of speech produced. (4)

He reflected: If I kill him, I shall have only little food.
 On this reflection he created by that word in union with that

soul all this is whatsoever, the Rig, the Yajur, the Sāma Vedas, the metres, the sacrifices, mankind, the animals.

He resolved to devour all that he had created in this manner; for he eats all, therefore he has the name of Aditi. He is the eater of this whole universe, this whole universe is his food. He, who thus knows him in his nature as Aditi, will obtain the reward of this knowledge. (5)

“He reflected” When death saw the terrified babe crying in such a manner, he reflected: “If I,” however desirous of eating, kill at any time this babe, “I shall have only little food.” On this reflection he abstained from eating him; for much food is required for eating a long time, not a little; for by eating this boy, there will be only little food, as by the eating of the seed there will be want of corn. After having thus reflected on the necessity of abundant food, he created by the union of the before-mentioned threefold speech with the soul, the mind, the whole moveable and immoveable universe, “all this whatsoever,” viz. the Rig, Yajur, Sama Vedas, the seven meters, viz. the Gayatri and others, the three kinds of Mantras which are the parts of the body of the Stotra Sastra, with their Gayatri and other metres, the sacrifices to be performed by Mantras, mankind, as the performer of sacrifices, and all the wild and domestic animals, necessary for the performance of the sacrifices. “How is it possible, that he created by the threefold speech in its union with the mind, the Rig and the other Vedas when it was said before, that he created them in this manner?” There is no fault in this. The union which the mind has with the three Vedas, does not exist as manifested, and the creation is the manifestation of the existing Vedas by their application to ceremonies. ‘He,’ Prajapati, being thus aware of the increase of food, “resolved to devour all that he had created,” all the actions, the cause of actions and the effects of actions. Death is therefore called Aditi, because he eats all; for Aditi, is derived from Atti, he eats.—Thus it is said in a Mantra: “Aditi is the sky, he is the atmosphere, he is mother and father.” He is the devourer of the whole world, considered as his food, by being the universal soul; otherwise there would be a contradiction; for no individual can be the eater of the universe. Therefore he is—

the universal soul. "This whole universe is his food." Therefore it is consistent that all becomes his food, because he, as the universal soul, is the eater,—he who in the aforesaid manner knows this state of Prajāpati, death, or Aditi, viz. this state, according to which he eats every thing will have such a reward. (5)

He desired: Let me perform again the great sacrifice. He became fatigued. He performed penance. When he was fatigued, when he had performed penance, glory and power departed. Life is glory, power; therefore, when life had departed from his body, his body assumed a swollen appearance; there was yet mind within his body. (6)

"He desired," this is said for the purpose to give the description of the horse and the horse-sacrifice. "Let me perform again the great sacrifice." The word again refers to his former birth; Prajāpati made the sacrifice of a horse in his former birth. With this recollection he came again at the [commencement of the *present* Kalpa.* Being impressed with the recollection of the ceremonies, the performer and the reward of the horse sacrifice, he desired: "Let me again perform the great sacrifice," and after he had thus desired the great work, he became fatigued like all other people. "He performed penance." When he was fatigued, when he had performed penance, as in the former description,† glory and power departed. The explanation of the words glory and power is given in the Upanishad itself; life, viz. the organs of sense, are glory, as being the cause of glory, for by the means of them renown is gained. In the same manner is power in this body; for if life is extinguished, no glory, no power is possible. Therefore the organs of sense are like glory and power in this body; thus that glory and power of life departed from his body. When the organs of sense the cause of glory and power, had departed from the body of Prajāpati, it presented the appearance of turgescence; and was unpurified. "There was yet mind in his body," although deserted by Prajāpati, in

* Kalpa, a renovation of the universe, one of the great periods, from the renovation to the destruction of the world.

† Vide p. 24.

the same manner as the mind dwells on a beloved object, however distant it may be. When he thus remained in the body as mind, what did he do? (6.)

He desired: Let this my body be pure. Let me have a self by this body. Hence it became a horse, because this became swollen. *And because* it became pure, therefore the ceremony gained the name of the As'wamedha. He, who thus knows the As'wamedha, knows also him.

He knows the As'wamedha, who knows him in this manner. Having left it unrestrained, he considered himself as the horse. After a year he slaughtered it for his own sake, he gave up the animals to the gods. Therefore they slaughter the purified animal, representing in its nature as Prajâpati all deities. He is the As'wamedha who shines. His body is the year. This fire is Arka. These worlds are parts of his self. They in such a manner are Arka and As'wamedha. They are again one divinity, death. He thus conquers the second death. Death does not obtain him. Death becomes his soul. He becomes one of those deities. (7)

The answer is: "He desired." What? "Let this my body be pure," worthy of the sacrifice. "Let me have a self," let me have a body by this body." Thus he entered this body. "Because this," this body by my separation from it, destitute of glory and power, became swollen (Aswad) for this reason it became a horse (As'wa) Hence the name of horse (As'wa) is evidently intended for the praise of Prajâpati in this ceremony. Further "because" that which was before impure (Amedhya) without glory and power, by his entering again "became pure" (Medhya,) worthy of sacrifice, "therefore" the ceremony bearing the name of As'wamedha obtained the name of As'wamedha; for the nature of the sacrifice is to have ceremonies, a performer and effects. This is like Prajâpati. That the horse, by which the sacrifice is accomplished, is to represent Prajâpati, is evident from the words of the S'ruti: "The dawn is the head of the sacrificial horse," etc.

The present passage, however : " He knows the As'wamedha," is commenced, in order that the worship of the sacrificial horse, as an emblem of Prajapati and also of the fire, as it has been described, both of which are equal as being the sacrifice and effect, should be established. This view is obtained first, because in the former passage no verb, enjoining the action, is met with, and secondly because the rite (of the As'wamedha) requires such a verb.* " He knows the As'wamedha, who knows him," viz. the horse and Arka in his nature as fire, in this manner, he knows the As'wamedha, none beside, which means, that it should therefore be known in this manner. The Upanishad now explains, why *Prajapati* is represented under the symbol of an animal. When *Prajapati* had desired : ' Let me again perform the great sacrifice,' and had represented himself under the emblem of a sacrificial animal, he considered himself as the horse which he left unrestrained viz. without rein. After the completion of a year, " he slaughtered it for his own sake," by his nature as *Prajapati* representing all deities. " He gave up the animals," all the other animals, wild and domestic, according to the deities which they represent, " to the gods." Because *Prajapati* considered himself as the horse, " therefore " any other person, who, according to the beforementioned manner represents himself under the emblem of an animal, of the sacrificial horse, will thus think : Let me as the representative of all deities, being purified, slaughtered, be the divinity of myself. Let the other wild and domestic animals, according to the deities of which they are symbols, be slaughtered for the other divinities which are my parts." In accordance with this, the priests slaughter at present the purified animal which in its nature as *Prajapati* represents all deities. " He is the As'wamedha who shines." He who is thus the sacrifice which is performed by the means of animals, is *also* described as the visible reward, in the words : " He is the As'hwamedha." " Who ? He who " shines," viz. *Savitri* (the sun)

* A'nanda Giri supplies here the defect in the argument ; for, says he, a verb enjoining the action, has been mentioned in the former passage by the words ' He who knows the nature of Aditi.' The rite or action which is by this established, he continues, refers however, only to a worship of secondary order ; here on the contrary, is the rule of the chief worship established.

who manifests the world by his splendour. "His body," viz. the body of him who is at the same time the reward and the sacrifice, "is the year," because his revolution is performed within a year.* And because the sacrifice which represents him, is only performed by means of fire,† the reward is described by the symbol of the sacrifice. This terrestrial fire, Arka, is the cause of performing the sacrifice, "These worlds," these three worlds, "are parts of his self," of the body of this Arka, which is called Chiti, when applied at the sacrifice. Thus it was before said: "His eastern quarter,"* etc. "They," the fire and A'ditya, "in such a manner," as they are described, "are Arka and As'wamedha," the sacrifice and the reward. Arka, the terrestrial fire, as the visible action, is therefore described as like the sacrifice, since the sacrifice is accomplished by fire. And because the reward (Savitrī) is the effect of the sacrifice, it (the reward) is described by the emblem of the sacrifice. Therefore it is said, A'ditya is the As'wamedha. "They," cause the effect, sacrifice and reward, Agni and Aditya, "are again one divinity."† This is death. Being before also one, he was divided to correspond to the division into sacrifice, performer and effect, as it was said: "He divided himself threefold." He becomes again in the time, when the ceremonies are accomplished, one divinity, viz. death representing the reward. Whosoever again knows him, the As'wamedha, death as one deity in this manner:—I am thus death, the As'wamedha, one deity; the state of this is gained by me as being like the horse and the fire,—"he conquers the second death," that is to say, once having died, he is not born again for the second death. Doubting whether death, although conquered, would still not get him again, it is said: "Death does not obtain him." Why? "Death becomes his soul," the soul of him who knows death in this manner. Or death being thus the reward, "he becomes one of those deities."‡ This is his reward.

* The sacrifice is also performed in the space of a year.

† Life, according to A'nanda Giri.

‡ Savitrī and Arka (sun and fire.)

Third Brāhmaṇa Udgitha* Brāhmaṇa.

Twofold indeed is the offspring of Prajāpati, the gods and the demons.† Therefore the gods are thus few in number, the demons many. They rivalled in these worlds. The gods of a truth spoke. Let us now in this sacrifice overcome the demons by the Udgitha.

What is the connexion of the words; "Two-fold indeed is the offspring of Prajāpati?" The highest reward of ceremonial works, accompanied with knowledge, has been mentioned, *viz.*, the state of death is the reward of the As'wamedha. Therefore the Udgitha Brāhmaṇa is now commenced to expound, from whence‡ the origin of ceremonial works and knowledge which lead to a state identical with death, is derived.

If it should be said: 'The state of death has been before declared as the reward of the beforementioned knowledge and ceremonies.§ Now it will be asserted, that the reward of the knowledge and the ceremonies of the Udgitha is to overcome the condition of death. Therefore, since the reward is different, it is of no use to explain the origin of the former ceremonies and knowledge.'

We answer, there is no fault in this; for as the reward of the Udgitha is the condition of Agni or A'ditya, it is the same reward which has been mentioned for the former ceremonies and knowledge

* The Udgitha, a part of the Sāma Veda (second chapter) is a kind of song, commencing with the mystic syllable Om, which the priest called Udgāta, sings at the Soma Yāga. The Soma Yāga is the general name for seven distinct rites, *viz.*, Agni Stoma, Atyagni Stoma, Ukthya, Shorasi, Vājapea Atirātra and Aptoryāma, where the Soma, or moon plant juice is offered. 6th Chap. of A'swalāyana's Sūtras.

† The same narrative, which here is given at the commencement of the Udgitha to show the power of life and its unity with the supreme soul, occurs in the Chāndogya Upanishad, first Adhyāya, first Prapāthaka where it is also used as an introduction to the Udgitha.

‡ This source of all ceremonies and knowledge is the all-pervading life, as described in this Brāhmaṇa.

§ As reward of the As'wamedha, performed either symbolically, or in reality.

in the words: "He becomes one of those deities." "Is it then not contradictory to say, that he overcomes death?"* No, because the overcoming of death means here to be liberated from the contact of innate sin.

To explain the meaning of the questions: Who is that death which is the contact with innate sin? Whence is his 'origin? By whom is he overcome and how? a narrative is given, commencing with the words: "Two-fold indeed." The word "indeed" is used to remind of a former state, *viz.*, it reminds of the state of the present Prajâpati in his former birth. The offspring of Prajâpati," means offspring in a former birth. Who are "the gods and the demons?" The organs† of Prajâpati, speech and the others. How again is the divine and demoniacal nature of the offspring? The answer is: The gods (Deva) who derive their name from manifesting (Dyotana) are such as are dedicated to knowledge and works, in accordance with the Sâstras; the demons Asura) as are dedicated to works and knowledge, the necessity of which is visible, in accordance with natural perception and inference. They are different from the gods or Suras, because they are satisfied within their own life,‡ and also because the knowledge and works of the demons are directed to visible wants. "Therefore the gods are thus few in number, the demons many; for the desire of the organs to act in accordance with natural knowledge and works is stronger than the desire to act in accordance with knowledge and works, derived from the Sâstras, because the necessity of the former is evident. Therefore the number of the gods is less, because the desire to act in accordance with the Sâstras, is less *strong*; for it can only be accomplished by excessive exertion. "They," the gods and the demons, being alike the parts

* *Viz.*, he who performs the Udgitha, overcomes death, while the reward of the As'wamedha has been stated as death.

† I remind here, that the number of organs, according to the Vedanta, is eleven, *viz.*, the five organs of sense, sight, etc., five organs of action, speech, the hand, etc., and the internal organ, the mind. Here, however, the organs of Prajâpati, refer only to speech, smell, sight, hearing and mind, *viz.*, to those which are required for the performance of the Udgitha.

‡ Asu here in the sense of vital air, life; it means also fire, reflection.

of the body of Prajāpati, rivalled with each other for the sake of the enjoyment of these worlds, which may be obtained by actions and knowledge either in accordance with one's own nature, or in accordance with the Sāstras. The contest is for victory or defeat, of the nature of the gods or demons. Sometimes the nature of the organs in accordance with knowledge and works derived from the Sāstras, is victorious. When it has the ascendancy, then the demoniacal power of the organs which refers to visible wants, and proceeds from knowledge and works in accordance with perception and inference, is defeated. This is the victory of the gods, and the defeat of the demons. Sometimes the reverse takes place, the nature of the gods is defeated, that of the demons is victorious. When the gods are victorious, then, by the prevalence of virtue, an ascension ensued up to the obtaining of the state of Prajāpati. When the demons are victorious, then, by the prevalence of vice, a descension ensues down to the state of inanimate matter. When both are alike, then the state of man is obtained. "The gods," who by their own small number and the greater number of the demons, were defeated by them, of a truth spoke: "Let us in this sacrifice," *viz.*, the Jyoti-Stoma,* "overcome the demons by the Udgitha," by taking refuge to the agent of the rite, called Udgitha. By defeating the demons, we shall obtain our own divine nature, as manifested by the Sāstras. Thus they spoke to each other,

To take refuge to the nature of the agent of the rite, called Udgitha, knowledge and works are required. The work consists in the recital of some (afterwards to the mentioned) Mantras, and will

* The Agnistoma is a modification of the Jyotistoma, a sacrifice, offered by a person who is desirous of obtaining the enjoyment of heaven. The time of the sacrifice is spring season. The performer is a Bráhmaṇ who has read the Vedas and entertains the sacred fire. The offering is the Soma (moon-plant) juice, and the deities to whom the offering is made, are India, Váyu, etc. The number of priests required to reform the rites, is sixteen, *viz.*, four Hotás (who read the Mantras of the Ríg-Veda), the same number of Adhwaryus (who recite Mantras of Yajur Veda), of Brahmas (who superintend and direct the rites of the sacrifice), and of Udgátas (who sing the Mantras of the Sáma Veda.) Each of the priests of the four divisions has again a separate name and office. The ceremonies continue for five days. S'abda Kalpa Drúmi.

be established by such passages of the Yajur as: "Let him recite those māntras." The knowledge will now be determined.

'But is this not rather Arthavāda,* as concluding the rite of reciting the Abhyaroha,† than an attempt to define knowledge?' No, because it is said in the S'ruti: "He who thus knows." 'But then it has the object to establish the rite of Udgitha, because in the topic of Udgitha it is authorized by the ancient narrative *commencing with the words: Two-fold indeed is the offspring of Prajapati.*' No, because it does not belong to this subject; further, because the Udgitha is established in another place;‡ further, because the rite of reciting the Abhyaroha is applied in two ceremonies§ and is therefore not invariable: further because the knowledge must be applied by a person who is perfect in his knowledge, and is declared invariable; further because the S'ruti says: "He who overcomes this world," etc., further, because life is declared pure, speech and the other organ, impure; for if life were no object of worship, it could not have been declared pure, nor speech, and the other organs which are mentioned in the same passage with life, impure; for by the reproof of speech, etc., the praise of the principal life is evident, as it was also intended.'

* A kind of praise The opponent reasons in this way. The Udgitha is Arthavāda, a kind of praise, and accordingly not knowledge; for praise of the deities does not contain a true knowledge of their nature and qualities, because it is merely offered for the purpose to make them propitious. A. G.

† Some Mantras of the Yajur Veda, recited by a person who is desirous of obtaining a divine state, as Ananda Giri explains: *Dévabhāvam anéna āróhati, iti Abhyaróha.*

‡ In the Karma Kānda.—A. G.

§ There are two classes of ceremonies, the Havir Yāga. (Havir a kind of oblation, usually clarified butter.—*Wilson Dict.*) including seven distinct ceremonies, viz., Agnyādhan, Darsapurna Māsa, Chatur Māsa, Pashu Bandana, etc., and the Soma Yāga, also including seven classes of rites, which have been mentioned before (page 29). The rite of the Udgitha, which is performed by the Udgāta, is only performed in the Soma Yaga, while the Abhyaróha is included in either of the two classes. On this account it is said, the Abhyaróha, as occurring in two places, is variable and is therefore no object of knowledge, as the Udgitha is

Lastly, because such and similar rewards are declared as: He who overcomes death, gets resplendent; for a state which resembles that life, for instance the state of the goddess of speech, when like Agni, is the reward.

‘Let then the worship of life be granted, but no purity and similar qualities. If we say, this purity, etc., follows also from the Sruti, we reply: it does not, because, as assigned in the act of worship, it is evidently intended as praise.’ (Arthavāda.)

We do not admit this; for, as in common life, by acquiring an object that is not contrary to our wishes, we acquire happiness; for in common life a person who obtains an object that is not contrary to his wishes, gets his desire, or he turns from the undesired object; but this is not the case by obtaining an object, contrary to our desires. Thus in our case also, by obtaining an object in accordance with the words of the Sruti, we evidently obtain happiness, not otherwise. Moreover, there is no proof against the truth of the object of knowledge, arising from the word, which is mentioned for the sake of worship. Nor is there stated any impediment of the said knowledge. Therefore by proving, that we have acquired happiness, we also acquire the truth of the object of knowledge; otherwise we evidently acquire an unreal object, contrary to his idea, for instance a trunk instead of a man, or an enemy instead of a friend, has evidently obtained something unreal. If in this way, the notions of the soul of Īśvara,* and of the gods in accordance with the Sruti, were not true, then we should obtain by the Śāstras something illusive. If this were the case, it be known, as in common life: but this is not admitted.

‘This is not true, because Brahma is represented by differences of name, form, etc.; but such distinctions are evidently excluded from the nature of Brahma. In this perception of Brahma† the Śāstra is guilty of the same contradiction, as if a man is perceived as a trunk.

* Īśvara the Supreme ruler. The soul in which the universality of ignorance or of unconsciousness, is inherent, and which has the attributes of omniscience, omnipotence . . . which is the cause of the world, is the universal ruler. *Vedānta Sāra*. p 5.

† This is to say, if Brahma is perceived, or comprehended by such distinctions.

Therefore we deny that with your obtaining the truth by the S'ashtra, you also obtain happiness.

We do not admit this argument, on the ground that there is the same distinction, as it is with regard to an image. For your assertion, that the perception of Brahma by such distinctions, as name, form, which are excluded from the nature of Brahma, etc., is in the same way contradictory, as if a man is perceived as a trunk is not right. Why not? Because by the distinctions of Brahma, who can not be perceived by name, form and other properties; the perception of Brahma by name, form etc., is established in the same way as the perception of Vishnu by an image and similar things. The perception by name, form, etc., is like the image, a mere appliance; for Brahma is by no means name, form, etc. The perception of Brahma by such distinctions, as name, form, etc., is by no means in the same way contradictory, as if a trunk, before it is ascertained as such, is perceived as a man.

If you say, 'that there is only a perception of Brahma, but Brahma himself does not exist; for the *perception of Brahma by name, form* etc., is just like the representation of Vishnu and other gods by an image, or of the forefathers by a Brahman,* we object; for the Rig and the other Vedas are represented under the form of the earth and other substances, that is to say, they are represented under the form of substances that really exist. Consequently, as the representation of Brahma, Iswara, etc., under name, form, etc., is the same with that just mentioned, the reality of Brahma, Iswara, etc., is proved. Hence also follows the objective reality of all those modes of perception, by which Vishnu and other gods are represented by images, or the forefathers by Brahmins.

This (the existence of Brahma, Iswara, etc.) follows also from the necessity, that every thing that is derived, depends upon the thing from which it is derived; for as in the five fires† the fire is only something derived, and hence proves the existence of an underived fire, so is the nature of Brahma in its distinctions of name, form, etc. only

* The Brâhman who eats at the Srâddha the food intended for the manes, is a representative of them.

† Here the Vedic fires, by which the ceremonies the householder has to perform, are accomplished.

something derived, and hence proves the existence of an undervied Brahma.

This follows also from the fact, that there is no difference between the passages of the Sruti referring to ceremonies, and those referring to knowledge; for as the ceremonies of the Dars'apaurna Masa have their peculiar reward, their special rites, and a disposal of their parts in a certain order, and as by means of this a transcendent thing which cannot be proved by perception or inference, is taught in its true nature by sentences of the Veda, so also such beings, as the supreme soul, I'swara, the gods, etc., who by their nature exclude the idea of corporeal composition, who overcome death, and who have these and other distinctions, are taught by sentences of the Veda, that is to say, by proofs different from perception and inference, and it is therefore right that they should be true.

Nor is there a difference in passages of the Sruti referring to ceremonies, and in such referring to knowledge, as to the formation of the true notion of them.

Likewise is the notion (Buddhi) whose object is the supreme soul and the like substances, neither indefinite nor contradictory. If you say: 'This is improper, on the ground that knowledge is no object of ceremonial practice. We may grant, that any rite which has the three parts above mentioned,* although it is beyond common evidence, may be communicated by ceremonial practice through sentences, explaining the ceremonies; but it is not so with the knowledge of the supreme soul, I'swara and the other substances, in which there is no possible object of ceremonial practice. Therefore the part of the Sruti explaining ceremonies, and the part referring to knowledge, have nothing in common.'

We do not admit this, on the ground that knowledge has objective reality; for the truth of that knowledge does not depend on its possibility to become an object of ceremonial practice, the rites of which have those three parts, and can be performed,—but on its possibility to be obtained by proof. Nor has a notion whose object is that knowledge, reality, because it can become an object of practice, but because it can be derived from sentences of the Vedas.

* These three parts are: special reward, special rites, and special arrangements.

If you say : ' Admitting the truth of the substance (Brahma) obtained by sentences of the Vedas, it is either an object of ceremonial practice, or it is not so. If it is such an object, it can be practised ; if otherwise, it cannot be practised. As an object of practice, however, it is not proved by the evidence of sentences ; for there is no connexion of words with a sentence unless there is a ceremonial practice. On the other hand, if it is an object of practice, there is also a connexion of words for the sake of the ceremonies. Therefore a sentence, dependent on practice, may be proved, as for instance : This, in this manner, is by this person to be performed, but, words, as, this, by this, thus, how many so ever you may string together, would never form a sentence, unless they be connected with such as : let, do, may be done, etc. Therefore the supreme soul, I'swara, etc., cannot be proved by sentences, And if you say, it can be proved by the meaning of the words, we reply, that in this case another kind of proof is necessary.* Therefore this Brainha does not exist.'

We do not admit this argument, on the ground that there are sentences which do not require any action *to be intelligible*, as for instance, there is the four-coloured Meru ; for if this sentence is pronounced there arises no notion referring to any possible practice with regard to Meru. If this is the case, how is it possible to prevent a connexion of words in a sentence, expressing the idea of the supreme soul, I'swara etc., with the word " exist," in the usual mode of connexion between subject and predicate. If you say, 'this is inadmissible, because the knowledge of the supreme soul has no final end, as the knowledge of Meru, etc., has,' we deny this, for the reward is mentioned in such passages of the Sruti, as : " He who knows Bramha, obtains liberation," and : " The bonds of the heart are broken," etc.

* I believe this to be the correct translation of the above passage, and the sense would be as follows : If you assume, that the supreme substance can be proved by the meaning of the words (Padārtha, the single words, in distinction from the whole sentence, Vākya : you have abandoned, your argument, which was, that it should be proved by the Vedas ; for the meaning of words or ideas does not depend upon the Vedas, but upon their own contents, and requires therefore an investigation, different from the present.

The same is evident from the ceasing of the ignorance and other faults which are the origin of the world. And since the knowledge of Brahma does not depend upon any other *knowledge*, it [§] cannot be considered as Arthaváda* (praise) as for instance, a special reward is declared by the use of the Juhu †

Moreover the connection of prohibitions with punishment is learnt from the Veda, which is also no object of practice. Nor is there, with regard to a forbidden object, any thing required but to refrain from an action ; for prohibitory regulations depend in reality upon the knowledge that a certain thing is not to be done. If a hungry man, whose mind is impressed with the notion of food, forbidden on account of its nature or of accidental circumstances, falls in with poisoned‡ meat, or with impure§ rice, and the idea arises in him, that the one is capable, and the other not impure, he is restrained *from eating* by the recollection, that food of this or that kind is forbidden to be eaten. The same is the case with regard to thirst, when a mirrage produces the appearance of water. When by the knowledge of the real nature of a thing, the natural knowledge that is opposed to the former, has been removed, no longer remains the injurious desire to eat what is forbidden by its nature or accidental circumstances. There is a cessation from the desire which is caused by such an opposite knowledge, and if that desire does not exist, no effort is again to be made. Hence it is evident, that the prohibitory regulations depend upon the knowledge of the true nature of things and not in any way upon the practice of a person. If this is true, then also in our case the regulations, respecting the true knowledge of the supreme soul, etc., are founded solely upon the knowledge of the supreme soul itself. In this manner, when the worldly knowledge, produced by one's own nature, is removed by the recollection of the

* Every praise depends upon a regulation, to which it supplies the motive,

† Juhu means a spoon of leaves, to the use of which in ceremonies in preference to any other kind of spoon, a special reward is attached.

‡ Poisoned meat is the meat of an animal, wounded by a poisoned weapon.

§ Rice, etc. is impure by the touch of a person who has committed the murder of a Bráhmaṇ, or similar crimes.

little knowledge of the supreme soul and of similar substances, a person, whose mind is impressed with the knowledge of Bramha, has not any desire, caused by a knowledge, contrary to that of Bramha, because he knows that those desires have no real object.

'The eating of poisoned meat having an undesirable (unreal) object and there being at the same time a recollection of the knowledge of the real nature of a thing, we may grant, that the natural knowledge, contrary to the former, which refers to its eating, is abolished; yet we must contend, that the absence of a desire to perform what is commanded by the S'astra, is not admissible, because there is no object of prohibition, as there is such an-absence of a desire to eat meat as before described.'

We deny this: for there is in reality no difference between the cause of the contrary knowledge and of the cause of the desire of an undesirable object. As the desire to eat poisoned meat, etc., is caused by a false knowledge, and is the cause of danger, so it is also with regard to the desire of what is commanded by the S'astras. Accordingly, a person who perfectly knows the reality of the supreme soul, has consistently no desire for any actions commanded by the S'astras, because all such desires are the causes of false ideas and of danger, and because by the knowledge of the supreme soul, the contrary knowledge is abolished.

'This may be granted for the above mentioned prohibitions and commands, but it cannot be granted for the regular ceremonies; for these are solely produced by the S'astra and not directed to an unreal object.'

We do not agree; for the regular ceremonies are merely commanded on behalf of such persons who are tainted by ignorance, passion, hatred and other faults; for as ceremonies whose object is the special desire, as those of the Dars'a Purna Masa, are commanded on behalf of a person who is tainted by the fault of desiring heaven etc., so are the regular ceremonies enjoined on behalf of a person who is stained by the fault of ignorance, the cause of all unreality, stained by love and hatred, etc., in obtaining the good and avoiding the evil, in accordance with the impressions of ignorance, and who is anxious to obtain the good and avoid the evil of his indiscriminate desires, caused by love and hatred; hence they (the regular ceremonies) do not merely refer to the S'astras. Nor can it be ascertained,

whether the Agnihotra, Dars'a Purna Masa, Chatur Masya, Pasu Bandha and Soma, are by their own nature regular ceremonies, or ceremonies, whose object is a special desire; for their reference to desire only arises, when they have found an agent, who is tainted with the desire of heaven, etc. Therefore the regular ceremonies behoof to one who is tainted with the blame of ignorance, etc., and who is desirous to obtain the good and to avoid the evil, pointed out to him by the promptings of his own nature. On the other hand, for one who has the true knowledge of the supreme soul, no action is found to be commanded, except the subduing of his desires; for by the annihilation of the knowledge concerning all other motives, as ceremonies, causes, divinities, etc. the knowledge of the soul is established. And the knowledge with regard to actions, performer, etc., being once annihilated, there does not arise a desire of any action, because this only takes place, if preceded by a knowledge of a special action, a special motive, etc.; for there is no time to engage into actions for him who has the firm idea of Brahma, remove as it is from all notions of space, time, extension, duality, etc.

If you say 'there is the same time, as if one is about to eat,' we deny this: there is no necessity to engage in eating, etc., all which acts are only necessary in consequence of ignorance and other faults; for if an action is sometimes performed, and sometimes not, it cannot be called a regular action that has been fixed according to a rule. Because eating and other actions are merely done in consequence of faults, there is no certain rule for them, as there is no certain rule for desire and their objects, faults being sometimes prevalent, sometimes subdued. Hence, however, does not follow any uncertainty for regular actions, because time and other circumstances have been fixed for them by the S'âstras.

If you lastly say, 'even granted, the faults, etc. are the mediæ cause of actions, (as eating, etc.) still there may have been fixed a time to engage in such actions, as eating as according to the command of the S'âstra for ceremonies like the Agni Hotra, the times of morning and evening are appointed,'—we do not agree because rule and action cannot be substituted for each other, *viz.*, a rule is no action, and an action no rule,—hence no objection remains against the supposition of knowledge. Consequently, in accordance with the rule of true knowledge of the supreme soul, which (knowledge)

has the power to destroy its contrary knowledge of extension, duality, etc., the reality of the rule by which all actions are forbidden, is established; for the absence of any engagement in actions is the same, as if there were a prohibition. Therefore as the prohibitory regulation of the S'astra is proved, so also the supreme soul, as produced by the S'astra, and as the sole object of the S'astra, has been proved. 1

The gods then said to speech: "Do thou for our sake sing the Udgitha." Speech, with the words: "Let it be so," sang the Udgitha for them. She sang to the gods all the enjoyment that is in speech. That she speaks well, is for herself.

The *demons* knew, by this Udgitha the gods will overcome us. Therefore, running up to him, they pierced him with their sin. That is this sin. That one speaks improper words, is the sin. 2.

"The gods then," after having thus considered, said to Speech, to the tutelary goddess of speech; "Do thou for our sake sing the Udgitha," perform the ceremony of Udgitha; for they considered the ceremony of the Udgitha to be performed by the goddess of speech, and moreover by Mantras like this: "Do thou lead us from evil to good," her as the goddess called Japamantra. In this ceremony speech and the other organs are pointed out as the agent of internal worship and external rites. For what reason?* Because their own

* In assigning devotion and rites to the agency of speech and the other organs, an objection may be made, on the ground that all agency depends according to the S'astra upon the soul. If this is the case, it depends either on the supreme soul, or upon the soul in its modification as life. Not on the first; for agency, etc., depending upon speech and other organs to which active power must be ascribed; cannot be assigned to the soul, which considered in itself, is wholly without such a power. Moreover, all activity is the effect of ignorance, which is totally opposed to the supreme soul. Not on the second, because life is only the general idea of the senses, and has therefore in reality no agency. Hence it is correct to assign agency and similar notions to the active senses. A. G.

objects and all intercourse concerning knowledge and ceremonies, are in truth only possible by their agency; for by the passage in the sixth chapter* of this *Upanishad*, "it thinks, as it were," "it proceeds as it were," it is evidently declared, that the soul has no agency. In the end of this chapter also it will be proved, that these three, name, form and action, as resulting from work, performer and effect in their unmanifested state, are object of ignorance. That, however, which is different from all unmanifested things, and which bears the name of the supreme soul, and is without name, form and work, will by such negations, as: it is not this, it is not this, etc., be proved as something distinct, to be comprehended under a different notion. But the mundane soul† the existence of which, as arising from all the senses considered as one, is only a fiction, is plainly shown as arising from those senses, considered as one, by such passages as: Arising from these elements it is also destroyed with them." Therefore it is right to assign to speech and the other senses the reward, obtained by their being the agents of knowledge and ceremonies.

* Vide 6th chapter, 2nd Bráhmaṇa, 7th Khandika.

† There are, according to the Vedānta, four sheaths or cases of the soul. The first is the intelligent case (Vijnánamaya Kos'a) and is formed by intellect and the five intellectual senses. The second case is the mental (Manomaya) and consists of mind (Manas) with the five organs of action, viz., speech, hand, foot etc. (I may here observe that Colebrook, in stating, (M. E. p 372,) that the mental sheath consists of the intellect, joined to the five senses and the mind is not quite correct, as it is mind joined with the five organs of action.) The third is the vital case (Pranamaya Kos'a) formed of the five vital airs, or faculties, (respiration, inspiration, circulation, etc.) and the five organs of action. The three cases united compose the subtle organism of the soul, which therefore comprehends 17 elements, viz., intellect, mind, the ten organs, and the five vital airs. This subtle organism is inseparable from the soul, as long as it has to undergo transmigration; considered as one, it is universal organism, and the soul, to which this universality is ascribed, is Hirányagarbha. (*Vedānta Sāra*, pp. 8—10.) In our passage the mundane soul means Hirányagarbha, the soul which has the three cases, and is therefore in actual relation with the world. The last case is the nutrimental (Annamaya) which is composed of the gross elements.

Speech, being addressed by the gods, with the words : Let it be so, performed for them, for the sake of their imploration, the Udgitha. Which is again the special work which speech by the ceremony of Udgitha for the sake of the gods? The answer is : " All the enjoyment," which means, all the assistance of speech and all the other organs, which by means of speech is obtained in the intercourse of speaking ; for the reward of all is the enjoyment, derived from speaking words, &c. It describes this enjoyment in three Stotras, called Pāvamāna, and in the nine remaining Stotras it assigns the reward of the Ritwig, as authorized by the Upanishad,* by the words : " That is speaks well," that it pronounces well the letters, " is for itself," for me ; for the special work of speech is the entire pronounciation of letters ; therefore it is mentioned, " that it speaks well ; but the effect of speaking as to the assistance of all, is for the sake of the sacrificer.

At that time (when the Udgitha was performed) by the contact which takes places between speech and the well speaking, an opportunity was obtained by the demons of entering the deity like a hole.† " The demons knew." What? " By this Udgitha the gods will overcome us," viz. natural knowledge and work, by the light of the Udgitha, which is knowledge and work in accordance with the Sastra. " Therefore," being aware of this, " running up to him," to the performer of the Udgitha, " they pierced," worried him with their sin, viz. the sin of contact, which means, they allied him with their sin. " That is this sin ;" " that," the sin which was not cast by the demons upon the speech of Prajapati in his former birth, " is this sin," which becomes manifest. Which is the sin? " That one speaks improper words," viz, words contrary to themselves, forbidden by the S'astra,

* *Viz.* The Ritwig, or priest, [who performs the ceremonies, is not entitled to a reward for himself, because his services are hired, and all the good resulting from [the ceremonies, will be obtained by the sacrificer. Hence the special reward here mentioned,] does not follow from the sacrifice, but from the word of the Upanishad. A. G.

† This means, the deity of speech, having spoken well for its own sake, commits the sin of contact, of the connexion of a desire with external objects. Therefore by this sin an opportunity is given, as it were, a hole of the deity, to pierce it with their sin,

by which induced, one speaks indecorous, hateful, false and the like words, even against his own inclination, "is the sin," known by its beforementioned effect, viz., the speaking of improper words, which is found in the speech of the intelligent creatures of Prajapati, which being implied by the speaking of improper words, is also in the speech of Prajapati; for the effect is of the same nature as the cause. 2.

Then they spoke to the breath : Do thou sing the Udgitha for us. The breath, with the words : 'Let it be so,' sang the Udgitha for them. It sang to the gods all the enjoyment that is in breath. That it smells well, is for itself. The *demons* knew, by this Udgitha the gods will overcome us. Therefore running up to him, they pierced him with their sin. That is this sin. That one smells improper odours, is the sin. 3.

Then they spoke to the eye : Do thou sing the Udgitha for us. The eye, with the words : 'Let it be so,' sang the Udgitha for them. It sang to the gods all the enjoyment that is in the eye. That it sees well, is for itself. The *demons* knew, by this Udgitha the gods will overcome us. Therefore running up to him, they pierced him with their sin. That is this sin. That one sees improper colours, is the sin. 4.

Then they spoke to the ear : Do thou sing the Udgitha for us. The ear, with the words : 'Let it be so,' sang the Udgitha for them. It sang to the gods all the enjoyment that is in the ear. That it hears well, is for itself. The *demons* knew by this Udgitha the gods will overcome us. Therefore, running up to him, they pierced him with their sin. That is this sin. That one hears improper sounds, is the sin. 5.

Then they spoke to the mind : Do thou sing the Udgitha for us. The mind, with the words : 'Let it be so,' sang the Udgitha for them. It sang to the gods all the enjoyment that is in mind; that it imagines well, is for itself. The *demons* knew, by this Udgitha the gods will overcome us.

Therefore running up to him, they pierce him with their sin. That is this sin. That one has improper notions in the sin. In this manner the deities came in contact with the sin, were pierced with sin. 6.

When the gods had in this manner successively examined, whether by the performance of the Udgitha the deities were fit to be manifested by the Japamantra, and to become objects of devotion, they were convinced, that speech and the other deities whom they had successively examined, were unable to perform the Udgitha ; for by contact, which is their connexion with the special work which they well performed, they were allied with the sin of the demons. Therefore they are not meant by the Mantra : " Do thou lead me from evil to good ; nor are they worthy to be worshipped, because they are not pure, and inferior to the principal life. In the same way as the deity of speech, &c , the deities of touch and of the other organs, although not especially mentioned in this passage, were pierced with sin by the manifestation of good and evil works, which means, they were allied with sin. Thus speech and the other deities, although gradually worshipped, were unable to protect from death, 3—6.

Then the gods spoke indeed to this life whose name is A'sanya : ' Do thou sing the Udgitha for us.' That life, with the words ; ' Let it be so,' sang the Udgitha for them. The demons knew. by this Udgitha the gods will overcome us. Therefore running up to him, they wished to pierce him with their sin. As a clod of earth, by falling upon a rock is destroyed, so they were also altogether destroyed. Hence, they became gods ; the demons perished. In this manner he becomes like him. By the soul perishes the enemy, the brother's son, of him, who thus knows. 7.

" Then the gods spoke indeed to this, (the word " this" is used to show respect) life, whose name A'sanya," which means, produced in the mouth, which abides in the inner cavity of the mouth : Do thou sing the Udgitha for us. The principal life, with the words : ' Let it be so, sang the Udgitha for the gods who had invoked its protection. This and what immediately follows, is all alike the former

description. when the demons, desirous of piercing life with sin, in accordance with the practice which they had acquired by repeatedly entering speech and the other organs, attacked by their sin of contact the principal life which was free from sin, they became destroyed. To show how, an illustration is given. As in common life a clod of earth which is thrown upon a rock to reduce it to dust, is destroyed, reduced to dust itself, so were the demons in different ways destroyed. By this destruction of the demons, speech and the other organs became free from the sins, which are the effect of the natural contact, and obstacles to their divinity; and obtained their own nature by the protecting power of the principal life which is free from contact. What did they obtain? The nature of fire, &c. in accordance with their own divinity, which (nature) will be explained hereafter, and which they had already before possessed. In this state, when their knowledge was darkened by their natural sin, they had a notion of an individual body alone. The meaning is: By the separation from that sin, they left off the notion of an individual body, obtained a notion of the nature of speech, &c. in its identity with fire, &c., as it is delivered in the S'astra. Moreover their opponents, "the demons, perished." Perished means, they were destroyed. "*in this manner* he (the present sacrificer) becomes *like him*" (the ancient sacrificer) this means: As the former sacrificer,* described in the ancient narrative,—when he had comprehended the meaning of the Sruti pointed out in this narrative, when he in the order mentioned in the Sruti, had examined speech and the other deities, and abandoned them, because they are tainted with the sin of contact, when he had known by the idea of the soul the principal life free from sin, and abandoned the idea, that the soul is different according to *the differences of* the individual bodies, as speech and others, which are believed to be the soul, *as the former sacrificer* obtained the nature of the present Prajapati, as manifested by the S'astra, which is the notion of the body, as Viraj,† and which exhibits speech in its nature as fire,—so the present sacrificer obtains the state of Prajapati in the same manner. "By the soul," in its modification of Prajapati, his sin, contrary to the nature of Prajapati, "the brother's son, perishes;" for the son of a brother, like Bharata and others, may be also

* The sacrificer in a former birth.

† Vide page 23.

not an enemy; but the sin produced by the contact of the senses with their objects, is at the same time a brother's son and an enemy; because it does not acknowledge the nature of the supreme soul. This sin then perishes, is reduced, to dust, as a clod of earth, by its contact with life. Whose is this reward? The answer is: "He who thus knows," which means, who thus, like the ancient sacrificer, comprehends life by the notion of the soul. Having described the reward, the Sruti, now shows the reward in the form of the narrative.* And for what reason? To prove, that the principal life, after the deities of speech, etc, have been rejected, is *alone* to be worshipped by the idea of the soul, on the ground, that it is the common nature (soul) of such separate substances, as speech, &c., the Sruti goes on in the narrative. 7.

They spoke. Where was he, who thus established us? He is within the mouth; hence he is Ayâsya. *He is* Angirasa, because he is the essence of the members. 8.

"They," the organs of Prajapati, having, by means of the principal life, obtained their divine nature and their reward, spoke thus: "Where then," the word where shows their reflection, "Where then was he who thus established us," that is to say, united us by the true notion of the soul with our divine nature, which was before separated from us; for whosoever is assisted by some body, remembers his benefactor. In the same manner the gods, when they had remembered their benefactor, had reflected on him, perceived him in the soul, which is the whole of cause and effects. Why is he within the mouth? Because he is evidently in the ether of the mouth (A'sya), as everybody will find on reflection. Thus also the gods. Life is called Ayasya, because, excluding all distinctions of the nature of speech,

* Ananda Giri explains this so:—As the reward, following from the worship of the principal life has been set forth, the next word of the Upanishad; "They spoke," etc., refer to a special worship of life. S'ankara says therefore, "Having described [the reward," which means having described the reward [following from the worship of the principal life, he is to show the worship of life, endowed with special qualities.

&c., it was perceived by the gods within the internal ether ; therefore is life like Ayasya, since opposed to all distinctions, it united the organs, as speech, etc., with their divine nature. Hence it is called also Angirasa, the essence of cause and effects ; for Angirasa is a compound of Anga and Rasa,—Anga meaning members, causes and effects, and Rasa essence, substance ; the whole meaning therefore is the substance, upon which causes and effects depend. It is the essence of every thing, because, unless it were present, all would become without effect. The meaning of the whole is :—Life, as the essence of causes and effects, and as annihilating all distinctions, is the common essence of causes and effects, and also purified ; accordingly life, without further reference to speech, &c., is to be considered under the idea of the soul ; for the soul can but be perceived by its own notion, since good is obtained by a notion that is not contradictory ; otherwise evil is obtained. 8.

The name of that deity is Dur ; for death is far (dur) from it. Far is death surely also from him who thus knows. 9.

If it be thought, that the purity of life has not been proved, we ask, is not this notion (of the impurity of life) removed, since life is no place for the sin of contact, as speech and the other organs are by well speaking, hearing, smelling, &c. ? 'This may be so ; but since it is called the essence of speech and the other organs as diffused through all, there is an apprehension that impurity may ensue through speech and the other organs, as it does by touching a person who has touched a corpse.' To this the Sruti answers : "Life is pure." Wherefore ? "The name of that deity is Dur" (far.) The demons, coming in contact with life, were destroyed, as a clod of earth is by a stone. This is the deity which, abiding in the body of the sacrificer of the present time, has been found by the gods as abiding in the mouth. It is a deity, because it is an object of devotion. Because its name is Dur, (Duriti,) its purity is proved by the name of Dur. Whence again comes the name of Dur ? The Sruti answers, because death, viz. sin, which is defined by contact, is far (dur) from that deity of life. Duriti, as the name of life, shows its purity, because death, although placed near, is yet removed from life, which by its nature is free from contact. The reward

of the wise is then mentioned, viz. "Far is death surely from him," from him means from the person who knows in the above described manner. Therefore he worships thus the true life which is pure. Upâsanâ (worship) is derived from Upa, which means, Manasa upa âyamyâ (having perceived by the mind) the nature of a deity in the same way, as by passages of the Sruti in the Arthavâda (praise) it is made known as an object of worship—and from A'sana which means continued reflection without interposition of worldly notions until the idea is manifested, I am that deity, just as in the common notion, I am a man. This is evident from such passages of the Sruti, as: "Having thus become a god, he goes to the gods," and "What god art thou in the eastern quarter?" 9.

This deity then, after having destroyed the sin of the deities, viz., death, made him depart, where the end is of the quarters. There it fixed the abode of the sins of the deities. Hence let no one repair to the outer people; let him not follow sin, death. 10.

"This deity then." Is it said, that death is far from it, but why again is death far from him who thus knows? The answer is, because death is opposed to a knowledge of such a kind; for sin, which is produced by the contact of the senses with their objects, is opposed to a person, who has the notion, that life is identical with the soul. He is at variance, because he has the notion, that the soul is different according to the differences of speech, &c., and because his knowledge is produced by his own nature. On the other hand, the notion, that life is identical with the soul, is produced by the S'âstra. In consequence it is proper to say, that sin is far from one who has such a notion of life, because both are opposed to each other. Therefore by the words: "This deity," the S'ruti shows the said meaning to be sin, the death of speech and the other deities: for every body dies by the sin produced by contact of the senses with their objects in accordance with his natural ignorance. Sin is therefore called death. Life, by the sole notion of its identity with the soul, destroyed the death of the deities who had the notion of the identity of life with the soul, and is therefore

called the destroyer. Sin then is removed from a person who thus knows by his being at variance with it. What did life again, when it had destroyed the sin, the death of the gods? The answer is: "Life made him depart, where the end is of the quarters," viz. of the eastern and the other quarters. But as there is no end of the quarters, how can life make him depart there? The word "quarter" is made for the purpose to designate the abode of the people possessed of the knowledge of the Vedas; the country therefore, inhabited by people who do not follow the Vedas, is called the end of the country, the desert. Accordingly, there is no blemish in the expression. The deity of life made depart there the sins of the deities, and by contempt fixed in various ways their abode among the outer people, who are without knowledge of the identity of life with the soul.

For he is by his nature produced by the contact of the senses with their objects, and is therefore dependent upon the living creatures. Hence let them not go to the outer people, not approach them by intercourse in words or other actions. By intercourse with them, intercourse is made with sin; for he is made with sin; for he is the place of sin. The meaning is:—Let none repair to his abode which is defined by the end of the quarters, although it may not be inhabited by the people, nor to that people, although it may be far from that country. 10.

That deity destroyed the sin, death, of those deities. Then life, having overcome death, saved them. 11.

By the words; "That deity," the reward is mentioned, which for speech, &c., results from the knowledge, that life is the soul, which reward is to acquire the nature of fire, &c." "Then life, having overcome death, saved them." This means: Life is called the destroyer of sin, death, because sin, death, which causes the separation of the soul from life, has been destroyed by the knowledge that life is one with the soul. Therefore this life, having overcome the natural sin, or death, saved them, which means, caused the deities of speech and the other organs to gain their divine nature as fire, etc., which is not separated from them (after the destruction of death). 11.

Life, having overcome death, saved the first speech. When speech, having overcome death, was liberated, it became fire. That fire, having become free after its separation from death, shines forth. 12.

Then life, having overcome death, saved the smell. That smell, having overcome death, became wind. That wind having become free after its separation from death, purifies. 13.

Then life, having overcome death, saved the eye. When the eye, having overcome death, was liberated, it became A'ditya. That A'ditya, having become free after its separation from death, burns. 14.

Then life, having overcome death, saved the ear. When the ear having overcome death, was liberated, it became the quarters; the quarters after their separation from death, are made free. 15.

"Life saved the first speech;" first means the principal, which is more efficacious than any other organ to perform the ceremony of the Udgitha. The nature of speech, which was saved, after death was overcome, is thus described: when speech, after sin or death was overcome, had been liberated, it became fire, which means, speech was fire, before it became united with death, and became fire again after its separation from death; so great is its difference after its separation from death. This fire, when released, shines forth after its separation from death. Before its liberation being allied with death, it was not shining, as it is at present; now again after its separation from death, it shines forth. 12.

In the same manner the sense of smell became air, wind, liberated from death, purifies. All the particulars are as before. 13.

Thus the eye became A'ditya. He burns. 14.

Thus the ear became the eastern and other quarters. 15.

Then life, having overcome death, saved the mind. When the mind, having overcome death, was liberated, it became the moon. That moon, having become free after its separation from death, is resplendent. In this manner that goddess

having overcome death, saves *the recent sacrificer*. Whosoever thus knows obtains his due reward. 16

Then life for its own sake praised by the Udgitha the primeval food ; for whatever food is eaten, the same is eaten by life. On this it subsists. 17.

Mind is resplendent as moon. As the deity of life, having in its identity with speech, &c. as fire, &c. overcome death, saved the former sacrificer, so she saves also the present one. He, who knows that, life is the same with speech and the other four organs in their state as fire etc., obtains the state of life, which he has worshipped, be it as fire, air, etc. 16.

"Then for its own sake," that is to say, as by speech and the other organs for their own sake praise was offered, so also by the principal life, when it had praised in the three Pavamana Stotras the reward which is the state of Prajapati, common to speech and the other organs, it praised it in the nine remaining Stotras food for its own sake. The connexion of desire with the agent is authorized by the Upanishad, as has been mentioned before. How again must it be understood, that life praised the primary food for its own sake ? To explain this, the cause is mentioned in the words : "for whatever," etc. The word food means here common food ; for whatsoever food in this world is eaten by any living individual, "the same is eaten by life." Prana (life) with the preposition Pra is derived from Ana. Ana, with a final s (Pranas) means cart, with a final vowel (Prana) life. The meaning is : this is eaten by life. And the primary food is not only eaten by life ; but life subsists on it, when it is transformed into the substance of its (life's) own body. Therefore the primary food is praised by life for the sake of its own subsistence. All that is eaten by life, is for its own subsistence ; therefore the sin, which arises from the contact with the excellence of performance, is not in life, as it is in speech, etc., 17.

The gods spoke : 'All this is *only* so much. Whatsoever food there is, is praised by thee for thy own sake. Let us eat of that food.' *Life answered* : 'Do enter me.' They with the words . 'Let it be so,' every where entered life. There-

fore whatsoever food is eaten 'by life, satisfies them. Him enter his own; he is the preserver of his own, he is pre-eminent; he walks before, he is an eater of food, he is the lord paramount, who thus knows. He, who against one who thus knows amongst his own becomes a rival lord, is not able to support his dependents. On the other hand, whosoever becomes a follower of such a one, and whosoever, following him strives to support his own dependents, he is able to provide for them. 18.

"The gods." 'But is it not improper to assert, that the food was thus eaten *merely* by life, since it is evident, that food is also the cause of the support of speech? etc. There is no fault in this, because the support is obtained by the means of life. How again is the food supplied by life, in support of speech and the other organs? To explain this, it is said: "The gods, (Deva) speech and others, (they are called gods, Deva, because they manifest their own nature,) "spoke" to the principal life. "All this is only so much;" hence there is no more than this. "Whatsoever food," the cause of the support of life, is eaten in the world, "is praised by thee for thy own sake," which means, is transformed by thy praise into thy own substance. We also are unable to subsist without food; therefore let us afterwards for our own sake eat of thy food. Life answered: 'All of you, if desirous of food, every where enter me.' When life had thus spoken, they surrounded and entered life with the words, 'Let it be so.' Thus the good food, the support of life, which is eaten by life, satisfies speech and the other organs which entered life by its command; but by their own will they have no connexion with food. Therefore it is proper to assert, that food is eaten merely by life. "Therefore" Because the deities of speech and the other organs, by taking refuge to life, had entered life, in accordance with its command, "therefore whatsoever food people eat by life, the same satisfies them," viz., speech and the other organs. Whosoever knows that life is the support of speech, etc., and also knows that the five organs depend upon life, "him enter also his own," his relations, as speech and the other organs enter life, which means, he is the supporter of his

relations. "He is the preserver of his own," who have entered him, by his own food, as life is of speech, etc. Thus "he is pre-eminent." "He walks before," he has the precedence, as life among speech, etc. "Thus he is an eater of food," which means, he is without disease. "He is lord paramount," and to guide them he becomes their preserver as independent lord, as life of speech, etc. He "who thus knows," *viz.*, life, will obtain the above mentioned reward. "But he who against one who thus knows," *viz.*, who thus knows life, "amongst his own," amongst his relations, "becomes a rival lord," like the demons who strove against life, "is not able to support his dependents." On the other hand "whosoever amongst his relations becomes a follower of such a one," of a man who has that knowledge, as speech and others were of life, "and whosoever, following such a person, strives to support his own dependents," as speech and the other senses, following life, strove to support themselves, "is able to provide for them," not any other who acts on his own will. 18.

He who abides in the mouth, is Angirasa ; for he is the essence (Rasa of the members (Anga.) Life is the essence of the members ; for life is the essence of the members ; therefore for the reason, that any member, from which life has departed, becomes dry, life is the essence of the members. 19.

All this is declared to be the reward, resulting from the knowledge of the qualities of life. To establish the idea, that life is the essence of causes and effects, life is named A'ngirasa. Before it was said : "This (life) is A'ngirasa ;"* but there was no reason assigned, why it is A'ngirasa ; to explain this reason, it is now said : "He who abides within the mouth, is A'ngirasa." For it depends upon this reason that life is the essence of causes and effects ; afterwards the dependence of speech and the other organs upon life is stated. How is this dependence to be proved ? To answer this, it is said : "He who abides within the mouth is A'ngirasa." Hence it is taken according to its former description. The next essence : "Life is the essence of the members," is to remind of the meaning that has

been explained before. How is life the essence of the members ? The answer is : " For life ;" the word 'for' is used to show, that the essence of the members is well known, It is well known, that life is the essence of the members, but not that speech and the other organs are the essence. Therefore, it is proper to remind of this by the words : " Life is." How it is again well known ? To answer this it is said, " therefore." The word " therefore," which conveys the idea of conclusion, must be connected with the last part of the sentence. " For the reason that any member, from which life has departed, becomes dry," without essence, " therefore " this is the conclusion, " life is the essence of the members." Hence, it is evident, that life is the substance of causes and effects, because when it is not there, dryness, death, ensues. Therefore all living creatures live through it. Therefore in preference to speech and the other organs, life is an object of worship. This latter is the meaning of the whole deduction. 19.

This is also Brihaspati. Speech is Brihati. Life is the preserver (Pati) of Brihati ; therefore it is Brihaspati. 20.

" This is." Life is not only the substance (soul) of causes and effects which have become forms and works, but also the substance of the Rig, Yajur and Sama Vedas which have become words. By the praise of life as the soul of all, it is exalted for the sake of worship. " This," well known " Angirasa " is also Brihaspati. Why ? The answer is : " Speech is Brihati," the Vedaic metre Brihati, com-posed of thirty-six syllables. Further, Anustup is speech. Why ? Because it is said in a passage of the Sruti : " Speech is Anustup." And this Anustup, which is like speech, is contained in the Brihati metre.* Therefore it is proper to declare it as a well-known fact, that " speech is Brihati." Moreover all the Mantras of the Rig Veda are contained in the Brihati, because life is praised as Brihati, as a passage of the Sruti says : " Life is Brihati." " Let it be known, life is the Rig," says another passage of the Sruti. Further : The Rigs are

* The Anustup, of 32 syllables, is contained in the Brihati of 36 syllables, as the smaller in the larger number.—A. G.

included in life, because]they partake of the nature of speech. To prove this, it is said: "This life is the preserver of this speech, Brihati, Rig, because it produces the Rig; for the Rig is depended upon the wind, produced by the digestive action of the stomach. Lastly, life is the preserver of speech for, preserving it; for speech is preserved by life, because without life (breath) it is impossible to pronounce a sound. Therefore Brihaspati² is the [life, substance of the Rigs, This] is the meaning of [the] whole. (20)

This is also Bramhanaspati. Speech is Bramha. Life is the preserver (Pati) of speech; therefore life is Bramhanaspati. 21.

Life is also substance of the Mantras of the Yajur. Why? "This is also Bramhanaspati. Speech is Brahma," that is to say Yajur, which is a kind of speech. "Of this," speech, Yajur, Bramhana, "life is the preserver" (Pati.) Therefore it is called Brahmanaspati, as before. How again is this known? The answer is Brihati and Bramha mean the Rig and Yajur, not any thing else; for since at the conclusion of this subject it is said: "speech is Sama," it is evident that the Sama Veda is the same with speech. In the same manner, if speech is Brihati, speech Bramha, and both therefore the same with speech; it is proper to maintain, Rig and Yajur are Brihati and Bramha, for they are remaining; for as the same is mentioned [last, the remaining two must be the Rig and Yajur. This follows also from the difference occurring in speech; for Rig and Yajur are different kinds of speech. Therefore it is right to say, that they are the same with speech. And also from the fact that *if this were not the case*, there would not be any distinction between them. The word: "The Sama is the Udgitha," clearly shows the use of a distinct name. Therefore it is also proper to employ the distinct names of Brihati and Brahma; otherwise, if distinct names were not fixed, there would be no sense. Further if special name of them were a mere sound, there would be a reception of the same.* And the names of the Rig, Yajur, Sama, Udgitha, are also successively mentioned in the Sruti, 21.

* *Vix*, Speech is speech.

This is also Sâma. Speech is Sâma. Sâma is Sá and Amas. Therefore the Sâma has the nature of Sâma.— Because it is like (Sama) a bee, like a gnat, like an elephant, like these three worlds, like this all, therefore again it is called Sâma. He obtains unity of nature with Sâma, or unity of place who thus knows this Sâma. 22.

"This is also Sama." Why? The answer is: "Speech is Sa," viz., whatsoever is included in the feminine gender, is Sa, speech; for the demonstrative pronoun Sa denotes all that is included in the feminine gender. In the same manner, this life is Ama, viz., Ama means all that is included in the masculine gender. How hast thou obtained my masculine names? The answer is: By life. How hast thou obtained my feminine names? By speech, as another passage of the Sruti says. Both, the names of speech and life are included in the sound of Sama. Accordingly the name of Sama means a song, consisting of the whole of the letters, *words and sentences*, and depending upon life; therefore the name of Sama is nothing else but a compound of the names of life and speech, because letters, etc. is produced by and dependent upon life. "This life is Sama" and "speech is Sama." Because the repetition of Sama shows, that Sama partakes of the nature of speech and life, viz., as compounded of the words Sa and Ama, "therefore the Sama," viz., the songs, which consist of the whole of the letters, *words and sentences*, must be comprehended under this idea of Sama. The connexion of the next sentence is: Because it is like" (Sama) all which is afterwards mentioned, "therefore again it is Sama."—The word "again" shows the possibility to explain *the meaning of Sama* in another way by the term of Sama (like). In what way is the likeness of life assumed? The answer is: It is "like (Sama) a bee," viz., the body of a bee, like a gnat," viz., like the body of a gnat, "like an elephant," viz., like the body of an elephant, "like these three worlds," viz., like Prajapati, whose body is the three worlds; "like this all," like Hiranyagarbha, whose form is the world, which is entirely found in all individual bodies, in the bee as well as in all others, as the idea of cow is found in all individual cows. This is the likeness (identity) of life. Again, this identity is not merely found in the different bodies in proportion to their size, because life has no shape and is everywhere; nor is the

identity in the individual bodies an identity of contraction and expansion, as a light contracts in a jar and expands in a palace ; for the Sruti says : " All these are like, all are without end." There is, however, no contradiction between its being everywhere and its being limited to a certain size in the *different* bodies. He, who thus knows the life whose name is Sama, under the idea of Sama (identity), viz., *the life*, whose greatness is declared in the Sruti, obtains this reward, viz., " he gains unity of nature (Sayujya)* with Sama," viz., with life, that is to say, unity of body, organs and knowledge, or unity of place, that is to say, the same world, according to the power of his meditation, viz., he who knows Sama, life, who meditated on it, until the knowledge of the identity of life with the soul became manifest. 22.

This is also Udgitha. Life is Ut ; for by life all this is upraised. Speech is Githa. It is Ut and Githa, therefore it is Udgitha. 23.

"This is also Udgitha." The name of Udgitha means *here* neither a portion, a special division, of the Sama-Veda nor the portion, referring to songs (Udgana) because the Udgitha is included in the description of the Sama, *which means here life* (Sa-Ama). Why *then* is life Udgitha ? The answer is : "Life is Ut ; for by life is all this," the universe, "raised up" (Uttabdha) that is, supported. The name Ut, which elucidates the meaning of Uttabdha, shows a quality of life. Therefore, in accordance with the single words in the compound of Udgitha, Ut means life, and Githa speech. This Githa, after the meaning of the ~~name~~ derived from Ga (to sing) is speech ; but with the exception of the sound Githa (song) there is nothing in any part of the Udgitha *which refers to singing*. Therefore the assertion, *that life is Udgitha*, is proper, viz., Ut is life, and Githa speech, dependent upon life ; both terms, thus compounded in one term, form Udgitha. 23.

* Sayuja, a kind of salvation, of which five kinds are stated. 1. Sálókya, the abode in the same world. 2. Sárshti, equal prosperity. 3. Sámipya, vicinity. 4. Sárupya, likeness of form. 5. E'katwa, unity or identity of nature.

There is also a narrative : Bramhadatta, the grandson of Chikitâna, when drinking the resplendent *soma juice*, spoke : 'Let this resplendent *juice* cut off the head of this *man*, if Ayâsya ug irasa performed the Udgitha by any other than this.' Therefore he performed the Udgitha by speech and life. 24.

To show the firmness of the just explained meaning, a narrative is commenced with the words : "There," that is, with regard to the meaning just explained, a narrative is also known. "Bramhadatta," by name, the young grandson of Chikitâna, when drinking at the sacrifice the resplendent *Soma juice* spoke : Let this resplendent juice," that is here in the sacrificial cup and drunk by me, "cut off the head of this *man*," of me speaking falsely, which means, if I speak falsely. How again is the meaning of falsehood implied in the words of the *Upanishad* ? "If Ayasya (he is called Ayashya Angirasa, because his name is derived from the principal life) the performer of the Udgitha in the assembly of the former Rishis, who created the world, "performed the Udgitha by any other," by another deity beside speech and life, "than by this," viz, by the above described life in union with speech,—then let me be a speaker of falsehood, let the Soma cut off the head of me who has asserted something contradictory to the nature of the deity. In these words he made an imprecation, and shows therefore the necessity of the strength of the faith in the knowledge, *that life is the Udgitha*. The *Śruti* confirms then by its own word the meaning conveyed by the narrative, viz, by speech, dependent upon life, and by life, transformed into his own nature, the Udgata, Ayasya Angirasa, performed the Udgitha. This meaning is established by the imprecation. 24.

He who knows the wealth of that *Sâma* here, obtains its wealth. The musical notes are its wealth. Therefore let one who is to perform the duties of a Ritwig, desire to acquire the musical notes together with speech. By that speech which has obtained the musical notes, let him perform the rites of the Ritwig. Therefore people are desirous to look during the sacrifice upon the sweet-toned performer of the *Udgitha* as

upon a rich man; for people desire to look upon him who has obtained wealth. He obtains wealth, who in such a manner knows the wealth of this Sâma. 25.

He, who knows the gold of this Sâma, obtains verily its gold. The musical notes are its gold. He verily obtains gold, who in such a manner knows the gold of this Sâma. 96.

“Of that Sama here.” The word “that” connects it with the above described life. The term “here” shows it as by a gesture as being present. He who knows the wealth of life which is called by the word Sama, obtains what? “He obtains its wealth.” This is the reward which the Sruti shows as an inducement to the hearer, viz., “The musical notes are its wealth.” The musical notes, the sweet sound, produced in the throat, are its wealth, its ornament; for a song, adorned with these notes, obtains wealth. Because this is so, “therefore let him who is to perform the duties of the Ritwig,” the song of the Ritwig, viz., the Udgata—who is anxious to exhibit the wealth of the Sama by its note, desire to acquire in speech the musical note, dependent upon speech. This, however, is established in the course of explaining the topic, that the tones of the Sama are necessarily musical notes, and that the musical notes are not acquired by mere desire, but by the cleaning of teeth and the drinking of oil, etc., “By that speech,” that purified speech, “which has obtained the musical notes, let him perform the rites of the Ritwig.” “Therefore,” Because the note has become the property (Swabhuta) of the Sama, and hence the Sama is adorned with the note as with wealth (Swa), “therefore people are desirous to look during the sacrifice upon the sweet-toned performer of the Udgitha, as upon a rich man; for it is well known, that “people desire to look upon him who has obtained wealth” (Swa). A person who has fully obtained the reward resulting from his knowledge of this quality, is described in the words: “He obtains wealth who in such a manner knows the wealth of this Sama.” 25.

Now another quality of the Sama is explained, viz., to be possessed of gold. This refers also to the sweetness of the notes, with the difference, however, that, while the former designated the sweet.

ness of the notes, produced in the throat, the latter means gold only figuratively. "He who knows the gold of the Sama, obtains verily its gold." The meaning is, since the same word, Suvarna, denotes a musical note, (Suvarna, from Su, good, and Varna, letter) and gold, (Suvarna) common gold becomes the reward of him who knows this quality. Its musical note is, as it were, its gold. "He who knows the Sama in such a manner, verily obtains its gold," just as it has been described before. 26.

He who knows the abode of the Sáma here, abides. Speech is its abode; for it is well known, that this life verily abides in speech, some say, that it abides in food. 27.

Then the quality of abiding is explained, viz, "He who knows the abode of this Sama." The Sama abides in speech; therefore speech is called the abode. He who knows this quality of abiding of the Sama, "abides," It is proper to assign this quality to him, because it is said in the Sruti, according to the manner in which "it is worshipped." To him, who as in the former description, is desirous of the reward, and wishes to know which is the abiding place of the Sáma, the answer is given: "Speech is the abode of the Sama." Speech means the organs of sound at the root of the tongue and elsewhere." This speech is the abode. Therefore it is said: "For it is well known," because it is well known, that this life abides in speech, in the organs of speech, the root of the tongue, etc., therefore speech is the abiding place of the Sama. "Some," others, "say, that it abides in food," that it is well known to abide there. And because neither of these two opinions is blamed, therefore it is optional to assign the quality of abiding either of speech or to food. 27.

Therefore afterwards the rite of the Abhyároha of the Pâvamâna Stotras is defined. The praiser verily praises the Sáma. Where he praises it, there let him mutter these Mantras: From the unreal lead me to the real, from

* *Viz.*, of the chest, throat, head, root of the tongue, teeth, nose, lips, and palate.—A. G.

darkness lead me to light, from death lead me to immortality. In the words of the Mantra: From the unreal lead me to the real, death is the unreal, the real immortality; from death lead me to immortality, which implies, render me immortal. Further in the words: From darkness lead me to light, death is darkness, light immortality; from death lead me to immortality, which implies, render me immortal. *In the last Mantra*: From death lead me to immortality, there is nothing concealed.—Then in the remaining Stotras let him praise the primeval food for his own sake. Therefore in those Stotras he may choose a blessing. Whatever desire one may desire, the same *he may choose viz.*, the Udgāta who thus knows. Whatever desire he may desire, either for himself or the sacrificer, the same he accomplishes by the recital. This verily overcomes the worlds. There is verily no doubt to be worthy of the worlds for him who thus knows this Sâma. 28.

For him who thus knows life, the rite of muttering prayers is appointed. The perfection in muttering prayers which one who thus knows has acquired, is called his knowledge. "Therefore afterwards." Because the rite of muttering prayers, the reward of which is the ascension (Abhyaroha) to a divine state, must be performed by one, perfect in knowledge, "therefore" it is defined. The muttering of prayers by its connexion with the Udgitha might be performed at any time, but according to the word of the Sruti: "*Pavamānām*," *a time is fixed for them*, and although the rite is *herewith* assigned to the three Pavamāna Stotras, yet the time is again restricted by the words: "The praiser verily praises the Sâma." "Where," at what time "he," the praiser, "praises," commences the Sâma, "there," at that time let him mutter these Mantras. The rite of muttering these Mantras, is called Abhyârôha (ascension) because a person who thus knows, directly ascends (Abhimukhyena arohati) to the state of a god. The plural *Ētāni* (these Mantras) shows that three Mantras of the Yajur are meant. *These Mantras* must be read according to the accent, which is in the Brâhmana, and not as it is in the Mantras,

as the second case (E'áni) proves,* and also their being found in the Brâhmana.† The rite of muttering must be performed by the sacrificer.

The following are the Mantias of the Yajur: "From the unreal lead me to the real, from darkness lead me to light, from death lead me to immortality." As the meaning of the Mantras is concealed, the Brâhmana itself explains it: "In the words of the Mantra: From the unreal lead me to the real, death is the unreal," "death" it is called, because his knowledge and works arise from his own nature; "unreal" it is called from the very low degree of its existence. "The real immortality," "the real," knowledge and works, derived from the S'âstra, are "immortality, because they are the cause of it. Therefore "from the unreal," viz., from unreal works and from ignorance "lead me to the real," viz., to such works and knowledge, as are derived from the S'âstra, that is to say, produce the state of the soul, by which the nature of a god is obtained. The meaning of the whole sentence is given in the words: "which implies, render me immortal." Thus also in the next Mantra: "From darkness lead me to light, death is darkness;" for every ignorance, from its natural tendency to screen, is darkness; this as the cause of dying, is death. "Light immortality," the divine nature, contrary to the former (darkness); knowledge by its natural tendency to manifest, is light; this is immortality, because its nature is exempt from destruction. Therefore: "From darkness lead me to light," as before, means: "From death lead me to immortality," which implies "render me immortal," that is, grant me the divine state of Prajapati as reward. The first Mantra means, from a state without causality produce a state that has causality. The second Mantra, however, means, from a state that has causality, but which is yet subject to ignorance, produce a state, where the *whole* effect is accomplished. In the third Mantra: "From death lead me to immortality," the whole meaning of the two preceding Mantras is given as conclusive. In the third Mantra, therefore, there is not, as in the two preceding, the meaning concealed, but it is the real meaning of the text. "Then," having made the song of the sacrificer in the three Pava-

* Otherwise the third case would be required. A. G.

† Viz., the Sâtapatha Brâhmana.

mána Stōtras, "in the remaining Stōtras let him," the Udgâta* who knows life and has obtained the nature of life, "praise the primeval food for our own sake" in the same way, as life did. Because such an Udgâta knows life thus, in the manner, before described, and hence, like life, is able to accomplish the desire; "therefore he," the sacrificer, "may choose in those Stōtras," at the recital of them "a blessing." "Whatever desire he may desire, the same he may choose," ask as a boon *viz*, "the Udgâta who thus knows." "Whatever desire the Udgâta desires," asks, "either for himself or for the sacrificer, the same he accomplishes by the recital." In this sense it is said, that the acquirement of life in its identity with the soul takes place by knowledge and works, and therein is no apprehension of any doubt. It may, however, be matter of doubt, whether in the absence of works life is obtained or not. To remove this doubt, it is said: "This verily overcomes the world." "This verily," this knowledge of life alone, separated from works, "overcomes the worlds," he is the cause of gaining the worlds. "There is verily no doubt to be worthy of the worlds," nor even a desire; for if one has the firm knowledge, that life is the soul, he has no doubt that he will obtain it; for a man, who is in a village, does not doubt like one in the desert, whether he may arrive at the village. There may be indeed a doubt for one who has not the knowledge of the soul, which is yet far from him, but not for one who has it; he therefore has no apprehension that he should not acquire the state of life as identical with the soul. For whom is there not such a apprehension? "For him who thus knows the Sâma"†to be life, in accordance with the greatness, as has been explained, *for him therefore who knows*: I am the life, inaccessible to the sins of the demons, which consists in the contact of the senses with their objects; I am purified; I am speech and the other four organs.‡ which by their dependence upon me have obtained their *original* nature, as fire, wind etc., which are free from the blemish of the sins of the demons, which consist in the contact of the senses with their objects; I am purified; I am speech and the other four organs,‡ which by their

* The priest who knows the Sâma Veda.

† Who knows that life is identical with the soul.

‡ *Viz*, nose, eye, ear, and mind.

dependence upon me have obtained their *original* nature, as fire, wind, etc., which are free from the blemish of the sins of the demons, produced by the contact of the senses with their objects, in consequence of natural knowledge, and which by dependence upon me are the cause of the connection of the primeval food with all the elements ; I am the soul of all the elements as the common essence of them ; I am also the soul of speech, embodied in the Rig, Yajur, Sama and Udgitha, because I pervade them and am their cause. When I have obtained the state of the song of the Sama, my external wealth, or ornament is the sweetness of the notes. When I have obtained the golden state, figuratively speaking, the sweetness of the notes, the state of the song, my organs are the various places of the throat, etc., Possessed of such qualities, I pervade with my whole nature all living beings down to the smallest insect, for I am without shape and everywhere. *He will attain such a reward, whose worship manifests such a knowledge.*

Fourth Bráhmāna.

This was before soul, bearing the shape of a man. Looking round, he beheld nothing but himself. He said first ; ' This am I.' Hence the name of I was produced. Therefore even now a man, when called, says first : " It is I," and tells afterwards any other name that belongs to him. *And* because he as the first of all of them consumed by fire all the sins, therefore he *is called* Purusha. He verily consumes him, who before this strives to obtain the state of Prajapati, he namely, who thus knows. 1.

" This was before soul." How the state of Prajapati is obtained by the united effect of knowledge and works, has been described, and also, how it is obtained by the mere knowledge of it, by passages as : " This verily overcomes the worlds," etc., By descriptions of the omnipotence and other attributes of Prajapati, who is the embodied reward, in the creation, preservation and destruction of the world, the eminence of the reward, resulting from knowledge and works in accordance with the Vedas, is *further* to be described.

For this object *the present Bramhana* has been commenced. This *description* sets forth the praise of the knowledge and works ordained by the practical* part, because they are of great power. But it is at the same time intended to show, that the whole reward, resulting from knowledge and works, has a worldly tendency; for it is said, that it is subject to fear and unhappiness; it is further involved in the connexion between cause and effect, and as a manifestation of the gross organism† it is not eternal. The second part of *the Vedas* on the other hand, is *intended* to show the liberation, resulting from the mere knowledge of Bramha, which will hereafter be explained; for he who is not dissatisfied with the objects of the world, subject as they are to the division of cause and effect etc, has no desire to obtain the knowledge, that the soul is one *and all*, as a person who is not thirsty has no desire to drink. Consequently the description of the reward, resulting from knowledge and works, is made for the sake of the second part. With regard to this, it will be said: "This should be known by him." "This is better than a son."

"This was before the soul." The soul is here defined as Prajapati, the first-born from the egg, the embodied soul, as the result from his knowledge and works in accordance with the Vedas. He was what? "This," produced by the division of body "was the soul," not separated from the body of Prajapati "before," before the production of other bodies. He was also bearing the shape of man, which means, that he was endowed with head, hands and other members; he was the Viraj, the first-born. "Looking round," reflecting, who am I, and of what nature, "he beheld nothing but himself," the fulness of life, the organism of causes and effects. He beheld only himself as the universal soul. Then endowed with the recollection of his Vedaic knowledge in a former birth, "he said first: This am I," viz., Prajapati, the universal soul. "Hence," therefore, because from the recollection of his knowledge in a former world he called himself I, therefore his name was I. The name of I, as proved in this Upanishad, and therefore in the Sruti, will afterwards be explained.

* Ceremonial part of the Veda. *Vide* page 2, note 2.

† *Vide* p. 40, note.

"Therefore," because this happened to Prajapati, as the cause, therefore it happens also to the living creatures, his effects; for ever now a man "when called," addressed with: 'Who art thou?' says first: 'It is I,' denoting himself with the name of the soul as the cause, and when afterwards asked for his special name, the name of this special individual, he answers by: 'I am Devadatta, or Yajnadatta,' etc., he tells the name, which was given to this individual person by father and mother." "And because he," Prajapati in a former birth, which is the cause, as the first of those who were desirous to obtain the state of Prajapati by the exercise of reflection on works and knowledge, viz, "as the first of all of them," of all those desirous of obtaining the state of Prajapati,—consumed by the perfect exercise of reflection on works and knowledge all the sins of contact, which are obstacles to the acquirement of the state of Prajapati,—because such was the case,—therefore he is called Purusha, because he, Purvam Aushad, (first burned) As that Prajapati, by consuming all opposite sins, became this Purusha Prajapati, so also any other consumes, reduces to ashes, by the fire of the practice of his reflection on knowledge and works, or only by the force of his knowledge. "He verily consumes," Whom? "Him who before this sage strives to obtain the state of Prajapati." The sage is pointed out as he who thus knows, who according to his power manifests his reflection on knowledge. 'But is it not useless for any one to strive for the state of Prajapati, if he is consumed by one who thus knows?' There is no fault in this; for consuming means here only, that the highest state, that of a Prajapati, is not obtained, because the eminence of the reflection on knowledge is wanting. Therefore by the words; "He consumes him," is it meant, that the perfect performer obtains the highest state of Prajapati, he, who is less perfect, does not obtain it, and by no means, that the less perfect performer is actually consumed by the perfect; thus it is said in common life, that a warrior who first rushes into battle, consumes his combatants, which means, that he exceeds them in prowess.

He was afraid; therefore man, when alone, is afraid. He then looked round: Since nothing but myself exists, of whom

should I be afraid? Hence his fear departed; for whom should he fear, since fear arises from another. 2.

To show that the reward of knowledge and works, as set forth in the Karma Kanda, which is the state of Prajapati, praiseworthy as it may be, does yet not overcome this world, it is said: "He was afraid," viz., this Prajapati, who is called the first-born embodied soul, bearing the shape of man, was afraid, as we and other creatures are. Hence it is said: Because he, bearing the shape of man, endowed with an organised body, was afraid in consequence of his desire against his destruction,* therefore man," on account of his likeness with Prajapati, also now, when alone, "is afraid." And further as with us, so also with Prajapati, the true knowledge of himself (the soul) is the cause, that the desire against one's destruction is removed. *Hence it is said:* "He looked round." How? The answer is: "Since nothing but myself," but the soul, not a second thing, exists, "of whom should I be afraid," while there is no cause of my destruction. "Hence," from the true knowledge of himself (the soul) Prajapati's "fear departed," for his fear is merely the effect of his ignorance, which cannot remain with true knowledge, wherefore it is said: "For whom should he fear," viz., he who fears, and the meaning which is intended, is, when truth has been ascertained, fear is removed, since fear arises from a second from another thing and a second, another thing, is merely the production of ignorance; for a second thing, of which there is no knowledge, cannot be the cause of the origin of fear. Thus it is said in a Mantra: What blindness of mind, what distress exists for him who is conscious of the *universal* identity? And it is also proper, that by the knowledge that all is one, the fear is removed; for the knowledge of a second, from which fear may arise, is removed by the knowledge that all is one; hence there is nothing, from whence it could arise. Here it is asked: Whence was produced Prajapati's knowledge that all is one, or who instructed him?

(*Either the knowledge manifested itself without instruction. Then the same should be the case with us and similar beings. Or, it is derived from impressions received in a former birth; then the*

* Of his desire for his preservation.

knowledge that all is the soul, is useless; for *in this case*, as the knowledge of Prajâpati, although existing when he was in the state of a former birth, did not remove the cause of the contrary ignorance, because on account of his ignorance he was afraid, so also is the knowledge of the identity of the soul useless for every one. And if you, *lastly*, say, that the knowledge removes the ignorance at the time of death, we also object, because, as before, it must again be connected with a prior *knowledge*, whence arises the logical fault of a too general argument. Hence it must be concluded, that the knowledge of the identity of the soul is useless)

We deny this, on the ground that the knowledge of Prajâpat is produced from the most powerful cause; for as in common life strength of intellect and extent of memory are observed with him from the time of his birth, who has acquired various efficacious causes by his pious actions, so also with regard to the eminent birth of Prajâpati, united as it is with efficient causes, which are purified by his having consumed all sins, the effects of opposite causes, by the power of moral merit, of knowledge and of liberty from worldly desires. Hence it is proper to maintain, that Prajâpati's knowledge of the identity of the soul, produced at the time of his birth, has arisen without any instruction. In this respect says the Smṛiti: "Whose four qualities, his unbounded knowledge, freedom from passion, power and moral merit are innate."

If you say, 'if they are innate, fear is impossible, for darkness does not arise with the sun,' we deny this on the ground, that the notion of innate knowledge has merely the meaning to exclude instruction from another. If your opinion is, 'that faith, devotion and reverence are no cause of knowledge, and that such causes of knowledge, as faith, devotion and reverence, assigned by the S'ruti and Smṛiti in such passage as: "The faithful whose mind is devoted to only one object, whose senses are subdued, gains knowledge,"* "Thou shalt know it by reverence,"†—have no causality,' and if you moreover say, 'that our moral merit in our former birth is the cause of our knowledge (in the next birth) as it is the case with Prajâpati, we do not agree, because we must attend to the distinction of general

* Bhagavadgita, Fourth chapter.

† Bhagavadgita, C. I.

and special causes, as well as of qualified and unqualified causes ; for in common life obtains a manifold division of causes with regard to effects depended upon a cause ; in the same manner of general causes. These as well as special causes are again divided into qualified and unqualified causes. To show this by an instance we chose the perception of form, as an effect from a variety of causes. Here the perception of form in the dark, without light, by animals roaming at night, is caused by the contact of the eye with form. The cause of perception of form by the Yogis is the mind alone ; for us it is the contact of the eye with form through light. Further by the division of light into sunlight, moonlight, etc., are produced the general divisions of the cause. Moreover there is the other division of light, light, especially qualified and light not qualified. In the same manner the cause of the knowledge of the identity of the soul is sometimes work performed in a former birth, as is the case with Prajāpati ; sometimes penance, as the S'ruti says : By penance search for Brahman,* sometimes instructions from the teacher, as follows from such passage of the S'ruti and Smṛiti : "A man who has a teacher knows." "The faithful acquires knowledge." "Do thou know it by reverence." "From the teacher he must be known, seen, heard," etc. Faith, devotion, etc., are direct causes to obtain that knowledge as they effect separation from vice and from other causes *of the contrary*. The same is the case with the hearing, thinking and mental intuition of the Védānta, because here is comprehended the present object of knowledge itself, and also because by the annihilation of sin and other obstacles the true knowledge of the soul and the mind from its very nature produces that knowledge. Therefore faith, reverence, etc., are real causes of knowledge. 2.

He did thus not feel delight. Therefore no body, when alone, feels delight. He was desirous of a second. He was in the same state as husband (Pati) and wife (Patni) are when in mutual embrace. He divided this self two-fold. Hence were husband and wife produced. Therefore was this only a half of himself, as a split pea *is of the whole*. Thus

verily has Yájnavalkya declared it. This void is thus completed by woman. He approached her. Hence men were born. 3.

From this also follows the worldly state of Prajâpati, viz., because "He," Prajâpati, "did thus not feel delight," which means, was unhappy, like us and others at the present time; "therefore," in consequence of the state of loneliness, etc., "no body, when alone, feels delight." Delight means the pleasure, derived from the union with a desired object. Unhappiness is called the state of mental distress, following the separation from an object of desire, to which one is attached. For the removal of this unhappiness "he was desirous of a second, of a wife able to destroy the unhappiness. And while he thus longed for a wife, his state was as of one, embraced by a wife. And because by this *state* he desired something real, he was of such a state. Of what state? In such a state, as in common life husband and wife are, when in embrace for the removal of unhappiness. "He," thus, "divided this "self," which was of such a kind, "two-fold." The term "this" is used in order to define *the self* and to distinguish it from the Virâj, the first cause. He was by the removal of the state of Virâj not in the same state, in which *curd* is, when *its former state*, that of milk, is entirely removed. Which was then *the state of separation*? By the objective mental power of Virâj, entirely dependent upon himself, there was, beside himself, another body in the state of husband and wife in embrace. And this Virâj of such a kind, "was in the same state," because he is the same subject for two predicates. "Hence," from this division (Pâranât) husband (Pati) and wife (Patni) were produced, which is a description of the common state of husband and wife. "Therefore," because this wife is, as it were, the *other* separated half of himself, "therefore was this," this body, *only* the half of himself, as a split pea is of the whole "Of whom was it only a half before his taking a wife? The answer is: "Of his self." Thus verily has Yajnavalkya, viz., the son of Yajnavalkya (which denotes him who speaks at the sacrifice) Dévarâti, declared it. It may also mean a son of Bramhâ. Because this male half is void, as wanting the female

half, "therefore," again* after the taking of a wife, it is again completed by the female half, as a split pea by its being joined *with its other half*. "He," "Prajapati," under the name of Manu, "approached her," by name S'atarupâ † his own daughter, under the notion that she was his wife. "Hence," from this union, "men were born." 3.

She verily reflected : How can he approach me, whom he has produced from himself? Alas, I will conceal myself. Thus she became a cow, the other a bull. He approached her. Hence kine were born. The one became a mare, and the other a stallion, the one a female ass, the other a male ass. He approached her. Hence the one-hoofed kind was born. The one became a female goat, the other a male goat the one became an ewe, the other a ram. He approached her. Hence goats and sheeps were born. In this manner he created every living pair whatsoever down to the ants. 4.

"She," S'atarupa, recollecting that it is forbidden in the Smṛiti to approach one's own daughter, "verily reflected : How happens this improper action, that he can approach me," whom he has produced

* Ananda observes that the word "again" refers to the same event in a former birth, —because the world is without commencement.

† The notion of Viraj dividing his own substance into male and female, occurs in more than one Purāna. So does that of an incestuous marriage and intercourse of the first Manu with his daughter S'atarupa, and the commentators on the Upanishad understand that legend to be alluded to in this place. But the institutes ascribed to Manu make Viraj to be the issue of such a separation of persons and Manu himself to be his offspring. There is indeed, as the reader may observe from the passage cited in the present essay, much disagreement and consequent confusion, in the gradation of persons interposed by Hindu theology between the supreme being and the created world. Col M. E. Vol I. p. 65. See also Wilson's Vishnu Purana, where, p. 51, note 5, a very lucid view of the opinions of the different Purānas on this subject is given.

from himself. "Alas, I will now conceal myself," will conceal myself under the disguise of another kind. "Thus," having thus-*re*-flected, "she became a cow," by herself, and again was this inclination of Satarupa, incited by the impulse of living creatures, as well as of Manu. Therefore "the other became a bull. He approached her," in the same manner, as it has been related before. "Hence kine were born." Thus "the one became a mare, and the other a stallion," thus, "the one a female ass, the other a male ass." There, by the union of the mare with the stallion and the union of the other kinds "the one hoofed kind," viz, horses, mules and asses, "were born." Thus "the one became a female goat, the other a male goat, the one became an ewe, the other a ram. He approached her," viz, the one after the other in the order *as they are mentioned*. "Hence goats and sheep were born. In this manner he created every living pair, male and female, whatsoever, down to the ants," viz, he created the world. 4.

He knew: I am verily this creation; for I created this all. Hence the *name of* creation is *derived*. Verily he, who thus knows, becomes in this creation *like him*. 5.

"He," Prajâpati, having created all this world. "knew." What? "I am verily this creation," The world is created, therefore the created world is called creation. Because the world is created by me therefore, since it is not separated from me, I am the world; it is not distinguished from me. Why is this? "For I," because "I created this whole world." therefore. Because Prajâpati called himself the *creation*, "hence," therefore "the name of creation is derived." "Verily he becomes in this creation," in this world of Prajâpati, "like him;" he becomes like Prajâpati, a creator of the world, which is not different from his own self. Who? "He who thus knows," knows like Prajâpati, as has been said, that he is the world, depending upon the notion of the soul, of the elements and of the deities, 5.

Then he churned. From his mouth, as the place of production, and from his hands he created the fire. Both

therefore are inside without hair; for the place of production is inside without hair.

That they speak there this word : Sacrifice to this, sacrifice to this, hence sacrifice to the one or the other god, is not proper. His is really this creation; for he verily is all the gods.

Then whatsoever, is moist, the same he created from his semen, this is the Soma. So much is this whole universe, either food, or the eater of food. Soma is the food, and Agni the eater of the food. This is the surpassing creation of Bramha. Because he from the better parts created the gods, *and also* because he a mortal, created the immortals, therefore is it a surpassing creation. He who thus knows, becomes in this surpassing creation *like Prajapati*. 6.

Prajapati, having thus created this world as a succession of pairs, was desirous of creating the guardian deities of the Brahmana and of the other castes, and at the commencement throwing his hands upon his mouth "he churned." Churning with his hands "he created from his mouth," as the organ of production, and also "from his hands," as organs of production, "the fire," the special benefactor of the caste of Bramhans. Because both the hands and the mouth are the organs of production of the fire whose nature is to consume, "therefore both are without hair;" not the whole, however, but only the inside, for both resemble in this respect the female organ of production; "for this is inside without hair." Thus also the Brahman was born from the mouth of Prajapati. Therefore the fire is the special benefactor of the Brahman, both being sprung from the same source, as the elder brother is of the younger. Therefore the Brahman has the fire as his guardian deity, and the mouth as his strength, as proved by the Sṛuti and Smṛiti. Thus he produced from his arms, the seat of power, the slayer of Bala,* and other gods, and the ruling deities of the Kshatriya. Therefore the Kshatriya has Indra as his guardian deity, and the arm as his strength, as both Sṛuti and Smṛiti attest. Thus he created from his thigh, as the seat

of endeavour—the Vasus* and others, the ruling deities of the Vṛ, and also the Vis. Therefore the Vaisya is devoted to agriculture, merchandize and similar pursuits, and his guardian deities are the Vasus, etc., according to the evidence of the Sruti and Smṛiti. Thus he created from his feet Pushana† the guardian deity of the earth, and also the Sudra, who is fitted for servitude, according to the evidence of the Sruti and Smṛiti. The Upanishad makes here for the praise of the whole creation, the supposition, as if the origin of the guardian deities of the Kshatriya and the other castes had been related, although it has not been done, and yet remains to be related. By this passage of the Sruti it is accordingly evident that Prajapati is all deities, because there is no difference between the creator and the creature, and because the gods are created by Prajapati.

The meaning of the subject being thus established, the blame of the contrary notion‡ of ignorant people is introduced for the praise of the meaning, as it has been established: for the blame of the one is the praise of the other.

“That they,” the mere performers of sacrifices, “speak there,” during the performance of the ceremonies at the time of offering, “this word: Sacrifice to this,” to Agni, “sacrifice to this,” to Indra, etc., they do so in accordance with the difference of name, Sāstra, Stotra, work, etc., by considering this or the other different god, for instance Agni, etc., as one among others. This should not be thus understood, because “his,” Prajapati’s, “is really this creation,” the whole division of the gods; “for he,” Prajapati, as life, “is verily all the gods.”

Here we meet with a contradictory opinion. ‘Namely, some say, the supreme Hiranyagarbha is meant, others Hiranyagarbha, as being in a worldly state. According to the letter of the Mantras the

* The Vasus were the sons of Vasu. Their names are: A'pa, Dhruva Soma, Dhava (fire), Anila (wind), Anala, (fire), Pratyusha (daybreak, and Prabhasa (light.—W. V. P. p. 128.

† One of the twelve A'dityas, sons of Kasyapa by Aditi, the daughter of Daksha —I. C. p. 127.

‡ The contrary notion is, that the deities are independent beings; this view is blamed in the next sentence of the Upanishad.

supreme is meant : for the Sruti says : " They call him Indra, Mitra, Vāruṇa and Agni." And another passage : " He who is Brahma, who is Indra and Prajapati, is all these gods." Also the Smṛiti says : " Some call him Agni, others Manu, others Prajapati." And further : He who is no object of the organs,† who is unapproachable,‡ who is infinitely little,§ unmanifested, eternal whose nature comprehends all elements, who is not conceived by thought,* sprung thus forth by himself. On the other hand he is also in a worldly state. This follows from the passage of the Sruti, stating : " He consumed all sins : " for unless one is in a worldly state, he cannot consume sins. It follows also from the passage of the Sruti, that he is subject to fear and unhappiness. Also from the other : Being mortal he created immortals." Further, from the letter of the Mantra : " Lo, the birth of Hiranyagarbha." Also from a passage of the Smṛiti in the chapter which treats on the results of works : Sages call Brahma, the creator of the world, virtue, the great, the unmanifested, the best condition, which can be obtained by the quality of goodness. Therefore a contradictory meaning being obtained, the argument is faulty ?

We do not grant this, because there is no contradiction, if it is considered under a different fictitious view, and a different fictitious view is obtained, if it is connected with a special fictitious attribute.‡ In this manner it is declared in the Sruti.

* The organs of action are here meant, according to Ananta.

† To the senses of intellect, eye, ear, etc.

‡ This is the cause, that he cannot be perceived by the senses.

§ No object of the mind, the internal sense.

|| This passage is taken from Manu 12, 50 According to Ananda, by the creators are meant Manu and others, by virtue Yama, by the great one (Mahat), intelligence, Buddhi, the first production of Prakṛiti, or self-existing nature according to the Sāṅkhya system. Kulluka Bhaṭṭa, the commentator of Manu explains it differently, viz., Brahmā is the Brahmā with four faces, the creators Maṛichi and the others, Mahat and Avyakta (unmanifested) two of the causes of the Sāṅkhya system, here the tutelary deity of the same, virtue and embodied virtue.

¶ I translated Kalpāna with " fictitious view " and Upadhi with " fictitious attribute, as I was unable to find more adequate words. Kalpanā according to the dictionaries means : arrangement, distinctions, artificial making ; but these

"Sitting he proceeds afar, sleeping he goes everywhere. Who beside me, is able to know the god who is happy and not happy." *

words do not express the meaning, which it has according to the Vedānta, where it is a predicate, which is assigned to a thing to which it really does not belong, or the conceiving of a thing under an idea which is contrary to its nature, as for instance, if Bramha (the infinite soul, infinite substance) is comprehended under the notion of infinite mind (manas) or infinite intelligence (Buddhi) which notions are mere anthropomorphisms. Thus far is the Kalpanā indeed an artificial notion, a notion made by some contrivance, or not founded on the real nature of thing Upadhi, (according to Wilson discriminating or distinguishing property, disguise, in the Vedānta, this is especially applied to certain natural forms or properties, considered as disguise of the spirit which I translated with fictitious attribute, is any quality which is assigned by a fictitious notion of the infinite soul; for instance, omnipotence, omniscience, etc. If the infinite substance is considered in its own nature, it has no attributes whatever, and the notions under which it is thought, *vis.*, existence, knowledge, happiness are in reality no different attributes, but they constitute the one identical substance (Ātma, soul).

On the other hand, it is necessary to form fictitious views of infinite substance; for the world cannot be thought in itself, therefore requires to be thought by the infinite soul, as entirely depending upon it. The act of the mind by which it transfers the notions of the world upon Bramha or the infinite soul, is called Adhyaropa, which is in fact the same idea with that of Kalpanā. Under the condition, that the world is considered in Bramha, Bramha or the infinite soul is also considered under various attributes, as for instance, omniscience, universal providence, immanent cause of the world, etc. The Kalpana the view, although fictitious, is yet necessary, and the Upadhi, the attribute, although not really an attribute of Bramha, is still indispensable, if he is considered in his relation to the world.

There is therefore according to the Vedānta, no contradiction, if attributes are ascribed to Bramha, and denied of him, as long as the notions under which both is done, are kept separate; namely, he has no attributes, if considered in himself; he has attributes in his relation to the world.

* Katha Upanishad, 2. V. 21. In this passage the contradictory predicates are founded upon the different modes, by which the soul may be conceived. Thus "sitting" refers to its unchangeableness, "proceeding" to its worldly nature, where it proceeds faster than any other being. The Upanishads generally represent the difficulty to understand the infinite soul by assigning to it contradictory predicates. Thus it is said in the Vajasaneya Up v 5. If (the soul) proceeds, it does not proceed; it is far; it is near; it is within the universe; it is without this universe.

Through attributes he is connected with the world; in reality by himself he is unconnected with the world. This is the identity and diversity of Hiranyagarbha, and in the same manner of all living creatures, which follows from the passage of the S'ruti: "That art thou." But while Hiranyagarbha, in consequence of the superlative purity of his attributes is, as it were, almost entirely supreme, as S'ruti and Smṛiti declare, although they show his worldly state as it were, at some places, the worldly state of the living creatures, in consequence of the prevalent impurity of their attributes, is almost everywhere evident. Divested, however, of all distinctions of attributes, every one obtains the name of supreme according to the evidence of the S'ruti and Smṛiti. But the logicians who abandoning the authority of the holy writings, reason much about existence and non-existence, agency and non-agency, confound the meaning of the S'astra, Hence the determination of the meaning becomes difficult. But for those who without pride follow the S'astra alone, the meaning of the S'astra with regard to deities is as clear, as if it were an object of perception. Here it is intended to introduce with reference to Prajapati, although he is one God, such distinctions as food, etc. Among them the fire has been mentioned; the Soma, as the first food will now be mentioned.

"Then whatsoever is," in the world, "moist," in the form of a fluid, "the same he created from his semen," from his seed. Thus it is said in the S'ruti: "From the semen sprang the waters." And the Soma is also watery; therefore all that is moist, is created by Prajapati from his semen. This is, "as it were, the Soma." "So much is this whole universe," that is, there is no more than this. What is it? "Either food," which is Soma, as nourishing by its fluidity, or "the eater of food," Agni by his heat and harshness. Hence Soma is defined as food. From the force of the meaning it is evident that, Soma is all that is eaten, and that Agni is the eater. Sometimes the fire, when offering is made to it becomes Soma,—Soma also, when offering is made to it, becomes fire, because it eats. Whosoever in this manner perceives the world, as consisting of Agni and Soma, under the idea of the soul, is not tainted by any blame and becomes also like Prajapati. "This is the surpassing creation of Brahṃa," Prajapati surpassing, because it surpasses his own nature.

Which is this creation? "Because he from the better parts," the parts resembling him, "created the gods," therefore is the creation of the gods a surpassing creation. How is it again a creation which surpasses himself? The answer is: "And also, because he a mortal," of a mortal nature, "created the immortals," the gods of immortal nature, after he had consumed all his sins by the fire of work and knowledge, therefore "he who knows" this surpassing creation of Prajapati, as proceeding from himself, verily becomes in this surpassing creation like Prajapati, becomes a creator like Prajapati. 6.

That which is this, was then verily unmanifested. That manifested itself by name and form, as it is *commonly* said: "He is of this name, of this form." In the same manner that which is this also then manifests itself, as it is said: "He is of this name, of this form" He entered this world.

"That which is this* was then verily unmanifested" All Vedaic causes, denoted by knowledge and work, depend upon such distinctions as agent, etc., and their ultimate reward is the acquirement of the state of Prajapati;† the effect is "so much," viz, this manifested world. The Upanishad is now to show, how this manifested world, depending upon the connection of causes and effects, was before its manifestation in the shape of a seed, (in its original shape) which is inferred, as the tree is inferred from its effect, the sprout; for this tree of the world, whose seed is work and whose field is ignorance, is to be taken up with its root, as by its taking up the liberation of man is accomplished. Thus it is said in the Kathaka;‡ "Its root

* That which is this. Tad idam (that this) according to an idiomism in Sanscrit, where two demonstrative pronouns, this and that, are connected with the same subject, and where tad (that) refers to the past time, and idam (this) to the present time. The Vedanta frequently uses this form of expression to show the identity of the logical subject in its connexion with predicates which exclude each other.

† Vedaic causes are here causes of any mode or form of worldly existence, as asserted by the Vedas; causes which lead to final liberation from the world, are accordingly in this passage not referred to; this is evident, says Ananda, on the ground, that a multiplicity of causes cannot be a means of liberation which is of a uniform nature.

‡ Or in other words the ultimate reward is the state of death.—A. G.

is above, its branches go downwards." The same is said in the Gita : "Its root is above, its branches go downwards." It is also said in a Purana : The eternal tree of Bramha. "That," the world in the state of a seed before its creation, is named, on account of its imperceptibility at that time, by the pronoun "that," which denotes any thing that is no object of perception. The word "verily," which is the mark of a narrative,* is used *here* for the object to make it easily understood, that the world was in the state of non-manifestation, because it is connected with the past time. If it is said : Thus it verily was, it is easily understood, that the imperceptible state of the world is meant, in the same way, as if it is said : There verily was a king Juddhisthira. "Which is this." This denotes the world as manifested by name, form and work, as being in the connexion of cause and effect, in the manner in which it has been described. The terms "that" and "this" denote the state of imperceptibility and perceptibility of the world, and placed upon one and the same subject, they express the identity of the world in its state of perceptibility and imperceptibility. The meaning is : That which is this, and this, which is that, was then unmanifested. If this is the case, it is evident that no effect can be produced from any thing that does not exist, and that it cannot be destroyed from any thing that exists.

"That," so described world, which was not manifested, manifested itself by name and form. The reflexive form† "manifested itself," shows, that the soul was manifested by itself. "It manifested itself," it clearly obtained a perceptible form of existence, the limits of whose knowledge are the differences of name and form, which by its own power‡ produced the *relations of ruler, agent, and depends upon the action of causes*. "He is of this name;" by the pronoun§ "he" which is a name without distinction, a name only is

* The word for narrative is *Iti-ha-asa* ; thus verily it was, which formula commonly concluding a narrative in the Vedas, became the term of a narrative generally.

† Karma Kartri, where the agent (Kartri) is its own object (Karma.)

‡ This is here mentioned, because according to the Vedanta it is necessary, that the world as an effect must have a cause.

§ The word for pronoun is in Sanscrit, *Sarvanama*, a general name, on the meaning of which the exposition, as given above, is founded,

indicated. "He is of this name," viz., Devadatta, or Jainadatta is his name. In the same manner the pronoun "this," *in the sentence, he is of this colour*, denotes colour generally, without distinction of white or black, etc.. "That, unmanifested, substance, " which is this, then, at that time, manifests itself, by name and form, in the manner as it is said: He is of this name, this form.

"He,"* for whom the whole Sastra† is commenced, upon whom by means of natural ignorance *the notions of agent, ceremony and reward are transferred*, who is *the cause‡ of the whole world*, from whom, identical with his nature, name and form, not manifested *before*, are manifested, as dirty foam from clear water, and who, different from either, name and form, of his own nature is eternal, pure, intelligent and free, "he," manifesting the before unmanifested name and form, which are identical with his own nature, "entered this world." these bodies from Bramhá down to inanimate matter, dependent upon works and the consequences thereof, and subject to death and other evils.

‘But it was said, that the unmanifested manifested itself; how can it now be maintained, that even the supreme soul, manifesting the the unmanifested, entered this world?’§

There is no fault in this; *first*, because the supreme soul was meant under the notion of the unmanifested world; for we said, that the unmanifested world, which produces the relations of a creator, agent, etc., and which is dependent upon the action of causes, etc., manifested itself; *secondly*, because the term "this" is identical with the term "manifested." As "this" means manifested, when it has obtained the endless differences of ruler of the world and other

* The Supreme Brahma.

† Viz. the Veda in its two parts, the Karma Kānda, which relates to the ceremonies, and the Jñāna Kānda which relates to the knowledge of Brahma.

‡ Viz., the only cause, without any difference of the mediate and material cause, as in the Sāṅkhya system.

§ In other words, before it was not said of the soul, that it manifested the world, but it was said, that the unmanifested manifested itself. How is it therefore consistent with that doctrine to substitute here the notion of the soul for the notion of the unmanifested.

agents, of cause, etc., so means "that" unmanifested, when it has not emitted any of its differences. The only difference* is, that the one is manifest, the other not manifest. In common life also the same word has different meanings according to the intention of the speaker, as it for instance it is said : The village is arrived, the village is empty. Sometimes the word village may only mean the dwellings, as in the sentence : the village is empty. Sometimes the inhabitants may be intended, as in the sentence : the village has arrived. Sometimes both meanings may be intended, as in the sentence : let him not enter the village. Thus also in the present case. If it is said : this manifested and unmanifested world, where there is no intention to separate them, the soul and the non-soul are meant. Further, this world, subject to production and destruction, means the world alone. Further, the soul, which is great, not produced, not extended, which is not this, which is not that, means the soul alone.

"But how can it be thought that *he* entered' the world, manifested by the supreme manifestor, and everywhere! and at every time pervaded by him? For a country, which is not entered before, may be entered by any thing of limited extent, as for instance a village by a man, etc., but not by *any thing without limit as for instance* the ether, because from its nature it is always present. If he entered it, as a snake, a stone, by a modification of qualities,† we may grant such a modification for the snake, but not for the supreme soul, because he entered even with his nature. If it be supposed, that, abiding in the effect (the world) he was produced by a modification of qualities, and that by this he entered, as a snake, which is produced at the same time, abides in the stone, or water in a cocoa-nut, we object, because the Sruti says : having created that he entered it; for here it is evident, that the creator himself, without assuming another mode of existence, when he

* Between the world in its former and in its present state.

† The snake can be considered as a modification of the stone, because according to the Vedānta, both are productions of the five elements; therefore there is no contradiction in considering the snake a modification of the five elements which abide in a stone. In the same manner it may be thought, that the infinite soul entered the intellect and other creations by its modification as life.

had created the world, entered it afterwards. Thus it is said: having enjoyed he goes. There also is a mutual difference between the act^{ss} of enjoying and going, referring to the past and present time, but the agent is the same. The same case is here, and it cannot be thought that a modification of existence of him who abides in this effect, is produced.

Nor accords *the idea of an entrance*, which denotes the separation from one place and the connexion with another, with the *idea of the soul*, which is without parts and without limits. If it be supposed that the S'ruti refers to an entrance, where parts are admitted, we deny this on the authority of such passages of the S'ruti as: for he is radiant, without form, he is complete, without parts, without actions; we deny it also on the authority of such passages as prohibit the application of any difference of qualities whatsoever *to the soul*.

Nor entered he the world as an image, as there is no separation of a second thing.

Nor did he enter it as a quality enters a substance, because he does not depend upon any thing; for a quality indeed, which in every way depends upon another thing, is considered to enter a substance, but not so Brahma, as depending upon himself according to the S'ruti.

Nor as a seed the fruit because such attributes as an increase and decrease of its parts, a production and destruction, are assigned to this relation; but there are no such attributes of Brahma, of whom it is said in the S'ruti. He is not produced, he is without age, etc.

Nor as another separate body; for from the passage of the S'ruti. This deity reflected, let me manifest name and form, it is clear that the same deity, which enters, also manifests and acts. Also from these passages: "Having created this, he entered it." and: "Having opened the place, where the hairs divide, he entered by this door."* Having considered all forms, having made all names, the hero sits inclined." "Thou, O youth, or thou, O maid, thou old man with a

* Aittariya Up. 3 Vol. II P., that is to say, having opened the middle part of the skull, where the hairs divide, he entered the body by this opening

staff, spends thy time," it follows that no other enters but the supreme soul.*

If it be thought, that there is a multiplicity in the supreme soul, in consequence of the natural differences of the things which he entered, we object from passages of the S'ruti as: "One god he sits at many places; being one, he proceeded to many places. Thou although one, hast entered many. One god art thou concealed in all beings, thou pervadest all; thou art the soul within all beings."

'We shall at present not enquire, whether the idea of entering has been established or not; but it is clear, that the supreme soul has a worldly form, because the things which he entered, have a worldly form, and are not different from the soul?

We deny this, because the S'ruti says: He overcomes death.

If it is thought that he is in a worldly state, on the ground that he is subject to happiness and unhappiness, we object; for the S'ruti says: "He is not tainted with the unhappiness of the world, he is free from it."

If you say, this is improper, because it is at variance with perception,† we do not agree, because the difference of objects of perception or other sources of knowledge is only produced by the notion of dependence on attributes.‡ Such passages of the S'ruti as: "Thou dost not behold the beholder of the visible." "How could one know him who knows?" Unknown is he who knows—prove that knowledge has no reference to the soul.§

To what then? Knowledge from perception, declared in such sentences as: I am happy, I am unhappy, is the object of the image of the soul, which is reflected in the intellect and in other attributes.

* The first part of the argument was to prove, that it is the supreme soul which enters; the second is to show, that the supreme soul is not affected in its nature by his entrance.

† With individual perception, as in common life, people say: I am happy, I am unhappy.

‡ And therefore not by the soul, as attributes do not really belong to the soul.

§ Accordingly no perception, for instance, I am happy, I am unhappy.

The same is also shown by the fiction of the identity of the perceptible object (the body) and the subject which perceives (the soul) in a sentence like this, I am this* (body). It follows also from the passage of the S'ruti: "There is none else but him who sees," by which the idea of another soul is prohibited.

If we say, that happiness and unhappiness are qualities of the body, because both must be predicated of parts of the body,† and that therefore from the passage of the S'ruti: "For the sake of the desire of the soul,"‡ it is improper to maintain, that the soul is free from the world?—we do not agree, because the passage of the S'ruti: "Where it is, as it were, some other thing," shows, that it is for the sake of the soul, which is in the state of ignorance. From such passages: "How can it behold any one." (B. A. 4th A 5th 5th B. 15. Bib. I. V. 11. p. 929.) "There is no difference whatsoever with regard to him. (K. U. 4th. V. 11. B. I. V. VIII. p. 130.) "There is no delusion, no grief," (Vaj. S. U. 7. B. I. Vol. VIII 14) which refer to knowledge, it also follows, that unhappiness, as prohibited in them, is no quality of the soul.

If it is said, 'that the unworldly state of the soul cannot be admitted as contradictory to the argument of logicians,§ we deny this, because by reasoning also it can be proved that the soul is free from unhappiness; for unhappiness, which is an object of perception, cannot be attributed to the soul, which is no object of perception. If you say, 'that unhappiness is in the same manner a quality of

* Because here the soul, which is endowed with the perceptible object, the body, is an object of perception, and therefore the soul in itself is not a worldly state.

† On the ground, that every one who feels pain or pleasure in any part of the body, refers this part to himself, as if one says, "my head aches."

‡ The desire of happiness; but if happiness is granted, the contrary must be also admitted, because both are inseparable.

§ Of the Vaiseshikas, according to whom the soul has the following fourteen qualities: intellect, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, endeavour, number, quantity, severalty, conjunction and disjunction, faculty, merit and demerit.

the soul, as the sound is a quality of the ether,* we deny this, because the soul and unhappiness are not objects of one and the same kind of knowledge;† for a knowledge of unhappiness, which is an object of perception, can never become an object of the soul, which is eternal, and can only be known by inference. *Unhappiness can not become an object of the soul for this reason* also, that the soul, as one, is no object of anything whatsoever.

If you maintain, 'that, like a light, the soul, although one, is an object and manifests objects,' we do not agree, because this is impossible at one and the same time,* and because the soul has no parts. Hence the idea, that there is a perception of knowledge, and that knowledge is at the same time perceived, cannot be admitted *with reference to the soul.*

If it is said: 'Unhappiness and soul, the one of which is an object of perception, the other of inference, are in relation of quality and substance, as may be known by inference; for unhappiness is constantly an object of perception, and has an equal dependence upon a substance, as form has,' etc., Accordingly, as unhappiness is *perceived by the soul* through its union with the mind, such attributes as multiplicity, changeableness and transientness, must be also assigned to the soul; for, without a change in the substance which is in contact, it is nowhere found that a quality is added or removed. Nor has it at any time been found that a substance which changes, is without parts, or that a substance whose qualities are transient, is eternal. Nor is the ether considered as an eternal thing by those

* Viz., the connexion [between substance and quality which exists between ether and sound, of which the one (sound) is perceptible, the other (ether) not perceptible, may also exist between soul and happiness.

† This is in accordance with the principle, that where there is a relation between quality and substance, these are both perceived by one and the same kind (source) of knowledge, as for instance a jar and its white colour.

‡ In accordance with the doctrine of the Nyāya, that the mind, through whose agency every object, external or internal, is represented to the soul, can only perceive one object at one time.

who follow the Sruti. Nor is there any other case.* If you say, "that a thing, although it changes may be eternal, because the knowledge, 'that is this,' yet remains."—we deny this, because the notion of change cannot be thought without the notion of a change of the parts of the thing.

And if you say, 'that a thing which has parts, may also be eternal,' we deny this, because a thing that has parts, must before have been joined by a union of its parts, by which the idea of a separation is established

If you say, 'that this is contrary to perception, as if you see lightning,' we object, because we conclude that its parts have been joined before. Therefore it is impossible to conceive the idea that the soul is the site of unhappiness and other transient qualities.

And if you say, 'on the supposition that the supreme soul is without unhappiness, and that there exists no other soul which is unhappy; the S'astra, which is commenced for the purpose to remove unhappiness, is useless.' we object, because it has the purpose to destroy the illusion of unhappiness, which is placed *upon the soul* by ignorance. And also because the unhappiness of the soul is only fictitious, and is removed in the same way, as a mistake in counting a common number, in which the person who counts himself, is included †

As the image of the sun, etc., enters the water, so the entrance of the soul means the perceptibility of the soul in its effect which is manifested like a reflection. Before the production of the world the soul is not perceived; afterwards being perceived within the intellect

* The supposition of atoms is meant; for the existence of atoms can not be proved by any evidence.

† This seems to refer to the following tale. Ten friends having crossed a dangerous river, were anxious to know, whether any of them had been lost, and accordingly one of them commenced to count, but omitting himself (A'tma, meaning the soul and himself,) found of course that there were only nine. The others successively counted also, but doing it in the same manner as the first, the result was the same. Upon this they thought, that one had perished in the river, and broke out in lamentations. A stranger who passed by, perceived the cause of their error, and explaining it to them satisfactorily, changed their distress into rejoicing.

in the effect which is created, manifested, as the reflection of the sun is perceived in water, etc., it is defined, as it were, as entering after the creation of the effect. This is evident, for example, from the following passages :

"He entered this world." B. A. U. 1st Adh. 3d B. 7. B. I. Vol. II. p. 155.) "Having created this world, he verily entered it." (Taittiriya U. 2d Adh. 6th Anu. B. I. Vol. VII. p. 90.) "Having opened the place, where the hair is divided, he entered by this door" (Aitt. U. 3 Kh. 12 Varga B. I. Vol. VII. p. 198). "This deity reflected: Verily, I am these three deities." (Chh. U. 6th Prapa 3 Kh. B. I. Vol. III. p. 406.) "Having entered by this life, soul, etc." (Chh. U. 6th Prapa 3d Kh. B. I. Vol. pp 407—411.)

This is meant by the entering of the soul, but we say it is impossible, that the soul which is all-pervading and, without parts, has ever a real entrance, the notion of which is to proceed from one part of space, place, or time to another.

Moreover there is nothing else but the supreme soul, as we said before in accordance with such passages of the Sruti as the following: "There is nothing else that sees, hears, etc., but he." (B. A. 3rd A. 6th B. 11 B. I. Vol. II. p. 637.)

And the notions of creation, entrance, preservation, and destruction are merely formed for the apprehension of the soul. Again the apprehension of the soul is enjoined for the sake of final liberation, which is evident from such passages of the Sruti as:

"He knew the soul." (B. A. 1st Adh. 4th B. 10. B. I. Vol. II. p. 198.) "Therefore he was this all." (B. A. p. 209) "He who knows Bramha, obtains liberation. (Taitt. 2d A. I Anuv. I Kh. B. I. Vol. VII. p. 37) "He who knows the supreme Bramha, verily becomes Bramha." (3 Mund. U. 2 Kh. 9 M. B. I. and Vol. VIII. p. 323.) "The person, who has a teacher, knows Bramha." (Chh. U. 6 Prapa. 14 Kh. B. I. Vol. III. p. 459) "He lives as long" (as he has not obtained liberation.) (Chh. U. 6th P. 14th KI. B. I. Vol. III. p. 460) It is also evident from passages of the Smṛiti as: "Then forthwith." Bh. G. 18th Adh. 55) Having known me in truth, he enters me. "For it (the knowledge of Bramha) is the highest knowledge; for immortality is thereby gained." (Manu, S. 12th Add. 85)

And the passages with regard to a creation, etc. serve for the purpose to establish the knowledge of the identity of the soul, because the notion of difference is prohibited. Therefore the entrance means the perceptibility of the soul, as far as it abides in its effect.

Until the ends of the nails, as a razor is placed in a razor-case, or Viswambhara in the dwelling of Viswambhara. They do not behold him. For when incomplete, when inspiring only, it is called life, when speaking, speech, when seeing, sight, when hearing ear, when minding, mind. These are the names of its actions. Whosoever worships one or the other special being, *separate* from that *totality*, he does not know, for that soul is incomplete; it is *determined* by this or that individual function. The soul; considering this, *let a man* worship it; for in it all these *differences* become one.

“Until the ends of the nails.” (Vide. p. 78.) This means, to the ends of the nails the consciousness of the soul extends. How did he enter the world? The answer is: As in common life, “a razor is perceived as placed in a razor-case, or as Viswambhara, which means fire,—so called from its supporting (bhara), the world, Viswa,—is concealed in a nest, viz, in wood, etc.,—it is there; for on rubbing wood, etc., fire is perceived,—and as a razor is placed on one side of the case, and as fire is everywhere pervading wood, etc., so, the soul, generally and specially, abides pervading the body. For there it is observed, performing the functions of inspiration, etc. and of seeing, etc., Therefore “they do not behold,” do not apprehend “him” the soul, which has entered there, endowed as it is with inspiration, etc., seeing and other functions.

But is not in the sentence: “They do not behold him,” a prohibition of a thing, which has not been obtained before? for, *no doubt* the beholding has not been obtained in our text.

There is no fault in this, for in the passages, relative to the creation, *preservation*, etc., which were directed towards the acquirement of the knowledge, that the soul is identical, the beholding (knowledge) of it (of the soul) has been introduced. Thus a Mantra declares: “Being of this and that form, he became every form for the sake of

being seen." (Kath. U. 5 V. 9-10 Mantr. B. I. Vol. VIII, p. 138. B. A. U. 2 A. 5 Bramh. 19 Kh. B. I. Vol. II. p. 6000 p. 23.)

The reason, why *the soul* having the functions of inspiration, expiration, etc., is not apprehended, is given in the words: "For when incomplete;" because it is not perfect, when inspiring or performing other functions. Whence again *proceeds* the incompleteness? The answer is: for by "inspiring" performing the function of inspiration (Prānana) it is called life (Prāna), for by performing the function of inspiration (Prānana) life (Prāna) inspires, that is to say, performs no other function, as a *wood-cutter* or a *cook*; *is so called from his special work*. Therefore because it does not include the other functions, it is incomplete.

In the same manner, "when speaking," performing the function of speaking, it is called speech, "When seeing," it is called sight; for because the beholder sees (chashte) therefore it is called eye (chakshu:); when hearing (s'rinwan), it is called ear (s'rotram). By the words: "when inspiring, it is called life, when speaking, speech," the origin of the power of action is shown, by the words "When seeing, sight, when hearing, ear," the origin of the power of knowledge; for the objects of the power of knowledge are name and form; for nothing is an object of knowledge, unless having name and form. The organs of perceiving them are the eye and the ear, and the action, to be performed by name and form, is intimately united with life. The organ of the manifestation of *this action*, which depends upon life, is the word. In this manner speech is mentioned here in illustration of the other organs of action, viz, the hand, foot, and the organs of excretion and generation; for it will afterwards be said: "for this all is manifested, or this threefold, name, form and action." (B. A. 2d A. 1st B. 1st Kh. B. I. Vol. II. p. 313.)

"When minding, mind." Mind (mana:) is derived from minding (manute), and it is the general organ of the manifestation of the power of knowledge.

These names of inspiration, etc., are the names of "its," the soul's, 'actions,' that is to say, produced from actions. They are names of action, as it were, but not objects of the substance, (of the soul) alone; therefore they do not manifest the whole substance of the soul; for in this manner the soul, although manifested by the

action of inspiration, etc. and by its forms and names, derived from its different actions, *is still not completely apprehended.*

"Whosoever worships this or the other special being,"—separated from its totality as inspiration, etc., for instance life, or the eye, as a being, unmodified by the totality of the other special actions,—*whosoever worships this* in his mind under the notion, that it is the soul, "he does not know" Bramha. Why? "for that soul is incomplete," not whole, because this soul, *as* separated from this totality of inspiration, etc., *seeing*, etc., and determined *only* by one or the other determining action, excludes all the other attributes. As long as a person knows himself *only* as determined by the activity of his own nature, which appears in such sentences as: "I see," "I hear," "I touch," etc., so long he does not know perfectly the complete soul.

How again seeing does he know? *The text* answers: "The soul;" for it is called soul (A'tmá) because it [unites (obtains, A'pnuvan) all the above mentioned different functions of life, etc., The soul, in this manner including all differences, become all; for only in its notion as substance it unites (obtains) the differences, produced by actions of inspiration, etc., etc., which are the fictitious attributes *of the soul*. For instance it will be said: "He thinks, as it were, he proceeds, as it were." (B. A. 4th A. 3rd B. Sth Kh. B. I. Vol. II. p. 730). Therefore "The soul, considering this, let a man worship it;" for in this manner the whole soul is comprehended by its own notion as substance. Why is it [the whole? Under this doubt it is said *in the text*; "For in it," "for," because, "in it" in this soul, when considered, *considered* without fictitious attributes, like the different reflections of the sun in water, the above mentioned differences as life, etc., which are fictitious attributes *of the soul* and bear different names from their different functions as inspiration, etc., "become one," obtain indifference, therefore "the soul considering this, let a man worship it."

The passage: "The soul; considering this, let a man worship, it is not a regulation, by which the acquirement of something not acquired before is enjoined, as it is acquired on our part; for the knowledge whose object is the soul, is produced by passages of the Sruti, intended to produce *the idea* of the supreme soul, for instance:

*
 "That present, perceptible Brahma," (B. A. 3rd A. 4th B. 2 Kh. B I. Vol. II. p. 575.) "Which is soul." (B. A. 4th A. 3rd B. 1st Kh. B, I, Vol. II. p. 723) Whose nature is knowledge, etc. (B. A. p. 305.)

There by the knowledge of the nature of the soul is removed the ignorance, which is the misunderstanding that the non-soul is the soul, and which creates the fictions of agent, etc., rite and reward. If this *ignorance* is removed, the thinking of the non-soul is impossible, because desires and other faults are impossible. It remains at last only the thinking of the soul. Therefore the worship of the soul is on our part not enjoined; for it is acquired.

We will not now discuss, whether the acquirement of the worship of the soul is called proceeding from the text, or permanent, but *at any rate* it is regulation for something not acquired before, because, if knowledge and worship are the same, it was not acquired *before*, and the identity of the terms of "knowledge" and "worship," is evident from the passage of the *Sruti*, commencing: "He does not know," where knowledge is praised, and concluding: "The soul; considering this, let a man worship it," (B. A. p. 173), for by such passage of the *Sruti* as: "By this he knows this all." (B. A. p. 185), and: "He knew the soul," etc. (B. A. p. 198), knowledge is the same as worship, and as it was not acquired before, it is also the object of a rule.

Nor show people any activity, if only the nature of a thing is related. Therefore that passage is a regulation for acquiring something not acquired before.

This follows also from its being identical with a regulation concerning rites. As the regulations concerning rites enjoin by such words as: "Let him sacrifice," let him offer," so by similar words as: "Let a man worship it," and: "The soul should be seen," etc., *the worship of the soul is enjoined*, wherefore there appears no difference between a regulation enjoining the worship of the supreme soul and the former *regulations*.

This follows also from the reason, that knowledge is an act of the mind. As a person, by whom an oblation is taken for a deity, should reflect on this deity in his mind, before performing a sacrifice, which is commenced by the word: "Vashad," by which this and

other ceremonies are proved as acts of the mind, so the passage : "Let a man worship," indicates *the soul* is to be thought of, to be meditated upon (B. A. A. 2d A. 4th B. 5th Kh. B. I. V. II. 450.) and that the act therefore refers to knowledge. In this manner we maintained that the terms "to know" (Veda) and "to worship" had the same meaning.

This follows also from the reason that *our passage*-possesses the three parts of a regulation. For instance in the regulation : "Let him sacrifice," etc., viz., what, by what means, and how, the three parts, by which future desires are removed, clearly appear. In the same manner, if the regulation : "Let a man worship," is about to be fixed, and at the same time the intention, what is to be worshipped, by what means or how, the three parts are established by a passage like this : "Let him who is intent on the duties of abstinence (from desires that are forbidden) of the observances of a religious student, of tranquility and self-restraint, of resting (from all ceremonies), endurance, etc., worship the soul by the mind."

And as by the enunciation of the regulation for the Dars'apurna-masa, etc., the application of all its parts *is established*, so by the enunciation of the regulation for the worship of the soul *is established* the application of the subject of the worship of the soul as found in *all* the Upanishads. The application of passage as : "He is not this, he is not that. (B. A. 2d A. 3. B. 6th K. B. J. V. III. p. 435.) "Without gross body," one, without duality. (Chh. U. 6 P. 2 K. p. 387.) "He overcomes death," etc., is made by showing the speciality of the nature of the soul which is to be worshipped. And the reward is liberation or cessation from ignorance.

Others say : 'By worshipping should be produced another special knowledge whose object is the soul. By this alone the soul is known, and ignorance also removed. The knowledge produced by the word of the Veda, has not the soul for its object. This sense is also supported by such passage as : "Having known, let him form *his* knowledge:" "he is to be seen, to be heard, to be thought of, to be contemplated, to be searched, to be enquired."

We do not admit *the latter view*, because its meaning does not differ from the former. Nor is the passage : "The soul, therefore

let him worship it," a regulation for something, not acquired before. Why? The words, referring to the nature of the soul, have no other meaning, of any thing to be done by the mind or the external senses beside the knowledge, produced by the prohibiting sentences with reference to the non-soul.* For there is a rule has taken effect, where, beside the knowledge produced by merely hearing the words a person is observed as engaged in its execution, as by the rule of the Darsapurnamasa: "let him, who is desirous of heaven, sacrifice;" for the knowledge, produced by the words for the regulation of the Darsapurnamasa, is not *also* the performance of its ceremonies. This is dependent on a perfect knowledge and the other requisites; but *here, on the other hand*, beside the knowledge, produced by the passage viz. "He is not this, he is not that," establishing *the idea of* the soul, there arises no activity, as it does not regard to the ceremonies of the Darsapurnamasa, etc., and this for the reason, that the knowledge produced by that passage, causes the cessation of every activity; for [the knowledge of] a person who is unconcerned in any worldly affair, does not produce activity, because such sentences as: "He is one without duality." (Chh. U. 6 Prap. 2 Kh. B. J. Vol. III. pp. 387, 389, 398.) "That art thou," (etc., pp. 448, 457, 453, 455, 461.) annihilate the (knowledge) relative to non-Brahma, or the non-soul. And this knowledge being annihilated, no desire for action arises: for it would be contradictory.

If it is said, 'that by the knowledge alone, produced by such passages (as established the nature of Brahma) there is no annihilation of the knowledge of a non-Brahma or a non-soul. And this knowledge being annihilated, no desire for action arises: for it would be contradictory.

If it is said, 'that by the knowledge alone, produced by such passages (as established the nature of Brahma) there is no annihilation of the knowledge of a non-Brahma, or a non-soul,' we contradict, because it is proved by such passages as: "that art thou," "It is not this," "It is that," "This is the soul," "One immortal Brahma without duality is this," "There is none who sees, etc., but

* That is to say, 'the sentences which declare the nature of the soul, have the same meaning as sentences, which prohibit to comprehend the soul by attributes of the non-soul.

him," "Know this alone as Brahma." (Kena U. 4, B. I. Vol. VIII. p. 43.)

Nor do those *passages* set forth the object of a rule with reference to *Brahma* to be seen, etc., because this, as we already said, does not differ from the meaning first stated. And we said before, that—because by passage, setting forth the true nature of the soul, such as : "That art thou," the knowledge of the soul was established at the time of hearing them,—no performance, different from the regulation for the object of the seeing, was necessary.*

1. If you say, 'that, without a rule, by the mere declaration of the nature of the soul, a knowledge of the soul could not arise,' we object, because the knowledge of the soul is produced by hearing passage, setting forth the soul, and why do you want to do once more what has been done already ?

2. If you say, 'knowledge does not arise by hearing such passages,' we do not admit this, because we should otherwise have a retrogress in infinitum. For as (according to your opinion) by hearing the meanings of the passages, declaring the soul, without a regulation, knowledge does not arise, it would follow, that also by hearing the meanings of the words of the regulation, knowledge could not arise without a regulation, and this would require another regulation. The same would take place on hearing the latter, so that a retrogress in infinitum is evident, (by your assumption)

3. Further, if you assume, 'that by the continuation of the recollection of the knowledge of the soul, arising from *Vedic* passages, a meaning is produced, different from the knowledge of what is merely heard, (and that therefore a regulation is necessary)' we do not agree on the ground, that the meaning has been obtained. At the time indeed that the knowledge, whose object is the soul, arises from hearing passages which produce the *idea* of the soul, at the

* Where then is the regulation ? If there is one, it either takes place—1, with reference to the knowledge of the soul, or 2, to the hearing of the passage, setting forth the knowledge of the soul, or 3, to the continuation of the recollection of its meaning, or 4, to the subsiding of the state of the mind. But in all those cases it is impossible, as will be shown presently. A. G.

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time this knowledge, at the moment of its production, annihilates the false knowledge with reference to itself. And if the false edge whose object is the soul, is annihilated, the natural recollections also, which are the effects of that *false knowledge* and manifest the differences of a substance not the soul, cease to

it follows also from the knowledge of the unreality of every thing; for if the knowledge of the soul is true, it is also known, every other substance is unreal, as tainted with transiency, impurity and many other faults; also from the fact, the substance of the soul is free from them. Therefore, if the soul is known, there are no longer any recollections of a knowledge with reference to a non-soul. And as at last there exists in reality a true recollection of the knowledge only of the soul, no regulation can be established.

It follows also from the annihilation of *all* faults, as grief, sorrow, fear, weariness and other kinds of unhappiness;* for grief, sorrow and other faults arise from a knowledge, contrary to that action, as is proved by such passages of the S'ruti as: "What is there?" (Vaj. S. U. B. I. Vol. p. 14.) "the wise is not sorrowful." You have, O Janaka, obtained fearlessness." (Br. A. p. 1. 1. 10.) "The bonds of the hearts are broken," etc. Mund. 2d. Kh. 1. 1. 1. Vol. p. 302.)

When you say, 'but then subduing has another meaning; there ought to be a *regulation*; for the subduing of the state of mind (Chitta) has a meaning different from the knowledge proclaimed in the words of the Veda. And in other philosophical systems the nature of a rule is known by that which is to be done.' We say, because it (the subduing of the state of the mind) is not effecting liberation; for in the Vedānta nothing else but knowledge of the soul as Brahma is considered as effecting the liberation of man. This follows from a hundred passages such as: "He knows the soul alone; hence he became this all."

*This may also be rendered . . . and other kinds of unhappiness, is effected by that recollection; for grief, delusion and other faults arise from a contrary knowledge.

In the Yogashāstra.

(B. A. p. 209.) "The knower of Brahma obtains the supreme Brahma." (Taittiriya U. 2d. A. I. A. I. M. B. I. Vol. VII. p. 51) "Whosoever verily knows the supreme Brahma, becomes Bramha." "A person who has a teacher, knows." (Chh. 6th P. 14th K. B. J. V. III. p. 459) "To him all becomes forever without fear." "Whosoever thus knows, becomes Brahma." etc.

Moreover the *aforesaid* subduing depends not upon another cause ; for beside the uninterrupted recollection of the knowledge of the soul, no other cause exists for the subduing of the state of the soul, and in this sense it has been stated before ;* without a knowledge of Brahma, however, nothing can be thought as cause of liberation.

Further there, is no intention, and therefore is no regulation, What has been said *before*, 'that, as an intention with regard to a regulation,—for instance when it is said: "Let him sacrifice," where the three parts of a regulation, *viz*, what, by what, means. and how. are present,—is removed by *understanding* the effect, cause and the necessary acts, so it is also here established with reference to the regulation for the knowledge of the soul,' *we say*, this is not true, because every intention is annihilated at the very time, when the meaning of passages as the following is understood: "One even without duality." "That art thou." "He is not this, he is not that." "That soul, which is not within, which is not without, is Bramha," etc.,

Nor is the application of a regulation possible, in order to understand the meaning of a sentence. And we have already explained the fault of a regress in infinitum, following from the application of another rule.

Further, no rule can be understood to proceed from passages such as ; "One Brahma even without duality," because it is abolished by the declaration of the nature of the soul.

And if you say, 'there is no proof that this takes place by the mere declaration of the nature of a substance. For instance as in the passage: "He wept (arodit): because he wept, therefore Rudra (a name of fire) obtained the name of Rudra," (Taitt. S. 5th Pr. 1st

* Viz. That the state of the mind, beside the knowledge of the soul has no other cause.

'By employing the term "considering this," (vide p. 86.) the worship of the non-soul† (under the idea of the soul) is rather enjoined, as if it were said: "the dear, considering this worship it." Here is not the quality of "dear" to be worshipped, but *the worship of life*, etc., which has the quality of "dear," etc., is here enjoined. In the same manner it must also be understood in the passage under consideration, that by employing the term "the supreme soul," the substance of the non-soul, determined by the qualities of the soul, is to be worshipped. This is also clear from the difference of that passage from any other, where the worship of the soul is enjoined. Thus for instance it will afterwards be said: "Worship the soul as the place of *dependence*." In this sentence the worship of the soul is evidently intended by using the accusative case. In the sentence under consideration, however, the accusative is not employed, and there "the soul, considering this worship it" the term "soul" means something different. Therefore it is evident, that not the worship of the soul is enjoined, but of something else possessed of the qualities of the soul.'

We deny this, for as at the end of the passage the idea of the worship of the soul is understood; it is also understood, that the soul alone is to be worshipped, viz., "This, even this is to be conceived in this all, viz., this soul," "Because this soul is more internal," "He knew the soul"

If you say 'that there does not arise the notion of the worship (of the soul) as the beholding is prohibited for him who entered; for which soul is said to enter, for the same the beholding is forbidden, as it is evident from the passage, obtained in the text, viz., "They do not behold *him*," (p. 85.) Accordingly the soul is no object of worship.'

We deny this, for the beholding is *merely* prohibited, in consequence of the fault of non-totality, with the intention to guard against the fault of non-totality, not with the intention to guard against the

* This is an objection in the view of the Sāṅkhyas viz., the non-soul is the Prādhāna, (the chief) or Mula Prakṛiti (nature as the root of all things) which, according to the passage, would obtain the attributes of the soul, or the non-soul is to be thought of under the attributes of

worship of the soul, because the soul is determined *in that passage* by the differences of inspiration and other actions.

And if you say, 'that the worship of the soul was not intended,' the consequence were, that the passage, referring to the non-totality of the soul, which is determined by individual functions, as inspiration, etc., would be without use, viz., for that soul is incomplete ; it is *determined* only by this or the other individual function," (vide p. 86.) Hence it is proved, that the soul, possessed of many functions, on account of its totality, is an object of worship. The final application, however, of the term "soul" after the term "considering this," is in truth only to show that the real notion of the soul is no object whatever of the inflective base of the word *atman* (soul) and its inflection-terminations, (that is to say, the supreme soul cannot be described by any words,) other-wise the accusative case would have been used : "Let him worship the soul." If this were the meaning, (that is, if, without the formula "considering this" the word *atma* should be applied) then the inflective base and one of its terminations would be applied to the soul. But this is not admitted, as is clear from such passages of the *Sruti* as : "It is not this, it is not that," "How should one know him who knows," "Unknown is he who knows." (B. A. p. 473.) "From whom words and the mind return, without having obtained him." (Taitt. U. 2d A. 9 A. B. J. Vol. VII. p. 119.) The *passage*, however : "Let him worship the soul as the place," is not a different word, because it is designed to remove the worship of the non-soul.

This even this is to be conceived in this all, *viz.* This soul ; for by this, one knows this all. As verily by a foot-print one finds *cattle*, so a person who thus knows, finds fame and completeness, 7.

If it is said : 'Both the soul and non-soul are to be known, as they have the common notion of not being perfectly known. Why then is here made an effort to worship the soul alone, as it is said : "The soul, considering this let one worship it," and not also *an effort* with regard to the other knowledge?' The answer to this is : "This, even this," which is obtained in the text, "is to be con-

case in Sanscrit, "Asya Sarvvasya," is, for the sake of determination, used for the seventh, "Asmin Sarvvasmin,") "this soul," the nature of the soul. Shall this not be known? *If so*, why not also what is different? Because, when known, another knowledge is not required, different from the knowledge of the soul. Why? "for," because, "by this," knowledge of the soul, "one knows this all," all this other which is non-soul.

If the objection is made, 'by another knowledge is not known another thing,' we shall refute it *afterwards* by the passage, referring to the drum, &c. (B. A. U. p. 452.)

How again is this to be conceived? The answer is: "As verily," in common life, "by a foot-print" (a foot-print is called a place marked by the hoof of a cow, &c.) "one" who makes a search by means of a foot-print, "finds," recovers, cattle that have been lost, and whose recovery is desired, thus, when the soul is obtained, all is obtained.

'If the soul is known, all other is known, and knowledge *we may admit*, is obtained in the text. But then how can it be called obtaining a term which is not authorised by the text?' This is not the case, because the term of "knowledge" and of "obtaining" have one and the same meaning according to the intention of the speaker; for the non-obtaining of the soul is even ignorance. Therefore is knowledge of the obtaining of the soul, *and* the obtaining of the soul is not,—like the obtaining of anything which is not the soul,—to be comprehended by the notion of an acquiring of what was not acquired before, because there is no difference (here) between the obtainer and what is to be obtained; for where the non-soul is to be obtained by the soul, there is the soul the obtainer, and the non-soul what is to be obtained. This (non-soul) is not acquired, as concealed by the action of producing, &c. and is to be obtained *when* producing a special action by the production of a special agent; but it falls under the notion of an acquirement of something not acquired before, *and* is transient, because it is the effect of an action in accordance with a desire, produced by false knowledge as the obtaining of a son in a dream. But the soul, which is contrary to the former (non-soul), is by its nature as soul not concealed by the actions of production, &c. Therefore, as there exists the nature of something eternally obtained, is ignorance only concealment. As the non-apprehension

of mother-of-pearl, although apprehended,* which appears through error as silver, is merely a concealment of the opposite knowledge, so is apprehension even mere knowledge, because knowledge (has destroyed the concealment by the opposite knowledge. Thus in this case also is the non-obtaining of the soul the concealment of it merely by ignorance. Therefore by knowledge must be understood an obtaining, which annihilates ignorance merely, and no other obtaining. Therefore we shall say afterwards, that in respect of the obtaining of the soul, any cause, which has any meaning different from knowledge is useless. Therefore the text, without any doubt, intending to set forth the identity of the terms of "knowledge" and "obtaining," after having mentioned knowledge in the text, says: "One finds" (as Vindati, "to find," has the meaning of Lâbha "obtaining," this is stated as the effect from the knowledge of the qualities)

As that soul, by entering with name and form, acquired fame, viz. with the names and forms of the soul, etc., and as it obtained completeness (Sloka) that is to say the totality of life and other actions, so a person who thus knows, "finds," obtains, "fame," (kirti) celebrity, and "completeness" (Sloka), a multitude of followers together with his friends.

Or the passage may also thus be understood A person who knows the substance in the declared manner, obtains the knowledge of identity (which is understood by term "kirti,") desired by those who strive for liberation, and the fruit of that knowledge (which is understood by the term Sloka) liberation, that is to say, the principal fruit. 7.

This is dearer than a son, dearer than wealth, dearer than any other thing, dearer than all, because this soul is more internal. Whosoever says to one, saying any thing else to be dearer than the soul: "What is dear, is to perish," he is the lord, therefore verily it should be so. A person should worship as dear even the soul. Whosoever worships as dear the soul, to him is not dear a perishable object. 8

* According to its nature, adds A.

And why *then* is the nature of the soul to be known without regard to other things? The answer is: "This," the nature of the soul, "is dearer," more beloved, "than a son;" for a son is generally known as dear. By saying that it is more beloved even than this, it is shown, how exceedingly dear it is. In the same manner it is dearer *than* "wealth," gold, jewels, &c., in the same manner "*dearer than any other thing*," which is generally known as dear, that is to say, therefore *dearer* than all.

Why then is the nature of the soul more beloved, *why not rather* life &c.? The answer is: The totality of life is more internal, is nearer the soul than what is external, a son, wealth, &c., "because this soul," this nature of the soul, "is more internal" than what is more internal. For a person who in common life is exceedingly dear, must be obtained by every effort. In this manner is the soul the dearest of all that is dear in common life, that is to say, great efforts should be made to obtain it. Why again, discarding an effort, considered as a duty, with regard to the obtaining of other dear objects, shall,—by the abandonment of either of the dear *objects*, the soul and non-soul,—with reference to the obtaining of the production of one, the abandonment of the other rather be made by the obtaining of the production of the soul,—why not the contrary?

In reply to this it is said: "Whosoever (viz. a person who holds that the soul is the dearest object) says to one saying any thing else," some particular non-soul, for instance a son, etc., 'to be more beloved than the soul,' what? "What is dear," in the opinion, a son or the like, "is to perish" (*rotshyati*) is to obtain concealment, or *ceasing* of life (*Prânasamrodham*) that is, "is to be destroyed." On what ground can he say so? Because "he is the lord," because he is able, fit to say so, therefore it should be so, that he obtains the *ceasing* of life, as has been said by him; for he is a speaker of truth; therefore he is the lord to say every thing. Some understand by the term "*Iswara*" (which has before been explained by able, and whose original meaning is ruler, lord) "*quick*." If it is accomplished, then, abandoning every other dear object, a person should worship as dear only the soul. "Whosoever worships as dear even the soul, to him, it is considered, is the soul alone dear, *and* no other object. Having come to the certainty, that any other worldly object which is dear, is even in reality not dear, he worships, he meditates; "to him," who

thus knows, "is not dear a perishable object," an object whose nature is subject to death. This sentence (let him worship as a dear even the soul) is *either* only a repetition of what is certain (of the sentence by which the knowledge of the soul is produced) because for one who knows the soul, nothing is dear or not dear, or it is said for the praise of the knowledge, that the soul is dear, or for the determination of the fruit of the attribute of "dear," because it is producing faith in the perishable nature of all dear objects in the mind of one whose knowledge of the soul is of a sluggish kind. 8.

Then they declare to be the knowledge of Brahma by which men think, we shall become all. What then knew that Brahma, by which he became all? 9.

The knowledge of Brahma has been declared in the aphorism: "The soul, considering this, let a man worship it." Wishing to explain this very aphorism, for which the whole Upanishad has been composed, the text exemplifies it under the desire of setting forth its necessity (end.)

"This," viz. the thing to be set forth, to be manifested in the text sentence, "they declare" they, viz. the Brâhmanas those who are desirous to know Brahma, having repaired to the Guru (spiritual teacher) the vessel over the future shoreless ocean of the pain of exertion, caused by the uninterrupted revolution of the wheel of birth, old age and death, who are desirous of crossing over to its shore, who are separated from the nature of cause and effect, viz., the cause of virtue and vice and its consequence, and who are desirous of obtaining the eternal incomparable good, free from those causes.

What do they declare? The answer is: "the knowledge of Bramha;" Bramha means the supreme soul; the knowledge, by which this is comprehended, is the knowledge of Bramha, "men, think, we shall become all" the totality. The term "man," is used for the purpose to indicate the special subject of this knowledge;* for men alone are the subjects of effecting in a special manner

* In the text is *adhikâra*, which means "possession," "competent knowledge." I translated *adhikari*, as conveying the idea more exactly.

either a state of elevation* or of liberation. This is the intention of the text. As with regard to works they think, that fruits will necessarily follow from works, so they think, that from the knowledge of Bramha the fruit, which is the state of universal identity, will necessarily follow; for as to their being proved by the Veda, there is no difference between them (the works and Bramha).

There† is something‡ contradictory indicated. Therefore we ask: "What then knew that Bramha," by whose knowledge men think, we shall become all? What knew that, "by which," knowledge, he became this all, and Bramha is all according to the Sruti.

If he, (Bramha) not entirely knowing any thing, became all, then it (all) may also belong to others, and of what use would then be the knowledge of Bramha? If knowing, *something* it became all, then, as it is effected by knowledge, *all* (the effect from knowledge) is like the effect from work, and therefore the notion of transientness is in fact applied. Moreover, the effect from a knowledge of Bramha, which (effect) is the state of the nature of all, has the fault of a regress into infinitum, namely knowing something else than this, he became all, and further knowing else, etc. etc. *However* if knowing all, it became all, there is not the fault of a contradiction of the meaning of the Sastra, and therefore not the fault of a transientness of the effect. If, knowing something *only*, this Bramha became all, we ask: "What then knew that Bramha, by which he became all? 9.

Brahma verily was this before; therefore he knew even the soul, (himself.)

Having thus said, the text gives an answer, untouched by any blemish: "Bramha," viz., the inferior *Bramha*, because it is obtained under the notion of a 'cause of the nature of all; for it is impossible to obtain by knowledge the nature of all with regard to the supreme Bramha, and the text speaks of an obtaining of the

* In the scale of existence, viz., the state of happiness, in the different worlds.

† In assigning to man the notion of subject.

‡ Something means here the effect from knowledge. A. G.

nature of all by means of knowledge, in the words: "Therefore this became all." Therefore the words: "Brahma verily was this before," cannot mean any thing else but the inferior Brahman.

Or: 'By making man the subject of the knowledge, a Brahman who is to become this *Brahman*, may be designated. For in the passage: "Men think, we shall become all,"* men are obtained in the text, and it is said, that they are in a special manner the subjects to effect elevation or liberation; *this is not said* either of the supreme Brahman, or of the inferior Prajapati. Therefore, on account of his knowledge of Brahman, is here designated a Brahman (Brâhmana), who is to become a supreme Brahman, who by the knowledge of the inferior Brahman, viz. the knowledge, that duality is identity, a knowledge which is connected with works, has obtained the state of an inferior Brahman, who has renounced *all* enjoyment, and who by obtaining all, has broken the bonds of desire and work. It appears also in common life, that a term is applied with reference to its future state, for instance in the sentence: "He cooks the boiled rice; (*Odana* means rice which is boiled,) and also in the Sastra, for instance: "Let a Paribrajaka (a person who has already obtained a state, entirely devoted to the contemplation of God) give to all beings *the blessing of fearlessness*." In this manner some explain a Brahman as a person who is to become Brahman.

This is not right, because, if the nature of all is obtained, the fault of transientness is committed; for it is impossible, that in this world any person should in reality obtain by any cause another state, and *at the same time* be eternal. In the same manner, if by means of the knowledge of Brahman the nature of all should be obtained, and *this state be at the same time* eternal, there is a contradiction. If *on the other hand*, it (viz., the nature of all) is considered as non-eternal, the before mentioned fault takes place, viz., that there is a resemblance with the effects from works. But if you think, 'that the abolition of the nature of non-totality (individual

* Here the opinion of the Vrittikrits is given; which is the view of the Bhartriprapancha Bhâshya, viz., because the nature of all is obtained under the notion of something to be accomplished (of an effect, viz. from knowledge) it is impossible, that the supreme Brahman should have obtained the nature of all by knowledge.

existence) which (nature of non-totality) is the effect of ignorance, and the obtaining of the nature of all, is the effect of Bramha, then the fiction of a person who is to become Brahman, is useless. But if you think, that even before the knowledge of Brahman every creature by its possessing the nature of Brahman, has eternally obtained the nature of all, that the state of non-Brahman and of non-totality is superimposed in reality by ignorance and that, as silver is superimposed on mother-of-pearl, or as any special place (Atala means, literally, a division of the infernal regions) of standing or uncleanness on the sky, so are here the notions of non-Brahman and of non-totality superimposed by ignorance and removed by the knowledge of Brahman; if you think thus, then it is right to say, that in reality the supreme Brahman was, because in the passage: "Brahman verily was this before," the literal meaning of the term "Brahman," is supreme Brahman; for the Veda declares a meaning, as it in reality is; but the fiction, according to which a person which is to become Brahman is called Brahman, at variance with the meaning of the term "Brahman," is not right, because a hypothesis, by which the meaning of the Sruti is lost, and a fiction is made of something, not acquired in the Sruti, is inadmissible, unless there be some strong necessity.

If you say, 'that, without being produced by ignorance, there may exist the nature of non-Brahman and non-totality,' we object, because it is impossible, that in this case they could be removed by the knowledge of Brahman; for it is never observed, that knowledge either destroys or creates the attributes of any actual thing, but it is every where observed as the destroyer of ignorance. In the same manner let also in our case the knowledge of Brahman remove the nature of non-Brahman and non-totality, as the productions of ignorance; but the knowledge of Brahman is never able to create or destroy any real thing. Therefore the hypothesis, by which the meaning of the Sruti is lost, and a fiction is made of something, not found in the Sruti, is even without use.

If you say, 'that ignorance with regard to Brahman is impossible,' we do not agree, because knowledge is enjoined with regard to Brahman; for if mother of pearl has become an object of the eye, then its nature is never known by such a sentence: This is mother-of-pearl and is not silver, unless there is a superimposition of (the

notion of) silver upon it. In the same manner, from such passages as: "This all alone existing," "This all alone Brahma," "This all merely the soul," "This is not duality, non-Brahma," the knowledge of identity with reference to Brahma could never be enjoined, unless there is a superimposition of ignorance upon Brahma. We do not say (like you), as there is a *superimposition* with regard to mother-of-pearl, so there is a superimposition of the nature of non-Brahma (atad.) What then? Brahma is not the cause of the superimposition of the nature of non-Brahma upon his own self, and is not the producer of ignorance.

We admit, that Brahma is not producer of ignorance nor deluded; but do not admit, that there is another deluded conscious *being* (beside Brahma, which could be the producer of the ignorance of non-Brahma. This is evident from such passages of the Sruti as: "There is no other knower than him." "There is nothing else which knows but him." "That art thou." (Ch. U. p. 448). "He knew the soul." (B. U. 184) "I am the soul." (B. A. p. 205). "Another is he, another am I." He does not know." And also from such passages of the Smriti as: Whosoever beholds God as the same in all beings," etc. (Bhag. Git. 13 Adh. 27th Sl). "I am the soul, O Gudakesha, dwelling in the heart of all beings." B. G. 10th Adh. 20th Sl.) "The wise see the same ... in the dog and the man who lives upon dog's-meat." (Bh. G. 5th Adh. 18th Sl.) And from such Mantras as: "Who beholds all beings in the soul," and "In whom all beings are like the soul (Vaj. S. U. M. 6 and 7 B. i. Vol. VII. p. 13.

'But if this is the case, then is the advice of the S'âstra without any use?' Well, this may in the manner be admitted, if *Brahma* is known; but if you say 'also the knowledge is useless, we object,* because the cessation of non-understanding is visible.' If it is said: 'That cessation is even impossible, because there is identity,' we object, because this is contradictory to what is visible; for it is 'visible, that there is a cessation from non-understanding by the knowledge of identity.

* The cessation of non-knowledge is either different from Brahma, and then there non-duality is lost, or it is not different, and then it cannot be comprehended under the idea of knowledge.

If any one says, 'that even, when seen, it is impossible,' it is contradictory to what is visible; and a contradiction to what is visible, is by no body admitted.

Nor, when visible, is any thing in reality impossible, because, it is even seen.

If it is said, 'that the seeing is impossible,' the same argument holds good.

If it is said: 'From such passages of the Sruti, as the following: "He becomes holy by holy work." B. A. p. 546). "Knowledge and work entered him." "The Purusha 'is the comprehender, agent, the knowing soul," it is evident, that there is another mundane soul, different from the supreme soul. And this different soul is the supreme *Brahma*, which follows from such passages of the Sruti as: "He is not this, he is not that." (B. A. p. 435.) "The soul liberated from sin, without old age, without death," "The ruler of this universe." (B. A. p. 628.)

Also in the Sastras of Kanada, Akshapada* and others, God (I swara) is proved as different from the mundane soul; for through the desire to remove the unhappiness, arising from the world, activity is perceived with the embodied soul (and not with God), and hence the difference between God and mundane soul is clear.

I am verily Bramha. Therefore he become all.

And the Sruti and Smṛiti declare: "He, without speech, without honour:" "There is nothing, O Partha, to be done by me in the three worlds." (B. G. 3d A. 22.) "He is to be searched, to be enquired into." (Ch. U. p. 571.) "A person, knowing him, is not contaminated." (B. A. B. I. Vol. II. p. 913.) "Whosoever knows Bramha, obtains the supreme Bramha." (T. U. 2d A 1st An. 1st M.) "He (Bramha) is to be contemplated in a uniform manner." (B. A. 6th Adh. 4th Br. 20. B. I. Vol. II. p. 889.) "Knowing that which is undestroyable, O Gargi." (B. A. 5th Ad. 8th B. 10. B. I. Vol. II. p. 636.) "The firm, knowing him." (B. A. p. 829.) "The great word (the letters A' U. M. being joined) is like a bow, and the soul like the arrow; and Bramha (what) is aimed at by it." (2d Mund.

* A name of Goutama, the founder of Nyāya,

U. 4th M. B. I. p. vol. vii p. 228.) In all these passages there is a declaration of agent and action.

This is also evident from the declaration, that the roads to elevation are different from *the road of him who strives after liberation*. If there were no difference, to what place could there be proceeded by any one? And if there were not, a difference of the northern and southern roads and of the places to be proceeded to, would be impossible; but if *the mundane soul* is different from the supreme, all this is possible.

This follows from the declaration with reference to the causes of knowledge and work. If the mundane soul is different from Brahma, the declaration *addressed* to the former about work and knowledge, as being the causes either of elevation or liberation, is consistent, but it is not with reference to God, because all desires are obtained by him.*

If it is therefore (on all those grounds) said, 'It is proper, that the term "Bramha" means a person who is to become Brahma,' we object, because the application of the declaration with regard to Brahma would be useless; for if the mundane soul,—which is not Brahma, *but* is to become Brahma, *on the strength of the passage*: "knowing the soul, I am verily Brahma,"—should become all, the advice with regard to Bramha, would be undoubtedly useless, because the effect, which is the state of the nature of all, would be accomplished by the knowledge of the soul, which is to be accomplished;* because that knowledge, (viz, the knowledge of the regulation concerning work) could never be applied to the accomplishment of the last aim of man.

If is said, 'that the declaration *with regard to Bramha*, in the passage: "I am Bramha," is for the sake of transforming the mundane soul to the nature of Brahma,' we object; for, if the nature of Brahma is not perfectly known, what can the passage, "I am Brahma" transform? If his nature is known, a transformation is possible. By passages in our text such as: "That soul is verily Brahma." (B. A. 6th Adh. 4th Br. B. I. Vol. II. p. 849) "That present perceptible Brahma." (B. A. 5th Ad. 4th Br. I. B. I. Vol. II. p. 575)

* If it is said, that the advice with reference to Bramha is useful, under the condition, that it is the object of a regulation, we ask, whether it is a regulation regarding work, or regarding worship? Either assumption is ordinary.

"Which soul." (B. A. p. 575). "This is true." "This soul." "He who knows Brahma, obtains the supreme," (T. U. 2nd A. 1st A. 1st M.) and by such a conclusion as: "'From this {very soul," the terms "Brahma and "soul" are more than a {thousand times placed on the same ground, and therefore it is evident, that they have the same meaning; for {transformation of another takes place to the nature of another, and not to identity.

And the passage: "Because this all is that soul," proves the identity of the soul, which has been set forth in the text, and which is to be seen *afterwards*. Therefore, it is impossible, that the soul could be transformed to the nature of Brahma.

It is also impossible to conceive with regard to Brahma any other effect, because in such passages as: "He who {knows Brahma, becomes Brahma," the obtaining of Brahma *only* is declared.

'If the transformation is the obtaining of Brahma,' we object; for another state of another is impossible.

If it is said, 'that according to the word of the S'ruti the obtaining to the state of Brahma, even implies transformation,' we object, because transformation is only a notion (not something real), and we said, that knowledge had no other agency but to destroy a false knowledge: a word has no power to produce any thing, S'âstra teaches, but does not create; that is evident.

From such passages as: "He entered this world;" (B. A. p. 77.) it is certain, that it is the supreme Brahma who entered; therefore it is not right to explain the term "Brahma" by a person who is to become Brahma.

This is also evident on the ground, that *the meaning, which you wish to establish*, is an obstacle to the admitted meaning; for the knowledge that, like a lump of rock-salt, Brahma is of the same taste (substance) without difference without or within,—which is the meaning intended to be expressed in all Upanishads, is clearly established at the end of two Kandas (of this Upanishad, viz. the Madhu Kanda and Muni Kanda) viz. "This is the declaration" (p. 503) and: "So far extends *this cause of* immortality." (B. A. B. I. Vol. II. d. 930.)

In the same manner is the knowledge of the identity of Brahma the *exterior* meaning of the Upanishads of all the Sakhas.

If by the passage : "He knew even the soul," (p. 101.) a mundane soul, different from Brahma, is assumed, it would be an obstacle to the admitted meaning. If it were so, then, by the contradiction of the commencement and of the conclusion of this Sastra, an inconsistency would be assumed.

Also the declaration would be impossible ; for if by the passage : "He knew even the soul," a mundane soul were assumed, there could not be a declaration of the knowledge of Brahma, because *then* the passage : "He knew even the soul," would refer to the knowledge of the mundane soul alone.

If it is said, that the term "soul" means something different from the knower, we object, because it is the predicate of *I*, [in the passage : "I am verily Brahma," and if any thing else were the object of knowledge, it would have been determined : This is that," but not : "I am." As in the passage : "I am verily Brahma," Brahma is the predicate, and as it is determined in the passage : "He knew even the soul," it is distinctly understood, that the soul alone is Brahma. If this is the case, the declaration of the knowledge of Brahma is possible, not otherwise ; for the knowledge would be otherwise.

Nor is the knowledge of Brahma possible, if the nature of Brahma and non-Brahma were to belong to one *subject*, because there would be in reality a contradiction, as darkness is contradictory at the manifestation of the sun.

Nor, if both (Brahma and non-Brahma) were the objects of knowledge, would the definite declaration of a knowledge of Brahma be proper, because in this case there should be a knowledge of Brahma and of the mundane soul.

Nor is it proper to assume a substance with contradictory attributes ; for in this case, the knowledge of the truth being declared, doubt would arise *in the mind of the hearer*, and a definite knowledge is required to accomplish the last end of man. From the following passages of the Sruti and Smriti : "Of whom there is even no doubt," "A person who doubts perishes," it is evident, that whosoever is desirous of the welfare of others, must not say the meaning of a sentence which is doubtful.

If it is maintained, 'that in (your explanation of) the passage : "He knew even the soul ; therefore he became all," the not very skilful assumption is made of Brahma being, like us and similar beings, an agent' (viz. as the subject of knowledge) we protest, because *this notion* is conceived in the Sastra ; for it is not our assumption, but that of the Sastra ; therefore the Sastra is to be blamed (which you would probably not do.) And by him, who is anxious about his welfare, must not be given up the literal meaning of Brahma by an assumption at variance with the meaning of the Sastra.

An obstinacy on your part which goes so far, is also not proper ; for all difference with regard to Brahma is only a fiction, and must be considered under the notion of identity, as follows from a hundred passages, such as : " Here is nothing different ; " " for where there is duality, as it were ; " " one alone without duality." Every action of man in fact with regard to Brahma is a fiction, wherefore it is said very little, that this assumption is not skilful.

Therefore (in the passage : Brahma verily was this before) " Brahma " means the Brahma who entered, who is the creator. The term " verily " is *used* for the sake of determination. " This," all that is perceived as embodied (in the shape of a body) " Before." Previously even to apprehension (awakening) was Brahma alone, and all this ; but from the moment of the apprehension *there is the opinion*,—" I am non-Brahma," I am not all,—the effect of superimposition ; hence the superimposition : " I am agent, I am performer of ceremonies, I am the mundane soul, the enjoyer of fruits, happy unhappy, etc. but in reality there is Brahma alone, and this all which, is separate from him. " He (tat), who has in any manner been made known by a merciful teacher in the sentence : " Thou art not the mundane soul,"—" knew even the soul," in its own nature, and the term " even " means *the soul* free from any differences, superimposed by ignorance.

' Say *then* when in the soul in its own nature which Brahma knew as the soul ? ' Do you not recollect the soul ? for it has been declared thus : " He, who having entered this world, inspires, causes to descend, diffuses, expires and equalises ? "

' But then you declare him in the same manner, as if you say : " This is a cow," " this is a horse ; " you do not show him directly.'

Well then, the soul is the beholder, the hearer, the thinker, the knower.

‘But then, here also you do not show directly the nature of the agent of the actions of seeing, *hearing* etc., for the action of going is not the nature of the goer, nor the action of cutting the nature of the cutter.

Then let us say, the soul is the beholder of the beholding, the hearer of the hearing, the thinker of the thinking, the knower of the knowing.

‘But how differs this from the *mere* beholder? Whether there is a beholder of the beholding, or the beholder of a jar, there is in every instance a beholder of a jar, there is no difference; for it is even a beholder.’

There is a difference. The beholder of the beholding, if there is a beholding, constantly sees the beholding; the beholding is at no time not seen by the beholder; therefore the beholding belongs permanently to the beholder. If the beholding of the beholder is transient, then the beholding, which is to be seen, does at some on the other time not behold, as for instance, where a jar and the like is seen by a transient beholding. Moreover, the beholder of that beholding sees never the beholding.

‘But then, there are two beholdings of the beholder, one, the permanent, which is invisible, and the other a transient one, which is visible.”

Be it so. On the one hand, the transient beholding of the beholder is evident from the appearance of blindness and non-blindness; for if *this beholding* were constant, no one would be blind. The permanent beholding of the beholder, on the other hand, is evident from the passage of the Sruti: “For there is no variance between the beholder and the beholding.” B. A. B. I. Vol II. p. 803) It follows also from inference; for it is observed, that in a dream, there is a beholding of the blind, by which a jar for instance is an object of manifestation. This beholding of the beholder then is not destroyed by the destruction of the other beholding. By this unperishable permanent beholding, which is identical with itself, which is called self-manifesting light, seeing the other transient beholding, which remains in a dream, and which among the two

beholdings resembles the knowledge of an impression, the beholder is *the beholder* of the beholding. If this is the case, the beholding is even his nature, like the heat of the fire, and there is not another conscious beholder, as is the opinion of the followers of Kanada. "This," Brahma, "knew even the soul," viz. *the soul*, like the permanent beholding, and free from the transient beholding, superimposed by ignorance.

'But then the knowledge of the knower is prohibited, as follows from the passage of the Sruti. "Thou dost not know the knower."

We say, No; for there is no prohibition of knowledge. In the same manner must be understood the beholder of the beholding.

This follows also from its independence of another knowledge; for, if it is known, that the beholding of the beholder is permanent, no other beholding, of which the beholder is the object, is expected; for it ceases the desire of a beholding, which is the object of the beholder, as this is improbable; for no one has a desire, if there is no object (of the desire.) Nor has the visible beholding the power to make the beholder its object, so that one could desire it. Nor is there any desire of any one whose object is one's own nature. Accordingly, by the passage: "He knew even the soul," it is said, that there is a cessation from ignorance, but not, that the soul is made an object.

How did he know? The answer of the text is: "I" the beholder of the beholding, the soul, "am verily Brahma" and 'Brahma' means the present, perceptible soul, which is within all, has overcome *hunger* etc., which is not this, which is not that, and has therefore, the characteristics, not to be of gross body, not to be an atom, etc.

This alone am I, not another mundane soul, as you said. Therefore from a knowledge of such a kind "he" Brahma, "became all." From the disappearing of the superimposition of non-Brahma by the cessation of the effect of it (the superimposition of non-Brahma) he became all. Therefore it is alone proper to say, "men think, that by the knowledge of Brahma we shall become all." What has been asked before: "What that knew that Brahma, from which he became all," is now defined, viz. "Brahma in truth was this before, he knew even the soul, therefore he became this all."

Whosoever among the gods comprehended it, he alone became it; thus whosoever among the Rishis, *whosoever* among men.

Knowing that this that, the Rishi Vâmadeva verily obtained these Mantras: I became Manu, I became the Sun. Whosoever knows this *Brahma* also in this time in the said manner: "I am *Brahma*," even the gods verily are not able to prevent him from its possession. (The possession of the state of all.)

In respect of this "whosoever among the gods comprehended" the soul in the manner explained (viz. according to its true notion) he alone," the enlightened soul "became it" *Brahma*; "thus *whosoever* among the Rishis," thus whosoever among men" (comprehend the soul, became this all.)

By the terms "among the gods," etc. a reference is made to the *different* worlds, and therefore the knowledge of *Brahma* is not mentioned thereby, but we declared, that by the passage: "*Brahma* (Purusha) entered before," *Brahma* everywhere entered within. Therefore the terms "among the gods" are used with reference to the knowledge of the *different* worlds, which is produced by the superimposition of body, etc. In reality, however, was *Brahma* here and there before, viz. before comprehension, in the bodies of the gods, etc.: otherwise he would be an object of investigation.

The meaning of the passages: "He knew even the soul," and also "he became all" is, that the fruit of this knowledge of *Brahma* is the obtaining of the nature of all. To establish this meaning firmly, the Sruti quotes some Mantras. How? "Knowing, that this" *Brahma*, "is that," the soul: "I am *Brahma*," from this knowledge of *Brahma* alone "the Rishi Vâmadeva," by name, verily "obtained *these Mantras*. He, firmly established in the knowledge of the nature of *Brahma*, saw these Mantras: "I became Manu, I became the sun," etc.

By the words: "Knowing that this is that," *Brahma*, the knowledge of *Brahma* is shewn; by the words: "I became Manu, I became the sun," etc., the text shows, that the fruit of the knowledge of *Brahma* is the obtaining of the state of all. Knowing, he obtained

the fruit, the state of the nature of all; thus by this declaration *the text* makes known the liberation, which is effected by means of the knowledge of Brahma, as he who eats gets satisfied.

Some one may have the impression : ' The obtaining of the state of all by the knowledge of Brahma was *possible* for the great gods by their extraordinary power, but not at present for beings of the present Yuga, especially not for men, because they have only little power.' To remove this objection, the text says : " Whosoever," free from external desires, " knows this," Brahma,—set forth in the text, as having entered all beings and possessed of the characteristics of knowledge, action, etc. " also in this," the present, " time," *whosoever knows* this as the soul alone in the said manner : I am Brahma, who, having discarded *all* differences, superimposed on knowledge by delusions, produced by fictitious attributes (upadhi), knows : I am only Brahma, not affected by *any* worldly characteristics, who is not within, who is not without,—he, from the cessation of the state of non-totality, becomes this all by the knowledge of Brahma. There is no difference with regard to Brahma or to the knowledge of him among persons of great power, such as Vāmadeva, and persons of little power, *such as* the present men. But there is a doubt, whether the present men are adequate to obtain the fruit of the knowledge of Brahma. To remove this, the text says : " Even the gods," of extraordinary power " are not able to prevent him," who knows Brahma in the said manner, " from its possession," from obtaining the state of all like Brahma. How then others ? But there is no doubt, that the gods and the like are able to create obstacles to obtaining the fruit of the knowledge of Brahma, as it is said : " The mortals are in the condition of debtors towards the gods ;" for the *Sruti* shows, that man, even when born, is indebted to the Rishis by the duties of a religious student, to the gods by sacrifices, and to the forefathers by his offspring. This follows from the declaration, *that men are like beasts to the gods*, and also from the passage : " Then he or the soul is the place of all beings."

From this argument : that the gods from the desire to preserve the state of all the soul, create obstacle to men, subject to another's will, like debtors, to obtain the state of immortality,—arises that apprehension. The gods preserve their beasts like their bodies ; for

the text shows afterwards, that the maintenance of [gods, etc. which depends upon work, becomes greater, because each single man is worth many beasts; for it will be said: "Therefore it is not pleasant to them, that men should know this." (p. 119.) "As one for his own body verily wishes welfare, so also wish all beings welfare for one who knows thus." (B. A'. p. 255.) If a man has the knowledge of Brahma, then, with the ceasing of dependance, there exists no longer the nature of one's own body and of a dependance like cattle; this is the intended meaning, as is evident from the two passages about "the not being pleasant," and the "welfare." Therefore the gods raise even to the knower of Brahma, obstacles to obtaining the fruit from the knowledge of Brahma; for they are powerful.

'But then, if this is the case, the gods raise obstacles also to obtaining other effects of works, like the drinking of what is drinkable. Alas then, there is an end of the faith, that practice (of ceremonies and knowledge) is the cause of elevation and liberation. In the same manner, on account of his inconceivable power, God is able] to raise obstacles, in the same manner, time, action, charms, drugs and penances; for that they are causes of obtaining or not obtaining the fruit, is evident from the S'âstra and common belief; hence there is no faith in any practice in accordance with the S'âstras.'

We reply to this, No; for all things are produced by their necessary causes, and the world shows a variety (of happiness and unhappiness,) both of which is impossible under the supposition that all arises from its own nature. But when the supposition, that (ceremonial) work is the cause of (the enjoyment of) happiness and unhappiness and of other consequences, is firmly established and confirmed by the statements of the Veda, Smriti, argument, and common belief, *it is clear, that* the gods, I'swara and [time are not opposed to *the acquirement* of the fruit of works, because [works are the causes of what is desired; for the good and bad work of men, [independent of the gods, time, I'swara and other agents, is by itself without effect (liter. does not produce [itself) and if it should]even have effect by itself, it is not able to give the fruit, as it is the nature of action to be produced by agents and other numberless causes. Therefore the gods, I'swara, etc. favour actions, and [hence there cannot be a disbelief as to obtaining of the fruit. Sometimes [actions are subject

also to them (to the gods) because their power cannot be destroyed ; but whether the nature of action or time, gods, things, etc. is the first or second, is not determined, and is difficult to be understood ; hence arises the delusion of the people. Some say, action is the cause, and not any thing else, with reference to the obtaining of the fruit ; others it is {gods ; others, 'time ; others, the nature of the things ; others, all this together. With regard to this, the statements of the Veda and the Smṛiti acknowledge action as the principal cause, as for instance : "Holy gets a person by holy action, sinful by sinful." Even if one or the other of those *agents* with regard to its own object should become principal, while at the same time the principal power of the others were stopped, yet it could not be said, that work is not the principal agent as the acquirement of the fruit, because the principal agency of work is established by the S'âstra and argument.

(But if it be asked, whether the gods do not hinder the acquirement of the effect of knowledge, we answer :) No, because on the mere cessation of ignorance the effect {is the obtaining of Brahma. In respect of what has been said, "that the gods raise obstacles to the effect, which is the obtaining {of Brahma," the gods have no power to raise obstacles. Why ? because there is no time intervening between the knowledge of *Brahma* and the effect, which is the obtaining of Brahma. How ? As in common life at the very time when light is in contact with the eye of the beholder, there is the manifestation of colour, so at the very time when the knowledge, [whose object is the soul, takes place, there is the disappearance of [the ignorance, whose object is the soul. Therefore, when the knowledge of Brahma exists, an effect contrary to it is impossible, just as it is impossible, [that the effect of light is darkness. Where (when the knowledge of Brahma exists) the knower of Brahma is the *very* soul (substance) of the gods, how can they in any way raise obstacles to him.

For he becomes the soul of them.

The text *then* declares, what is this very nature, viz. Brahma, identical with himself (whose nature is the soul) who is to be thought of, who may be known from all the Sastras ; "for he," the knower of Brahma "*becomes the soul of them,*" of the gods, at the very

time, when there exists the knowledge of Brahma, by the mere cessation of the screen of ignorance, like the nature of mother-of-pearl, which appears as silver, as we said before. Therefore the endeavour of the gods has no success against the soul; for where an effect ensues, not referring to the nature of the soul, and where there is a difference of space, time and causes, there, in respect of any thing whose object is not the soul, the endeavour of the gods to raise obstacles is successful, but not in respect of the effect referring to the nature of the soul, which takes place at the time of the knowledge without any difference of space, time and causes, because an opportunity (to raise obstacles) is impossible.

‘But then, since there is no continuation of the (first) apprehension of the knowledge of *Brahma*, and since (after the first apprehension) the contrary apprehension (=non-soul), and its effects are apparent, only the last apprehension of the soul destroys the ignorance, and not the first.’* (If the last knowledge destroys ignorance, it is either, because it is the last, or because its object is the soul). Not under the first alternative, because the last could not be determined. (Nor under the second) for if the first apprehension, whose object is the soul, does not destroy the ignorance, then also not the last, because the object is the same.

* As S'ankara has set forth his argument rather enigmatically, I give it in the more explicit form of Ananda Giri. “‘But then, an opponent may say, the knowledge which destroys the ignorance, cannot be the first, because after the first knowledge there is no continuation of it, and because afterwards the opposite knowledge and its effects take place.’ To show the futility of this objection, S'ankara assumes the following alternative, if the first knowledge does not destroy the ignorance, either the last knowledge destroys it, or the continuation of knowledge.

If the last knowledge destroys the ignorance, it is either, because it is the last, or because its object is the soul; but not under the first of these alternatives, because it could not be determined (which is the last); not under the second, (because its object is the soul) because in this respect it is the same as the first knowledge, which according to admission, does not destroy ignorance.” The second part of the argument is clearly given by S'ankara, wherefore we do not repeat it here.

If it is said, 'this being the case, the continuation of knowledge destroys the ignorance, not a single *act of knowledge*,' we object; for as long as life, etc., remains, a continuation (of knowledge) is impossible; for as long as there is an apprehension, of which life, etc., is the cause, the continuation of the apprehension of knowledge is impossible, because it is contradictory.

If you say : 'But then by the disappearance of the apprehension, of which life, is the cause, there remains a continuation of knowledge until death,' we object, because the continuation of a so-much-ness of the apprehension is not defined, and there is hence the fault, that the meaning of the Sastra is not defined. By saying,—the continuation of a so-much-ness of the apprehension destroys the ignorance,—there is nothing defined, and hence the meaning of the Sastra is undefined.

If it is said, 'that the meaning of the S'astra is even defined, when there is a mere continuation,' we object, because there is no difference between the first and last *knowledge*; for either the first knowledge is the continuation of the apprehension, or the last until the time of death; but as in this way no difference is found between the first and last apprehensions, the two above mentioned faults apply.

If it is said : 'This being the case, then *knowledge* does not even destroy *ignorance*,' we object, because our text declares : "Therefore he became all," the same is also declared in other passages of the Sruti "The bond of the heart is broken," and "There is no delusion, etc."

If it is said : 'It is *merely* for the sake of praise. (Arthavāda) we object, because *otherwise* the same applies to the Upanishads of all the Sākhās (Vedaic schools) viz, that they are merely for the sake of praise; for the Upanishads of all the S'akhas set forth neither more nor less than this meaning.

If it is said : 'Let it be so, (that they are for the sake of praise,) since the object of the soul is evident from perception;' we object, because from the said statement (that knowledge destroys ignorance) ignorance, grief, delusion, fear and other faults have ceased.

If it is said "from perception," the answer has already been

first, or the last, a continuation, or not a continuation, because the ultimate effect of knowledge is the cessation of ignorance and other faults. That apprehension, whether the first or the last, continuation or no continuation, is alone knowledge, which produces the effect, viz. the cessation of the faults of ignorance, etc. Having come to this conclusion, there remains nothing to be fixed.

But what has been said before: "Since the contrary apprehension and its effects are apparent, only the last apprehension of the soul destroys the ignorance and not the first," (p. 115) this *also* holds not good, because the last action (in a former birth) is the cause of the production of a body (in this world). The action,—Which is the cause of the production of the body, *and* which, by means of the fault of the opposite apprehension of the work, which is of such a nature and which has the fault of the opposite apprehension, is able to produce the fruit,—*this action* puts into effect the opposite apprehension, and the faults of passion, etc. by the continuation of the enjoyment of the effect, as long as life lasts, and only so long, because the entering upon the enjoyment of the effects follows necessarily from their cause, viz. action, like arrows which are shot (continue their course, until their velocity is spent). Therefore knowledge does not destroy action of such a kind (which is the effect of actions in a former world) because it is not opposed to it. What then (does it destroy)? The effect of ignorance, opposite to its own (knowledge's nature, which (effect) has the tendency to produce *another body* (in a future world) even from *ignorance, which is its support*, (it destroys it,) because it determines it; for it (the action) has not yet arrived, (not yet been done) the other action (which is the cause of the present body) has been produced (is passed, and cannot therefore be destroyed by knowledge). Moreover, the opposite apprehension (opposite to true knowledge) is not produced for the knower, because it (the opposite apprehension) is without object; for the opposite apprehension, when produced, is produced as dependent upon generality, when the nature of its particular object has not been ascertained, as silver is on mother-of-pearl. But this (opposite apprehension) by the destruction of the site of opposite apprehensions without number, does not arise for one who has ascertained the differences of objects, as the *delusion*

of silver does not again appear, when a perfect apprehension of mother-of-pearl has taken place.

If you say, 'that recollections—manifesting opposite apprehensions, *and* arising from impressions, produced from opposite apprehensions which were made previously to the knowledge,—that these recollections in the moment of their birth sometimes cause of a sudden the obtainment of opposite apprehensions, *and that* in the same manner, as for one who is perfectly acquainted with the divisions of space, yet of a sudden a confusion may arise with regard to space, so also for the perfect knower an opposite apprehension may be produced, as it was before' (the attainment of knowledge) *then it would follow*, that there is no confidence also in perfect knowledge, that hence an activity with regard to the knowledge and the works in accordance with the meaning of the Sastra would be inconsistent, and that proof had become non-proof; for a difference between proof and non-proof were impossible.

Hereby it is ascertained, for what reason there is no liberation from the body (immediately) after the attainment of perfect knowledge. But that consequent to knowledge, from the very same time, there is a destruction of the actions which are collected for a future birth and whose fruits have not commenced, has been proved from our text, which prohibits any obstacles to the obtaining of the fruit; also from such passages of the S'ruti as: "His actions also are annihilated," (1st Mund. B. I. Vol. VIII. p. 302.) "All is his forever," All sins are shaken off, "Having known him, they are not tainted by sin," (B. A. B. I. Vol. II. p. 913). Him alone do those two not trouble, him good and bad actions do not torment," (I. c. p. 910.) "Him he does not torment, he is not afraid of any thing;" (S'. U. B. I. Vol. VII. p. 110.) also from passages of the Smṛiti such as this; "The fire of knowledge burns all actions to ashes." (Bh. G. 4th Adh. Sl. 37.)

Then whosoever worships another deity in such a manner, as: "He is another, another am I," he does not know; like a beast, he is *used* by the gods.

As verily many beasts maintain a man, so every man maintains the gods. It is not pleasant, even if only one beast

is taken away, how then, if many? Therefore it is not pleasant to them, that men should know this. 10.

But what *before* (p. 112) has been said, that he is bound by debts, is also not applicable, because this refers to ignorance; for the ignorant is a debtor; for him the notion of agency etc. is true; thus it will be said afterwards: "Where some other thing exists, there another sees it otherwise," and the term "other" means here, what differs from the true substance, the soul. Where ignorance exists, there it is another thing, as it were; there, like the moon on the second day after its darkness, is an action of showing (one saying, It is this, another, It is not this, etc.) dependent on the many agents through ignorance; and the effect, arising from its (ignorance) is also shown by passages such as this: "Another sees it otherwise." (B. A'. p. 813.) Where, however knowledge exists, by the removal of the numberless illusions, arising from ignorance, there is shown the impossibility of actions by such passages as: "the he sees all." (p. 94.) Therefore the *state of a debtor* is described as referring to ignorance alone,—because that state is the consequence of actions,—not as referring to knowledge. This we shall in the next passage explicitly show by our explanation, as follows: "Then whosoever," not knowing Brahma, by praise, reverence, offering, (of flowers, scents, etc.) oblation (gift of eatables), attention and contemplation, "worships" (represents to himself the state of the excellencies of a deity) "another deity," a deity different from the soul "in such a manner as: He is another," not the soul, different from me, "another am I," subject to him, I, like the debtor, have to propitiate him,—whosoever through such a belief worships, "he" through such a belief "does not know" the truth. Such a person is not only ignorant, or has the faults of ignorance, and the like, but like a beast, a cow, etc. is used for the benefit of conveyance, of giving milk, etc. so for the various benefits he affords through offerings, etc. is he used by each of the gods. Therefore he is, like a beast, subject to works of all kinds—this is the meaning. For the effect of the work in accordance with the word of S'âstra, united with knowledge be it work alone, done by a person who is ignorant, a partaker

of the division of caste and the orders of life,* and dependent, *the effect of such a work* is elevation from man, etc. to Brahma; the effect, however, of work, which is at variance with the word of the Sâstra which is done by promptings of one's own nature, is descension from man, etc., down to inanimate matter. For as here, so we shall say *the same* at the end of the chapter by the passage: "Again there are three worlds, etc. (B. A'. p. 301.)"—That the effect of knowledge is the obtaining of the state of all, has been briefly shown; for the whole Upanishad is engaged to show the divisions of knowledge and ignorance (or the whole knowledge within this Upanishad is not very extensive as it describes the divisions of ignorance).

And that this is the meaning of the whole Sâstra, we shall *afterwards* show. Because it is so, therefore the gods are able to raise obstacles or to show favour to an ignorant man. This is said in *the words*: "As verily" in common life," "many beasts," cows, horses, etc. "maintain a man," their owner, ruler, "so every" ignorant "man," who stands for many beasts, "maintains the gods," (the plural "the gods," is here used to indicate also the forefathers, etc.) under the idea: "Indra and the other gods, who are different from me, are my lords; I am like a servant of them. It I adore them by praise reverence, gifts, etc. I shall obtain the rewards, given by them, viz. elevation and liberation." Thus as in this word it is very unpleasant for a possessor of many beasts, "even if only one beast is taken away," is seized by a tiger, etc., so if one man who stands for many beasts rises from the state of a beast, it is not surprising, that it is unpleasant to the gods, as the taking away of many beasts is to the householder. "Therefore it is not pleasant to them," to the gods,—what? "that men should" in any way "know this," truth of the nature of Brahma. In this way it is said by the venerable Vyâsa in the Anugitas (a part of the Mahâbhârata) "The words of the gods is closed for the performers of works; for the gods do not wish, that men abide above." Therefore the gods try to exclude, like cattle from tigers, *men* from the knowledge of Brahma, as it is their desire, that they

* These are four, *viz.*, of the religious student, of the house-holder, of the anchorite (Vanaprastha, who retires to the wood,) and of the mendicant.

should not be elevated above *the sphere of* their use. Whom they wish to liberate, to him they impart belief, etc. and unbelief to him whom they wish not to liberate. Therefore !let a person, desirous of liberation, be intent on the adoration of the gods, on reverence and faith, submissive, assiduously striving for the acquirement of knowledge, or for knowledge, as is implied in the words of fear : "How then, if many." This is the meaning of the passage : "It is not pleasant to the gods." 10.

Brahma verily was this before, one alone. Being one, he did not extend. He with concentrated power created the Kshatra of all elevated nature, *viz.* all those Kshatras who are protectors amongs the gods, Indra, Varuna, Soma, Rudra, Parjanya, Death, and I's'âna. Therefore none is greater than the Kshatra ; therefore the Brâhmana, under the Kshatriya, worships at the Râjasuya ceremony. The Kshatra alone gives *him* his glory, Brahma is thus the birth-place of the Kshatra. Therefore, although the king obtains the highest dignity, he at last takes refuge in the Brahma as in his 'birth-place. Whosoever despises him, he destroyes his birth-place. He is a very great sinner, like a man who injures a superior. 11.

The meaning of the Sâtra has been declared in the Sutra : "The soul, considering this, *let a man* worship it." (p. 86.) The relation and the necessity of this Sutra, which was to be explained, has been determined by the words : "They declare, that by the knowledge of Brahma, etc." (p. 100.) together with its Arthavâda (by the words : "Therefore, whosoever among the gods," etc. (p. 101.),—and the subjection of ignorance to the world in the words : "Then whosoever worships another deity, etc." (p. 118.)

There it has been said, that the ignorant is a debtor, *and* subject to *the will of* another by the necessity to perform, like a beast, the works of the gods and others. What again is the means of performing the necessary works of the gods and others? The *different* castes and orders of life. Which then are the castes? In reply to

this the present passage is commenced, viz. to show how that ignorant person, dependent on another's will and subject to works in connexion with their agents, is busy, *like a beast*, in this world.

The creation of Indra, etc. has not been described above after the creation of Agni (v. p. 70.) ; but the creation of Agni has been described to complete the creation through Prajâpati. The creation of Indra, etc. *however*, should there have been shown, because it is its conclusion ; but it is here told in order to show, that the ignorant is the proper subject for the performance of works.

"Brahma verily was this before." "Brâhma," by the creation of Agni having obtained the nature of Agni (he is called Brahma by believing himself to be the caste of Brâhmanas) "verily was this," the caste of Kshatras, etc. the undivided Brahma, "one alone." There was no distinction of the Kshatriya and other castes. "Being one" without *the distinctions of* Kshatra, etc., of preserver, etc. "he" Brahma, "did not extend," which means, was not sufficient for extensive work.

Then "he," Brahma, reflecting, I am a Brahmana, I who by nature desire to perform the work to be done by the Brâhmana caste, have to discharge such and such duties, "created" for the amplification of work and agent, "with concentrated power the Kshatra of elevated nature." Which again is the Kshatra the Kshatriya caste, created by him? To show this, the text specifies the individuals, viz., "all those Kshatras who are protectors among the gods." Those who are anointed kings, are here specified "Indra," the king of the gods (Devas) "Varuna" of the aquatic animals, Soma," of the Brâhmanas, "Rudra," of beasts, "Parjanya," of lightning, etc., "Yama" of the forefathers, "Death," of persons in ill health, etc., and Is'ana of splendours. These and others are the Kshatras among the gods. After them (the divine Kshatras) *he created* the Kshatras who are ruled by Indra and other Kshatra deities, viz., the families of the moon and sun, as *the king* Pururavas, etc. For this reason the creation of the Kshatras among the gods has been set forth.

Because the Kshatra was created by more concentrated power the Brahmana, "therefore none is greater than the Kshatra," who is also the ruler of the Brahmana caste. "Therefore the Brâhmana,"

although the source of the Kshatriya, placed "under the Kshatriya," "worship" him who is placed above. Where? "At the Râjasuya ceremony." "The Kshatra alone gives him glory," repute as Brâhma, The Ritwig,—at the Rajasuya ceremony addressed by the king, who is anointed and seated on the royal chair, by the words: "O Brahma,"—replies again to the king: "O king, thou art Brahma." He alone is called Kshatra who bestows glory. "Brahma is thus the" well known "birth-place of the Kshatra." "Therefore, although the king obtains the highest dignity," in virtue of the anointing at the Râjasuya ceremony, "at last" at the completion of the ceremony, "takes refuge in the Brahma," in the Brahmanical caste, "as in his birth-place," that is, he appoints a family priest. "Whosoever" again from the pride of power, "despises," lowers, "him" his birth-place, the Brahmanical caste, the Brahmana, he destroys his "own birth-place." "He," by so doing, "is a very great sinner;" (in former times the Kshatriya was also a sinner) by his wickedness, because he injures his producer, "like," as in common life, "a man who injures," defeats, "his superior" is a very great sinner. 11.

He did not extend. He created the Vit. He is all those gods who, according to their classes, are called Vasus, Rudras, Adityas, Viwedevas, and Maruts. 12.

(As Brahma did not extend before the creation of the Kshatra), so even after the creation of the Kshatra "he" Brahma, "did not extend" for the work. He did not extend, because there was none to procure wealth. "He created the Vit." to procure wealth for the performance of ceremonies. Who again is the Vit? "He is all those gods according to their classes" (for almost all the Vits are called so, as they are counted in classes; for commonly they are only capable of collecting wealth, when joined together, and not singly; the class of "the Vasus," is eight in number, of "the Rudras," eleven, of "the Adityas" twelve, of "the Viswedevas" means either the thirteen sons of Viswa, or all (sarve-viswe) the gods, and of "the Maruts," is seven times seven. 12.

He did not extend. He created the castes of S'udras as the nourisher. This *earth* is the nourisher; for it nourishes all this whatsoever. 13.

He did not extend; he created with concentrated power justice of eminent nature. This justice is the preserver (Kshatra) of the Kshatra. There is nought higher than justice. Even the weak is confident *to defeat* the more powerful by justice, as a *householder* by the king. Verily justice is true. Therefore they say of a person who speaks the truth, he speaks justice, or of a person who speaks justice, he speaks the truth. In this manner verily it is both. 14.

"He" in want of servants, "did not extend. He created the caste of the S'udras." Which again is the caste of the S'udras, created by him? "The nourisher," (Pushana) because he nourishes. Who again is that Pusha? The text determines this in a special manner. "This," earth, "is Pusha: for it nourishes all this whatsoever." 13.

"He," after having created the four castes, did not extend. "He," from a fear of the ungovernableness of the Kshatra on account of his fiery nature, "created by concentrated power justice of eminent nature." "This justice," created of eminent nature, "is the preserver," the governor even "of the Kshatra," more fiery even than the fiery. "There is nought higher than justice." because it governs even the Kshatra; for all are ruled by it. In what manner? To this it is replied: "Even the weak is confident to defeat the more powerful" than himself, "by" the power of "justice," "as" in common life "house-holder by the king" who is the most powerful. Therefore it is in this manner evident, that justice is governing all, because it is more powerful than all. "Verily justice," viz. a case which has been decided according to legal evidence, "is true." Here "true" means, in accordance with the meaning of the S'āstra, and justice means, what is transacted in such a manner; it is true, if understood in accordance with the meaning of the Sāstra. Because this is so, "therefore they" those who are sitting near, who are aware of the arguments on both parts, "say of a

person who speaks," at the time when a suit is transacted, the "truth" that is, according to the Sastras. "He speaks justice," viz. he speaks according to fitness, which is well known and pursuant to usages. Thus, on the other hand, they say "of a person, who speaks in accordance with justice," to usages, "he speaks in accordance with truth," he speaks what does not deviate from the S'ashtra. "In this manner verily it," which has been mentioned before, is both viz. the justice, which must be made known and which must be practised. Therefore justice, as an object of knowledge and of practice governs all, as well those who know the S'astras as those who do not know them. Therefore, it is the preserver even of the Kshatra. Hence an ignorant person, who is proud of justice, acknowledges for the practice of its different parts, its difference which is the cause of the Brahma, Kshatra, Vit and S'udra castes. These *differences* are by their own nature the causes of the *different* agents. 14.

This *is the creation of* the Brahman, the Kshatra, the Vit and the Sudra. He was in the form of Agni (fire) among the gods as Brahma, he was the Brahman among men, in the form of Kshatriya Kshatriya, in the form of Vais'ya, Vais'ya, in the form of S'udra, S'udra. Therefore among the gods the place (loka) is desired through Agni only, among men through the Brahmana, because in their forms Brahma became *manifest*.

The passage: "This is the creation of the four castes" "of the Brahma, the Kshatra, the Vit, and S'udra," serves as an introduction into the next sentence. "He," Brahma, the creator, "was in the form of Agni among the gods," that is to say in no other form. "As Brahma," "the Brahmana caste, he was the Brâhmana," in the form of a Brâhmana Brahma was among men. Assuming other modifications among the other castes, he became in the Kshatriya whose tutelary deities are Indra and other gods (devas;) in the Vaishya form, a Vaishya, and in the S'udra form, a Sudra.

Because Brahma, the creator assumed *other and other* modifications among the Kshatriya and other castes, and remained, un-

modified only in Agni's form, "therefore among the gods the place," the fruit of works, "is desired through Agni only," that is to say, by the performance of works, dependent on Agni; for on this ground is this Brahma evidently represented under the form of Agni, the locality of works. Therefore it is established, that by the performance of work through Agni, the fruit, resulting from it, is desired. "Among men through the Brâhmana." If among men there is a desire of the fruit to be derived from works, there is no dependence upon works, of which Agni, etc. is the cause. How then? The object of man is effected only by reliance upon the nature of the castes. Where, however, the accomplishment of the object of man is subject to the gods, there it is dependent upon work in conjunction with Agni, etc. This follows also from the passage of the Smṛiti: "By muttering prayers, the Brâhmana, no doubt, is successful, whether he performs other work (work, dependent upon fire) or not. Friend is called the Brâhmana,*" This is also evident from his leading the life of a religious mendicant.† Therefore among men the place, the effect of works, is desired through the nature of the Brahma alone, "because Brahma," the creator, "in their forms," in the forms of the Brahma and Agni, the forms upon which the agents of work are dependent, "became manifest."

Then whosoever, through this world not seeing the self-like world, dies, him the latter, because unknown, does not preserve, as the Veda which is not read, or as other work, which is not done. Even the great *and* holy work, which a person who does not know in this manner, performs, all this work of him, verily perishes at last. Let a man worship the soul as *his* place. Whosoever worships the soul alone as his place, his work does verily not perish. For whatsoever he desires from the soul, the same he obtains. 15.

* By giving to all beings the blessing to be without fear. *

† Which is to renounce all worldly objects—the cause of obtaining the world of Brahma.

With reference to this, some* say, 'it is the place of the supreme soul, *the obtainment of which is desired through Agni and the Brahmana.*' This is not true; because a subjection to ignorance existing, the division of the castes is introduced for the subjection to works, it is not true, moreover, because it differs from the next passage; for if here (in the present passage) by the term "place," even the supreme soul were declared, then in the next passage: "Not having seen the self-like place," the predicate "self-like," would be absurd; for if there the common place (world) which is desired by dependence upon Agni, is different from the self-like place, then the predicate "self-like," is proper, because the meaning is the annihilation of the common place (world) after death, and because by the term "self-like" there is no going astray from the place of the supreme soul; but the works, performed by ignorance, would go astray by the term "self-like." And by the passage: "Perishes certainly," the going astray of all the effects by works will be set forth. By Brahma the castes were created for the sake of work, and this work, because it rules all *castes* by the notion of duty and accomplishes the object of man, has the name of virtue.

If therefore by this work alone the self-like place which is called the supreme soul, is obtained, although it is unknown, why then is it necessary to do any thing with reference to its production? On this ground it is said in the text: "Then," which is to remove the objection of the opponent, "Whosoever through this world," which is subject to transmigration, whose nature is the assumption of a body, whose causes are the desire and work of ignorance by believing in the work, dependent upon Agni, or by believing in work to be performed by the Brahmana caste alone, on account of the world which is transient, and whose nature is not self-like, "not seeing the self-like world," which is called soul from not going astray from the nature of the soul, *not seeing* "I am Brahma,"—"dies," the latter, (although "the latter" means the self-like world, yet it is unknown, concealed by ignorance, as a horse, which is not recognised) "does not preserve him,—as the tenth soul in the well known example (vide p. 83.), does not preserve himself,—by the removal of grief, delusion, fear and other faults. And "as" in common life,

* The commentary, called Bhartriprapanchika.

"the Veda, which is not read," does not teach work and whatsoever arises from it, "or as other work," in common life, for instance ploughing, "Which is not done," is not manifested by its own nature, does not preserve him by the yielding of its fruit, so the soul, if unmanifested by its self-like nature, which is the eternal soul, does not preserve *him* by the annihilation of ignorance.

"But then, does it not follow from the necessity that work obtains its effect by preserving the cause of the knowledge of the self-like world, and from the abundance of work, which is [the cause of the desired effect, "that its preserving cause is undestroyable?" No, because *every* effect is liable to destruction. Therefore it is said in the text: "Even the great," as for instance many As'wamedha sacrifices, "and holy work," which obtains its fruit, as if it were desired (although there has been no desire of its fruit) "which a person," of extraordinary magnanimity, "who does not know in this manner," who does not know the self-like place in the said manner, continually "performs," under the notion, that he shall thereby gain immortality, "all this work of him," of the ignorant person, "verily perishes at last," at the end of the enjoyment of the fruit, because desire, the effect of ignorance, is its cause, like some *wonderful* superhuman power (perished) which appeared by the delusion of a dream. Since the causes of it (of the work) viz. ignorance and desire, are not permanent, it is necessary, that its effect is also liable to destruction. Therefore there is no hope to preserve for ever the fruit of holy work. "Therefore let a man worship the soul alone" as the self-like place; the soul is the self-like place; for in this meaning is the self-like place set forth in the text, and here is the term of "self-like" not applied. "Whosoever worships the soul as *his* place," what of him? It is replied in the text: "his work does verily not perish," because there is, even no work; this is repeated here in order to establish it firmly. The meaning is, as there is constantly worldly unhappiness, consisting in the decrease of the effect derived from work, so there is not for him (the wise) as if one thinks: if Mithila is burned, nothing {burns me. Others* explain it to mean, 'that the work of the knowing worshipper of his own-self (soul) does not perish by the connexion with a person who does

* viz. the explanation, given by the Bhartriprapancha.

not know. Further, for the term of "place," intimately connected with work, they in fact assume two meanings; one is the place in the state of manifestation, depending upon work, and bearing the name of Hiranagarbha. Whosoever worships this place, which is intimately connected with work, which is manifested and finite, the work of him, who knows the finite self as engaged in work, verily perishes. But whosoever worships the world, which is intimately connected with work, comprehending it in its unmanifested state under the notion of cause, his work does not perish, because he knows the infinite self (soul) as engaged in work. This assumption is ingenious, but it does not accord with the S'ruti, because by the term "the place of self" the supreme soul, set forth in the text, is denoted.'

The text having mentioned (before) "the place of self," omits (now) the term "of self" and introducing the term 'soul' shows its identity with the former by the words: "Whosoever worships the soul alone as his place." There is here no possibility for the assumption of a place, intimately connected with work.

Moreover it (the place intimately connected with work) is different from the supreme *place*, whose object is knowledge alone. By the passage: "The soul is not the place," it is distinguished from the places, which are gained by inferior knowledge and the work of a son. Therefore "the soul is not the place," and also: "His place is not measured by any work; this is his highest place." By these sentences, because they are determined, a corresponding meaning is proper. Thus here also, because by the words "the place of self," the predicate is fixed.

If it is said 'that according to the passage: "for whatsoever," it is improper, that the place of self is the supreme soul; for if it is certain, that by the worship of him he becomes the supreme soul; whatsoever he desires, he obtains from the soul, then the declaration with regard to the fruit is improper, unless it is to obtain that soul.' We contradict, because it has the object to extol the worship of the world of self; for the meaning is, from the place of self alone all that is desired is obtained; any thing different from it is not to be asked for, because all desires are satisfied, as it is said in another passage of the S'ruti (Chh. U. 7th Pr. 16th Kh. B. I. Vol. III

p. 524): "From the soul is life, from the soul hope." Or it means to show the state of the universal soul as before (p. 105). For if the supreme soul is declared, it is right to apply the term "soul" in the passage: "for . . . from the soul," (p. 128) and it means, from the place of self, which is set forth as soul in the text. Otherwise it would have been said with a predicate, "from the place of work in its unmanifested state" in order to remove *thereby the idea of a place* of the supreme soul in accordance with the text, and to remove the state of manifestation: for since it set forth in the text and determined, another state, not authorised by the S'ruti, is impossible. 15.

Next that soul (self) verily is the place of all beings.

He is the place of the gods by what he offers and sacrifices, further of the Rishis by what he learns, further of the forefathers (Pitris) by what he gives to the forefathers, and by his exertions about offspring, further of men by housing them and giving them food, further of cattle by finding them grass and water, further of beasts of prey, birds, etc. down to ants, by sustaining their life in his dwelling. As every one desires the continuance of his place, so verily desire all beings welfare for one who thus knows. This verily is declared and considered. 16.

"Next that soul verily." It has before (in the last section, describing the state of ignorance) been said, that the ignorant in the conscious pride of caste and order of life, etc., and governed by the law, is like a beast, subject to another by the necessity of performing the works of the gods and others. Which again are the works by the necessary performance, of which he becomes, like a beast, subject to another? And who are the gods and others whom he assists, like a beast, by works? Both are explained in the text. The term "next" is intended as an introduction to *the present sentence*. The house-holder, as set forth in the text, who is subject to work, ignorant, and endowed with body, senses, etc., is here called "that soul." The meaning is "he is the place," the object of enjoyment, "of all beings," from the gods down to the ants, because he affords assistance to all by works which are commanded with

reference to the different castes and orders. By what special works again affording assistance does he become the place, for what special beings? The answer is "by what he," the house-holder, "offers and sacrifices." Sacrifice with reference to the deity is an abandonment of wealth (to the deity). If it is performed until the sprinkling of the water (on the head of the sacrificer), it is Homa. (offering) and sacrifice (Yāga) which it is his duty to perform, "he is," like a beast, subject to the will of another, "the place of the gods." Further by what he reads, viz. his daily reading of the Vedas, "he is the place of the Rishis." Further by what he gives to the forefathers, viz. the oblation, water, etc., "and that by his exertions about offspring," by that work, which he is bound to perform, "he is the place of the forefathers." Further by housing men, by giving them place, water, etc. in his house, "and giving them food," viz. them who ask him for it, whether they live in his house or not, "he is the place of men." Further by feeding, giving "them grass and water," he is the "place of cattle." Further of beasts of prey, birds together with ants, by sustaining their life in his dwelling, with grains and (particles of food gained) by the cleaning of the sacrificial vessels, "he is the place of them." Because by those works he affords assistance to the gods, etc.; therefore "as every one desires continuance of his own place," of his own body, desires the preservation of his nature, from the fear of losing his nature sustains it always by nourishing, protecting it, etc., "so verily desire all beings" the gods and others, the above mentioned continuance of life "for him who thus knows," who thus frames his soul: "I am to be enjoyed by all beings, I, like a debtor, am bound to make returns;" that is to say they preserve him for the continuance of their own existence, as house-holders preserve cattle. Therefore it is said: "It is not pleasant to them." "This verily," that the said works must necessarily be done, like the paying of a debt, "is declared," in the chapter of the five great sacrifices, (the five great sacrifices, viz. to all beings, to men, to the forefathers, to the gods, and to Brahma) "and considered," and proved as necessary by consideration in the chapter of the distribution of the things, required for the five great sacrifices (Avadānaprakarana). 16.

Self (the soul) alone was this before ; he was even one. He desired : Let me have a wife ; again,—let me be born ; again,—let me have wealth ; again,—let me perform work. So far extend, verily desire, For without desire one does not get more than this. Therefore also now a person, when alone, desires : Let me have a wife,—again, let me be born,—again, let me have wealth,—again, let me perform work. As long as he does not obtain one of them, so long he thinks himself incomplete. His completeness is this, that the mind is his self (soul) and speech his wife.

Life is their offspring, the eye, the wealth of man ; for by the eyes one obtains it,—the ear, *the wealth* of the gods ; for by the ear one hears it ; self is even his work,—for by self one performs work.

The sacrifice is five-fold, the animal five-fold, the man five-fold, fivefold this all whatsoever. Whosoever thus knows, the same obtains this all. 17.

“Self alone was this before.” If the knower of Brahma is liberated from the state of cattle, which consists in the bondage of duty, by whom then has he been made subject to the bondage of work, and not again to the practice of knowledge, which is the means of liberation ? Is it not said : “ The gods preserve ? ” Certainly, but they preserve those who by the performance of work obtained their own (the gods’) state ; otherwise it would be in their power to bestow the effects of actions not done, or destroy *the effects* of actions done, (that is to say ; otherwise, they would be partial) but they do not preserve a common man, who has not obtained a special perfection. Therefore it must be the same (who makes him subject to the bondage of work) by whose power a *person* subject to *work* is getting out of his own place. Is that not ignorance ? for the ignorant, getting out of himself, is engaged in work ? No, ignorance also is not the cause which makes one to engage in work ; for its character is to conceal the true nature of a thing ; but it may be the cause of making one to engage in work, in the same manner, as blindness is the cause, that one is liable to fall into holes, etc. If

his is the case, then say, what causes one to engage in work? This is set forth, viz., it is willing, desire. Thus it is said in the Káthaka (4 to P, 2. B. I. Vol.VIII. p. 139): "Remaining in their natural ignorance, youths engage in action; follows external objects of desire." In the Bhagavadgitâ: "It is desire, it is anger, etc." (B. G. 3rd A. 37) And in Manu: "Desire is the cause of all engagements in action, (M. S. 2d. A 4.) This meaning is in all its detail proved throughout this whole chapter, "Self alone was this before." Self alone viz, the person who is ignorant by his own nature, who is to be comprehended under the notion of effect and cause, the Brahmachári (the religious student). "Before." Previous to the union with a wife he is called self.

There was no object of desire, as a wife, etc., different from this self. "He was even one," possessed of ignorance, the cause of the desire of a wife etc., he was even alone; he was pervaded by ignorance the nature of which is to assign to one's own soul the assumptions of agent, action and fruit. "He desired" What? "Let me have a wife." Let me, the agent, have a wife, the cause of the performance of work; without her I am not a fit agent for work; therefore to accomplish the performance of work, let me have a wife. "Again,—let me be born," let me be produced as offspring. "Again,—let me have wealth," cows etc., by which work is accomplished. "Again let me perform work," the cause of elavation and liberation, viz., let me perform work,—by which,—liberated from my debt, I may obtain the places (worlds) of the gods, etc.,—and the ceremonial rites for objects of desire which are the causes by which a son, wealth, heaven, etc., are effected. So far extends verily desire," which means, desire is limited to those objects. So far extend the object which are to be desired, viz. a wife, son, wealth and works. viz., the desire as cause. The three worlds, the world of man, the world of the fcrefathers, and the world of the gods, are the effects of this desire as cause; for the desire, as cause referring to wife, son, wealth and work, is for their sake. Therefore this is one desire; and the *other*, the desire of the worlds, which is also a desire, depends upon a cause; in this manner desire is two-fold. Hence it will be afterwards (B. A. p. 592), said; "These two desires." Because every action is undertaken on account of its effect, therefore

it should be understood, that by the passage : "So far extends desire" the worlds are necessarily implied, and *therefore* declared," for if eating is mentioned, it is not necessary to mention also satisfaction, because eating is merely for the sake of it. These two desires, characterised as cause and effect, are the longing, by which compelled, the ignorant, who is subject *to work*, like the silk-worm, encases his self (soul) ; *that is to say*, on the road of action not attending to himself (the soul) *and* having got out (of himself). Thus it is said in the Taittiriya : "Bewildered by fire, teased by smoke, he does not know his own place." How again it is ascertained, that *desire* extends so far, because desire are infinite, for desires have no end ? On this account the reason is stated : Because without desire one does not get more than this," which consists of effect and cause ; for, beside cause and effect, nothing, either perceived or not perceived, is to be gained in *this* world ; for the object to be obtained is desire, and as this does not exist without them (cause and effect) it is proper to say : "So far extends verily desire." Hereby it is said : Wish, the object of action of the ignorant subject, is two-fold desire, *Viz.* either desire as effect, or as cause, whether its object is perceived or not perceived. Above this wish the wise must be elevated. Because in this manner the ignorant self (soul) being desirous, before desired, *and* also he who preceded him,—(*for* this is the law of the world, and in the same manner was this the creation of Prajāpati ; *for* it is said, (p. 64) "he was afraid" by ignorance. Then (pp. 67 68) : "Hence, excited by desire, a person is not happy when alone ; to remove the unhappiness, he desired a wife ; he approached her ; hence sprang forth this creation,"—"Therefore," after this creation, "also now," at the present time, "a lonely person" before his being married, desires in accordance with what has been said : "Let me have a wife,—again, let me be born,—again, let me have wealth,—again, let me perform work." "As long as he," who is thus desirous and endeavouring of getting all, a wife, etc., "as long as he does not obtain one of them," one of what has been mentioned, a wife, etc., "so long he thinks himself incomplete." At last when he obtains all of them, his completeness ensues ; but when he cannot accomplish his completeness, he is in the state of incompleteness ; then for the accomplishing of his completeness, the text says : "His completeness," the completeness of him, who, as before mentioned

is conscious of incompleteness "is this." What? (To show this), the totality of effect and cause is divided. Here (in this division) "the mind is" (for every thing else, produced from *the totality of cause and effect* is governed by it), by its superiority, "his self (the soul)" which means like his self, as the master of the family is like the soul of the wives, etc., because his wife, son, etc., follow him. In the same manner is the mind here assumed as the self for the sake of completeness: "and" thus also "speech his wife," on account of speech, being in like manner governed by the mind. Speech, viz., sound, whose characteristic is directing, etc., is received by the mind through the ear, etc., considered and revered; in this manner is speech the wife of the mind. From both, speech and mind, represented as wife and husband, was produced life for the *performance of work*: therefore "life is their offspring," as it were. There (if self, wife and offspring are present) work characterised by the effort of life, etc., is to be accomplished by the wealth perceived by the eye, and therefore is "the eye the wealth of man." Wealth is two-fold, wealth of man and other wealth; therefore it is said, "of man," to distinguish it from other wealth; for cattle, the wealth connected with man *and* perceptible by the eye, is accomplishing action; therefore *it* represents it. Hence by connexion is the eye the wealth of man; "for," because "one obtains," perceives, "it," the wealth of man, cattle etc., "by the eye" (therefore is the eye the wealth of man). What again is the other kind of wealth? "The ear the wealth of the gods" because knowledge is the object of the gods. Knowledge is the wealth of the gods. Therefore in our case is the ear even the object of wealth. Why? "For by the ear;" because by the ear "one hears it," the wealth of the gods, knowledge, therefore is the ear even the wealth, because knowledge is dependent on the ear. How again is work to be performed by those agents, the first of which is self, and the last wealth? The answer is: "Self is even." Self means *here* the body. How again is self (the body) the representative of work? because it is the cause of work for him (the sacrificer). How is it the cause of work? "For by self," by the body, "one performs work." In this manner is the completeness, whose characteristics are external objects, as a son, etc., accomplished for him, who thinks himself incomplete. In this manner therefore, "The sacrifice is five-fold," to be performed by five, even

in the case of a person who has ceased from work, where it is to be performed by symbols alone. How again is the symbol by the mere apprehension of five, called a sacrifice? Because an external sacrifice also is accomplished by men and animals, and there are five men and five animals, by the application of the mentioned five, mind, speech, etc. Therefore, it is said: "the animal [five-fold,—the men five-fold." Although the notion of animal is found also in men, yet there is a difference between them, wherefore "man" has been separately mentioned. What more? "Five-fold this all," the cause and effect of the work, "whatsoever." "Whosoever thus knows," whosoever in this manner represents the five-fold sacrifice as himself, "the same obtains this all," the world under the notion of himself. 17.

Fifth Bráhmana.

Of the seven provisions which the father created by understanding the penance, he assigned one as the common to *all* and two to the gods, three he made for himself, one he gave to the animals; for upon this all is founded, whatsoever breathes and whatsoever breathes not. Why are they not destroyed, although always consumed? Whosoever knows the cause of the non-destruction, he eats the principal food; he goes to the gods, he lives eternally. 1.

There in the last Bráhmana) ignorance has been introduced by the words: "Whosoever worships another deity in such a manner:" "He is another, another am I," "the same does not know," (B. A. p. 118). It has also been said (p. 129), that the person who has the consciousness of caste and of the different conditions of life (viz., of a religious student, a house-holder, of one who retires to the forest, and of one who lives merely for the contemplation of God), who is ruled by his duties, who, compelled by desire, affords assistance to the gods forefathers, etc., through sacrifices and other rites, is the place for all beings. And as by each and all of his works he has been created as the place to be enjoyed by all beings, thus he has created all beings and the whole world for his own enjoyment. The meaning is, in this manner everybody, in accordance with his knowledge and

work, is the enjoyer and enjoyment, and agent and the object of action of the whole world. To understand the identity of the soul we shall say with reference to knowledge in the chapter treating on the knowledge of the universal essence (madhu lit. honey,): "All is the effect of all, one universal essence."

He created by the five fold work whose object in desire, viz., by the *five-fold* sacrifice, etc., the world for *his* enjoyment, and also by knowledge (for his consideration). This whole world is seven-fold divided according to its being cause and effect. They (these parts) are called provisions, because they are objects of enjoyment. He (by the creation of them through work and knowledge) he is the father of those provisions. Those Mantras: "Of the seven provisions," etc., are here assumed as Sutras, because they show, compendiously, the meaning of those provisions, together with their application. (The term "Yad" is here an adverb in connexion with 'he created.') By "understanding," knowledge, and "penance," work; for knowledge and work are the meanings of the terms "understanding," and penance," because they are topics of the text, and not the literal meanings of them "understanding" and "penance," because they are not topics of the text; for the five-fold work, to be accomplished by a wife, etc., and afterwards knowledge by the words: "who thus knows, etc.," have been set forth in the text. Therefore it must not be doubted, that understanding and penance are well known. Again: "The seven provisions which the father created," by knowledge and work, here it must be supplied: the same I will mention.* 1.

The Mantra: "Of the seven provisions which the father created by understanding and penance; for the father created by understanding and penance." "He assigned one as the common to all." The common provision to all, is that which is eaten. Whosoever worships it, the same does not turn from sin; for it is mixed. "And two to the gods," viz., the sacrifice and the oblation. Again, others say they mean the

* There is no necessity for assuming the proposed ellipsis, and I have, therefore, followed S'ankara's explanation in the translation.

ceremonies at the new, and full moon. Therefore it is not their nature to be associated with desire. "One he gave to the animals." This is milk; for before men as well as animals subsist on milk alone. Therefore they feed the child, when born, either with melted butter, or put him to the breast. Then they call the babe born; for he does not eat grass.

Here is the sense of the Mantras on account of their obscurity difficult to be understood; hence the Brahmana is engaged in the explanation of them. There what means *the Mantra* "Of the seven provisions which the father created." "The answer is given by the term for" which is to show, that the meaning is well known; for the meaning is, that the meaning of the Mantra is well known, and therefore by the repetition of the Mantra: "The provisions he produced," is to indicate, that the meaning is well-known. Therefore the Brahmana says without hesitation: "For the father created by understanding and penance." But how then is the meaning well-known? The answer the causes, producing the worlds, of which the first is a wife and the last work, is evident, and it is also declared by such passages as: "Let me have a wife." There it has been declared, that the wealth of the gods,—viz. knowledge,—work] and a son are the cause of the creation with reference to the worlds in their nature as effects (that is to say, as the result of good or bad actions). And also that which will be said, is well known. Therefore it is proper to say; "By understanding, etc." for desire, whose object is (enjoyment of) fruit, is well-known in common life, and also desire, whose object is a wife, etc., which is set forth in the passage: "So far extends desire;" but as to the object of the knowledge of Brahma (which is liberation), desire is impossible, because then all is one and the same. Thereby (by showing, that the cause of the world is desire, produced by ignorance) it is also, said, that the world is created by natural, unscriptural knowledge and penance. This follows also from the reason, that work and knowledge are the cause of consequences which are not desired, down to the state of inanimate matter. But it was intended to explain the relation of effect and cause in

accordance with the Śāstra; for in the desire to establish the knowledge of Brahma, there is included the intention to describe the state, in which the world is disregarded; for this whole world, whose nature is manifested and not manifested, is impure, transient, a compound of cause and effect, the object of unhappiness and ignorance, and therefore for him who has no regard for this world, the knowledge of Brahma is to be commenced.

There, by the division of the provisions, their application is set forth. "He assigned one as the common to all," this is a part of Mantra. Its explanation is as follows: "The common provision to all" to all enjoyers, what is it? "that which is eaten," enjoyed by all beings day by day; this common *food*, the object of all enjoyers the father assigned after the creation of the provision.

• "Whosoever worships, —which means is attached to, (for worship means *also* attachment, as it is clear from common expressions such as. "He worships the teacher," "he worships the king,") "it"—viz. the common provision, which is to be enjoyed, the cause of the preservation of all living beings, whose principal object is the enjoyment of provision for the sake of the preservation of the body, and not work for the sake of something unseen,—"the same," being of such a nature, "does not turn," is not liberated, "from sin," from vice. Thus a Mantra says: "He enjoys useless food," etc. (Kr. Yajur Brāhmaṇa 2d Adh. 8th Pr. 8th Anva.) Also the Smṛiti: "Let him not cook food for himself" (alone). He, who eats, without giving to the guests, is a thief. Even a person, who procures abortion,* becomes free from sin, if he eats food, after he has first distributed it."

Why again does he not turn from sin? "for it is mixed;" for the property, which is enjoyed by the living creatures, is undivided (and therefore it does not belong to one, as the property, left by a father, does not belong to any of his sons, before it is divided) because it is the object of enjoyment for all. Even the morsel, which is put into the mouth, is observed to cause pain in the mind of another; for, while there is the desire, let me have it, the hope of every one is thereby excluded. Therefore it is impossible to take even a

* According to A'nanda a person, who kills a high caste Brāhmaṇa.

mouthful of food, without giving pain to another. Thus it is said in the Smṛiti : " It is the guilt of man," etc.

Some (the Bhartriharyapancha) say : The food, called that of the Vis'wadevas which is daily given by the house holder, is *here* meant. This is not evident, like the food, which is an object of enjoyment for all living beings, nor does it agree with the passage : " that which is eaten." Because the food, which is called the food of the Vis'wadevas, is included in the food, which is an object of enjoyment for all living beings, therefore it is proper to understand the food which, may be eaten by a dog, a Chandala, etc., for it is the food which, beside the Vis'wadevas, is taken by a dog, Chandala, etc. In this case the expression ; " that which is eaten," is proper ; for if food is not to mean general food, then it must be said, that it has neither been created nor applied by the father ; but it has been granted, that all food has been created and distributed by the father ; and it is very improper to say, that a person who has performed the work, which is called that of the Vis'wadevas, and which is in accordance with S'astras, is not released from all sin. Nor is there a prohibition of it ; nor is it, like the action of catching fish, blamed for its own nature, because it is performed by good people, and because the S'ruti declares it sin, if it is not done ; moreover, otherwise also sin is obtained ; for it is said in a Mantra : " I am food, I eat him who eats food."—" And two to the gods " This is a part of the Mantra. Which are the two provisions, which after their creation he assigned to the gods ? The answer is : " The sacrifice (Hutam) and the oblation (Prahutam) " * Sacrifice is an offering in the fire. The oblation is the taking of the offerable food after the sacrifice. Because the father made over these two provisions, the sacrifice and the oblation, to the gods, therefore at this time house-holders also " sacrifice to the gods," thinking, this food must be given by us to the gods, " and offer," which means, and having sacrificed, take the offering. " Again others say," the two provisions which were given

* The Bráhmaṇa has twice daily to perform the ceremony of Homa (the offering of ghee in fire). When the food is ready, a part of it is to be offered in the fire to the gods ; this is called Hutam, while another part is thrown on the ground as an offering to those gods, who are called Dharmádi.

by the father to the gods, are not the sacrifice and the oblation ; what then ? “ They *mean* the ceremonies at the new and full moon (Dars’apurnamasau). Here, according to the first supposition, it will be said, because there is no difference } with reference to the dual number (dwe, two provisions, which may be as well applied to Huta-prahute as to Dars’apurnamasau) and because *they* (the Huta and Prahuta) are otherwise known, it means the sacrifice (Huta) and the oblation (Prahuta). But although the dual number accords also with the sacrifice and the oblation, yet the ceremonies at the new and full moon are also performed by the Srauta fire,* and the notion of their being provisions, is yet better known, because they are declared in a Mantra.* And if a quality and the thing to which it refers, are obtained (at the same time) the latter must first be comprehended ; but to the ceremonies at the new and full moon the idea of priority must be assigned rather than to the sacrifice and oblation. Therefore it is proper to think of them by the words : “ And two to the gods.” Because these two provisions under the name of the provisions at the new and full moon, were designed by the father for the gods, “ therefore,” in order to remove any objection, that they are made for the gods, “ it is not their nature to be associated with desires ” (ishti;) that the term “ ishti ” means desire, is clear from the S’atapatha Brahmana, (the affix uka in the word, “ Ishtiyayuka,” means a natural inclination).

“ One he gave to the animals.” Which is the one provision which the father gave to the animals ? “ This is milk : ” How again it is known, that the animals are the possessors of that provision ? The text answers : “ For before,” because before, at first, “ men as well as animals, subsist on milk alone,” therefore this provision is proper for them : how could they otherwise before subsist on it in accordance with a law ? How do they before subsist on it ? The answer is : Because men as well as animals subsist on that provision (as this application is made at the commencement, although there also *other* provisions) “ therefore they,” the three castes, “ either feed,” cause to

* The house-holder has to perform his daily ceremonies, etc., by the Smárta fire (the fire obtained by the Smṛiti) and the ceremonies at the new and full moon by the Srauta fire (the fire, ordained by the S’ruti).

eat, "the child, when born," at the ceremony of its birth, "with melted butter," together with gold,* "or they put him afterwards to the breast," they cause him afterwards to drink *milk*. As it is natural for the others, (viz., for animals, different from men) they put the *the young animal* first to the breast. "Then they call the babe born." Of what size (that is to say "age") is the babe? To this question it is replied: "for he does not eat grass," even until this day he does not eat grass, which means, that a very young child even until this day lives upon milk. And what has before been said "that at first at the ceremony after birth they subsist on melted butter, and others on milk (viz., that they subsist upon milk merely: this makes no difference) for melted butter is of the same nature as milk, being a modification of it. Why is the provision for animals, which was before (in the Māntṛa) given in the seventh place, explained *here* in the fourth? *This is done*, because thereby the work is accomplished; for all work which refers to burnt-offerings, etc., depends upon milk as its cause.

And this work (milk) which is to be effected by wealth, is to effect the three provisions which will be mentioned, as the before mentioned two provisions of the ceremonies at the new and full moon (are the cause of the three provisions); therefore it (milk), being a part of the work (ceremonial work) it is declared to be identical with work. Moreover, since there is no difference as to its being a cause (as this provision, milk, is a cause in the same way as the former two provisions are) and hence the meaning (of the two former provisions with milk) is similar, the succession (in which the topics are described in the Māntṛa) is disregarded (*It is no reason, that the explanation should not have been made in a different order.*) It is also done, because the explanation is *thereby made more easy*, for the provisions, when *treated* one after another, can be easily explained, and when explained, are easily understood.

Upon this all is founded, whatsoever breathes and whatsoever not breathes; for on milk all is founded, whatsoever

* It is only a touching of the tongue with melted butter, mixed with gold.

breathes and whatsoever not breathes. The saying: "a person, offering throughout the year with milk, overcomes the second death," let none understand this in such a manner. Which day a person, sacrifices, the same day he overcomes the second death. A person, who thus knows, will overcome the second death that day on which he offers; for he gives all the eatable food of the gods. For what reason do they not decrease, although they are continually consumed? The soul is verily the cause that they do not decrease, for he again and again produces this provision.

"Whosoever knows the cause that they do not decrease—the soul is the cause that they do not decrease; for he produces this provision by understanding, by understanding and by works: if he did not produce it, it would verily decrease,—“he eats food in the true manner,” true means principal; therefore he eats food in the principal manner, he goes to the gods, he lives upon strength; this is said for the sake of praise. 2.

"Upon this all is founded, whatsoever breathes and whatsoever not breathes." What is the meaning of this? The answer is: "Upon this," the animal provision, "all," be it characterized as belonging to the soul, or to the material sphere, or to the superintendence of deities, the whole world, "is founded," "whatsoever breathes," endowed with the effort of breathing, "and whatsoever not breathes," immoveable matter, as rocks, etc. And there (in the text) it is explained by the term "for," which illustrates any thing already well known. How can it be said that the notion "to be the foundation of all," belongs to milk? On account of its being considered as cause. And it is the intimate cause of all the works connected with burnt-offerings, and by its nature a modification of the oblation of a burnt-sacrifice. That it is the whole world (which is founded thereon) is established by a hundred passages of the S'ruti and Smṛiti, wherefore it is proper to explain it by the term "for." "The saying:" in other Brahmanas, "a person, offering throughout a year with milk, overcomes the second death." (here by

the year are in fact meant three hundred and sixty days, and in them there are seven hundred and twenty burnt-offerings.) *By the sacrificer* the bricks* which are collected in accordance with the Yajur Veda and the days and nights of the year, obtains Prajâpati in the shape of the fire, which is called Sambatsara (the annual fire.) Having performed in this manner offerings throughout the year a person overcomes the second death ; having died he becomes like the gods, and does not die again. This, which is said in the passages of other Brâhmanas ; " let none understand this in such a 'manner,' let it not be explained thus. " Which day a person sacrifices ; the same day he overcomes the second death," it does not depend upon the practice of the whole year. " A person who thus knows," viz., what has been said, that " Upon milk all is founded," because all is a modification of the burnt-offering of milk, obtains the nature of the world (of Prajâpati) in one day. Thus it is said : " He overcomes the second death ;" the sage, once dying, being separated from the body, becomes the universal soul (the nature of all) which means, does not assume a finite body for dying again. What again is the reason, that by gaining the nature of all he overcomes death ? It is replied : " for he gives," because he gives all " the eatable food to the gods," to all of them, by his morning and evening burnt-offerings ; therefore it is proper, that he,—after having made his whole self like a burnt-offering, after having gained one identical nature with all the 'gods by his being the provision of all the gods, and after being like all the gods,—should not die again. In this manner it is also said in a Brâhmana. " The self-existing Brahman (in the form of Hiranyagarbha) performed penance. Then he reflected : Verily, there is a limit of penance ; also, let me offer myself in all beings, and all beings in myself," therefore, having offered himself in all beings and all beings in himself, he obtained by his excellency over all beings, his kingdom, his dominion." " For what reason do they not decrease, although they are continually consumed ?" From the time that the provisions after their creation were given by the father to the seven different enjoyers,

* The sacrificer, or in his stead his appointed substitute, is, after every daily ceremony, to put down a brick to mark the number of ceremonies he has performed in the year.

they are consumed by them. Since they (the provisions) are the cause of their (of the enjoyers') preservation, and since there "continually," without interruption, is a decrease of what has been made, their decrease is proper. But they do not decrease, as is evident, from the world continuing in an unshaken manner; hence there must be a cause for it, that they do not decrease. Therefore it is asked: "For what reason," again, "do they not decrease." The reply is: "The soul is verily the cause, that they are not decreased." As the father was before the creator of the provisions by understanding, and as he was enjoyer by the five-fold work in connexion with a wife, etc., in the same manner also those, to whom the provisions are given, although they are enjoyers of those provisions, are fathers; they produce by understanding and penance those provisions. It is then declared: the soul which is the enjoyer of the provisions, is the cause, that they do not decrease. How is it the cause, that they do not decrease? The answer is: "For he," because he "again and again produces this provision," viz., this seven-fold provision, which is to be enjoyed, the characteristic of which is to be cause and effect, and which consists in the effect of work,—“by understanding, by understanding,” by knowledge which will take place at this or the other time, “and by works,” the efforts of speech, mind and body. “If he did not produce it,” the mentioned seven-fold provisions, even in an instant, by knowledge and works, then he would be separated from the permanent enjoyment, “would verily decrease.” And the meaning is, therefore, because the soul, the enjoyer of the provisions, uninterruptedly produces *them* according to *his* knowledge and action, therefore is the soul the cause that they do not decrease, as it is a constant agent; therefore the provisions, although consumed, do not decrease. Hence the whole world, the totality, characterised by knowledge and the result of action, consisting of effect and cause, being the effect resulting from action,—because it is an expanse, concentered by the actions and desires of numberless embodied souls joined together,—of a moment's duration, impure, without substance, like the continuation of a light reflected on the current of a river, without substance like the trunk of the plantain-tree, like foams, like a deception, like the water in a mirage, like a dream, etc., although changeable and transient, appears to be substantial to those whose knowledge is

formed by it. For the sake of disregarding the world it is said: "He produces this provision by understanding, by understanding *and* by works. If he did not produce it, it would verily decrease;" for in this manner *the disregard* of those who disregard the world, has success:—therefore the science of Brahma will be commenced in the forth chapter. "Whosoever knows the cause that they do not decrease,"—the three provisions to be mentioned are by this opportunity explained; in this manner the effect of true knowledge is set forth. "Whosoever knows the cause that they do not decrease,—the soul is verily the cause that they do not decrease; for he produces this provision by understanding, by understanding *and* by works; if he did not produce *it*, it would verily decrease,—he eats food in the true manner." The sense of this is explained. "in the principal manner;" whosoever knows in the principal manner that the cause of the non-decrease of the provisions is the father, the soul, "he eats the food;" a person who knows is not placed as the ignorant is, in an accidental relation to the food; having become the substance of the provisions, he is alone the enjoyer; he does not become an object of enjoyment (for others), "he goes to the gods," obtains a godlike state; "he lives upon strength," and immortality, "this is said for the sake of praise," it has not another meaning relative to an invisible effect. 2.

"Three he made for himself," *vi.*, mind, speech, *and* life; these he made for himself." "I was absent in mind, I did not see. I was absent in mind, I did not hear;" in this manner it is evident, that a person sees with the mind. Desire, determination, uncertainty, belief, unbelief, steadiness non-steadiness, shame, intellect, fear, all this is the mind alone. Therefore, when touched from behind, a person knows by the mind. Every sound whatsoever is speech; for it extends as far as the end; for it is not an object of *manifestation*. The vital air, which goes forwards, the vital air, which goes downwards, the vital air, which goes everywhere, the vital air, which goes upwards, and the vital air, which equalises, vital air, all this is life (Prana:). Thus modified the soul is the modification of

mind, the modification of speech, and the modification of life. 3.

The three provisions, mentioned before which are the effects of the five-fold work, exceed in value the others on account of their nature as effects and of their extensiveness. For the separate explanation of them, the present section, from the words: "Three he made for himself," until the end of *this* Brâhmana is commenced. What is its meaning? The answer is: "Mind, speech and life, these," three provisions, these mind, speech and life. "*He*," the father, at the commencement of the creation, "made for himself," for his own sake. With reference to them there is a doubt as to the existence and nature of the mind: hence it is said, the mind exists as something different from the ear and the other external organs, because it is well-known, that, although there is a connexion of the soul with the objects of the external organs, yet a person does not (always) apprehend a present object. A person, when asked. Dost thou see this form? answers *for instance*: My mind wandered somewhere else. "I was absent in mind, I did not see." In the same manner, when asked: Dost thou hear my word? *he answers*: "I was absent in mind, I did not hear." Therefore, it is evident, that that,—in the absence of which a knowledge of form, sound, etc., by the eye, ear, etc., (*the instruments* fit to apprehend forms, sounds, etc.,) does not take place, although they (eye, ear, etc.) are in connection with their respective objects, and by the presence of which such a knowledge takes place,—is something different, named the mind, the internal organ, connected with the objects of all the *other* organs. Therefore "in this manner it is evident, that a person" every person "sees with the mind, hears with the mind," because the mind being disturbed, there is no seeing hearing, etc. The existence of the mind having been proved, the following is said with reference to its nature: "Desire,"—the wish to be united with a woman, etc., "determination,"—the ascertaining of a present object white, blue, etc., "uncertainty,"—doubt, "belief,"—the knowledge of the existence of actions whose effects are not perceived, of deities, etc., "unbelief,"—the knowledge, opposite to the former, "steadiness,"—the firmness in pain of the body, etc., "non steadiness,"—the opposite of the former, "shame,"

—bashfulness ; “intellect,”—knowledge ; “fear,”—apprehension, “all this, etc., is the mind,” are forms of the mind, of the internal organ. Another reason is also mentioned for the existence of the mind. Because, “when touched from behind,” by some body unperceived by the eye, a person is aware by discrimination, this is a touch of the hand, that a touch of the knee, therefore exists an internal organ, called mind. If there were nothing which discriminates, called mind, how could there be discrimination by the mere skin ; therefore the mind, the cause of the possibility of discrimination, exists. Its nature has already been shown.

The three provisions, the effects of actions, *viz.*, mind, speech and life, are here to be explained inasmuch as they are subservient to the soul, as they have their material sphere, and as they are superintended by deities. Among them, *viz.*, among mind, speech and life, are subservient to the soul, the mind has been explained. Now speech will be explained. “Every sound whatsoever,” *viz.*,—either that which is characterised as a letter, etc., to be pronounced through the palate and other organs by the agency of living beings, or the other *kind*, produced by drums, clouds, etc.,—every sound “is speech.” Such is the nature of speech, now its effect will be mentioned. “For it,” for speech “extends as far as the end,” the conclusion of what is to be named, the determination of the same ; “for it,” again, as being the manifest, is not to be manifested, as is what is to be named, because its nature is to manifest like a light, etc. ; for what manifests as a light and the like, is not manifested by some other manifestation. In the same manner speech which manifests, is not manifested itself. Thus the S'ruti removes the regressum in infinitum (that any thing which manifests, supposes some thing else by which it is manifested, etc.) It is not an object of manifestation, and the meaning is, manifestation is not effect of speech.—Now “the vital air, which goes forwards,” (respiration, Prāna :) is explained. Respiration is the function of the heart which is to be discharged by the mouth and nose. Respiration (Prāna is derived from Pranayama, taking forwards). “The vital air which goes downwards,” (Flatulence, Apāna) whose function is downwards, from the carrying away of excrements, urine, etc., the vital air which goes every where,” circulation : Vyāna has its place from the navel (throughout the whole body) and is called Vyāna from its functions of

regulating Vyāyamāna); it is the union of the function of respiration and flatulence and the cause of energetic action. The vital air, which goes upwards," (Eructation, Udāna) is the getting stout, it is the cause of going upwards, the function of rising from the sole of the feet to the head; "the vital air, which equalises," (assimilation, Samāna) because it equally (Samam) carries (distributes) what is eaten and drunk; its place is the stomach, and its function to digest the food; vital air (Ana) is the common function of all those special functions, and united with the common effort of the body. "All this," the whole of the mentioned functions of respiration, &c., is life (Prāna),—Life, as having a function and subservient to the soul, is not mentioned; but its action has been explained by showing the division of its functions. Explained are the provisions called mind, speech and life, in their relation as subservient to the soul. "Thus modified," viz by the modifications commenced by mind, speech and life, as referring to Prajāpati.

Which is that soul, the whole of causes and effects, the thus or thus modified totality, which by those who do not discriminate, from want of distinction, is thought to be of the nature of the soul? The mentioned totality is the modification of speech, the modification of mind and the modification of life; this also is said for the purpose to determine life. 3.

They are even the three worlds; speech is even this world, mind the atmospheric world, life that world. 4.

They are even the three Vedas; speech is even the Rig Veda, mind the Yajur Veda, and life the Sāma Veda. 5

They are even the gods, the forefathers and men; speech is even the gods, mind the forefathers and life men. 6

They are even father, mother and child; mind is even the father, speech the mother, and life the child. 7.

The material sphere (Adhibhautika) of these provisions of Prajāpati will now be stated. "They" speech, mind and life, are even "the three worlds," earth, atmosphere and heaven. Their distinction is "speech is even this world," mind the atmosphere, and life that world. 4

In the same manner: "They are even," etc.; the meaning of these words is plain. 5—7.

They are even that which is known, which is wished to be known, and which is not known; whatsoever is known, is of the nature of speech; for speech is known; speech being of such a nature, preserves a person. 8

Whatsoever is wished to be known, is of the nature of the mind; for the mind is desired to be known; the mind being of such a nature, preserves a person. 9.

Whatsoever is not known, is of the nature of life, for life is not known; life being of such a nature, preserves a person. 10.

"They are even that which is known, which is wished to be known, and which is not known." Their destination is, whatsoever is known," fully known, "is of the nature of speech; and the text gives the reason for this; "for speech is known," because its nature is to manifest. How can that be unknown, which makes other things also known? "By speech the universal king is known as a companion," will be said afterwards. The effect of knowing the nature of speech is "speech being of such a nature, being known, preserves him," viz. the person who knows the mentioned perfections of speech, that is to say, in the form of knowledge becomes a provision, an enjoyment, for him. 8

In the same manner, "whatsoever," how indistinct soever, desired to be known distinctly, "is wished to be known, is of the nature of the mind, for," because, "the mind" on account of its doubtful nature, "is described to be known." As before, is described the reward for one who knows the perfection of the mind. "The mind," being of such a nature, viz. which is wished to be known "preserves him," remains the nature of a provision by its own characteristic to be something wished to be known. In the same manner "whatsoever is not known," is not an object of knowledge, nor doubted, "is of the nature of life; for life is not known," not known in its nature, since it is not heard to be determined. As the distinction of speech, mind and life is established by the division into what is known, what is

wished to be known, and what is not known (viz., by a division, comprehending all objects of knowledge) the three worlds, etc., are only mentioned for the sake of illustration. By the passage showing, that the nature of what is known is everywhere, etc., its rule is to be remembered. "Life being of such a nature preserves him," which means life with its unknown nature becomes his provision. Teachers, fathers, etc., appear to be doubted and their assistance to be not known by disciples, sons, etc. In the same manner is obtained the nature of the provisions of mind and life, which are doubted and not known. 9—10.

Of this speech is earth the body, its illuminating nature that fire. Therefore as far as speech *extends*, so far *extends* the earth, so far fire. 11.

The material extent of speech, mind and life has been explained ; now their sphere, as superintended by deities, is commenced. "Of this speech," which is shewn in the text under the notion of a provision of Prajapati, "is earth the body," the external locality ; "its illuminating nature," the manifesting organ, located upon the earth, "that" earthly, "fire:" for twofold is Prajapati's speech, viz., effect, locality, which does not manifest, and secondly organ, which is placed *in that locality*, and which does manifest. Both of them, earth and fire, are the speech of Prajapati. "Therefore (tat, explained by S'ankara with tatra, "with reference to this") as far as, in measure "speech, extends" in its divisions, viz, in its subserviency to the soul and in its material sphere, "so far extends the earth," which is established everywhere under the notion of locality as effect, "so far goes that fire," as located in the form of sense, it entered so far with its illuminating nature the earth. The last (relation viz, the sphere superintended by deities) is the same (and therefore not commented on.) 11.

Again, of this mind is heaven the body, its illuminating nature that A'ditya. Therefore as far as mind extends, so far extends heaven, so far that A'ditya. They united in love. Hence life was produced.* He is Indra, he is without rival.

A second verily is a rival. Whosoever knows this has no rival. 12.

Again, of this life are the waters the body, the illuminating nature that moon. Therefore as far as life extends, so far extends the waters, so far extends that moon. They are even all alike, all infinite. Whatsoever worships them as finite (beings) conquers the finite world; again whatsoever worships them as infinite (beings) conquers an infinite world. 13.

"Again of this mind," which has been declared a provision of Prajâpati "is heaven," the place of heaven, "the body," the effect, the locality, "its illuminating nature," its organ, that which is to be located, "that A'ditya." There "as far as," in measure, "mind," as subservient to the soul, or in its material sphere, "extends, so far" in expanse, in measure, is fixed heaven to be the locality for the illuminating organ of the mind, "so far that Aditya," the illuminating organ, which requires to be located. "They," Agni and A'ditya, speech and mind, in their nature as superintending deities, mother and father, "united in love." *Both having the intention*, I will do the action, it was—between the two places (heaven and earth),—produced by the mind, Aditya, as father and manifested as speech, Agni as mother. "Hence by the union of both of them, "life," air, "was produced" for the sake of motion, of work. "He," who was born "is Indra," the supreme lord (Parameswara) and not only Indra, but "without rival." Without rival means a person, for whom there exists no rival. Who again has really a rival? "A second verily," a second who approaches with *the intention of contention*, "is" called "a rival." Accordingly, although speech and mind have the nature of a second, yet they entertain no rivalry; for they have a friendly intention towards life.—The fruit arising from the knowledge, that there is no rivalry from those who were united in love, is like that *derived* from the subserviency to the soul, as follows: "Whosoever knows this," life as it has been described, as being without rival, viz., he who has true knowledge, "has no rival," no antagonist. 12.

"Again of this life,"—of the life set forth in the text, which is a provision of Prajâpati, not the life which has been declared as offspring, described immediately before, "are the waters the body,"

the effect, the locality for the organs, "the illuminating nature," as before, "that moon." There "as far as," in measure "life extends," in its divisions as subservient to the soul and as material sphere, "so far extend" pervade, "the waters," in their measure, "so far" extends that moon" which is to be located, so far, having entered the waters, and being of the nature of sense, it extends, as far as the sphere, subservient to the soul, and the material sphere extend.—Those three provisions, created by the father through the five-fold work, bear the names of speech, mind and life. The whole world in its sphere, subservient to the soul, and in its material sphere, is pervaded by them, or, besides them, there is nothing whatsoever, either effect or cause. But all these are Prajâpati. "They," speech, mind and life, "are even all alike," having the same extent, are as far pervading, as the objects of living beings together with the sphere subservient to the soul and the material sphere. Therefore they are "infinite;" because they are present in all bodies; for a body cannot be conceived without cause and effect; for it is said, that they consist of cause and effect. "Whosoever worships them," which are of the nature of Prajâpati, "as finite," limited, under the notion of their material sphere and their sphere, subservient to the soul, "conquers" as the reward in accordance with his worship, "a finite world," a world which is limited, which means, "he does not get their nature." "Again, whosoever worships them as infinite," as possessing the nature of all, the nature of all living beings, as unlimited "conquers an infinite world." 13.

That Prapajâti in his likeness of the year consists of 16 parts (Kalâ). His nights are even 15 parts; his fixed part is the sixteenth. He becomes full and wanes by the nights. At the day of the new moon, during the night entering with this sixteenth part all that is endowed with life, he is then the next day born in the morning. Therefore let in that night no body cut off the life of any one endowed with life, not even of the chameleon; it is intended for the honour of this deity. 14.

It has been said, that the father, after having created seven provisions by the fivefold work, produced three provisions for his own

sake. They are explained to be the effects of the five-fold work. How again are they called the effects of the five fold work? Because even in these three provisions the five-fold work is perceived, as wealth and work are there probable, *therefore is their cause also similar*. There (as to the three provisions) the earth and fire are the mother, heaven and A'ditya the father, and the life (air) which is in the middle of them, is *their* offspring, as it has been explained. On account of this wealth and work should be produced; this means to imply the commencement: "That Prajāpati, in his likeness of the year," who has been set forth in the text as consisting of three parts, is determined in a special manner by the nature of the year as consisting of sixteen parts. He, consisting of sixteen parts, is the year, the nature of time. "His" Prajapati's, as the substance of time, "nights," days and nights—meaning lunar day (tithi) are fifteen parts. "His fixed," permanent, "part" remains, as "the sixteenth," as the part (Kalā) which completes the sixteenth. "He" becomes full and wanes by the nights;" by the lunar days which are called parts (Kalā); for by the first day of a lunation, and by those which succeed it, the moon, Prajapati, gets full in the light half of the lunation, it grows by the increasing parts (Kālās) until the orb is full at the day of the full moon; it wanes by the decreasing parts in the dark half of the lunation, until the one permanent part remains in the dark night. "He," Prajāpati, the substance of time, "at the day of the new moon during the night," "entering with this sixteenth part," which has been called the permanent part, "all that is endowed with life," all living beings, viz. all that drinks water and all that eats annual plants, pervading all this by his identity with the annual plants (or with water) and abiding during the dark night, "is then" the next day, "born in the morning," united (the moon) with its second part—In the following manner is Prajāpati of five-fold nature. The heaven and sun are the mind, the father,—the earth and fire speech, the wife, the mother; and their offspring is life, the days of the moon, the parts (Kalā) are the wealth, because by their increasing and decreasing they are like wealth, and the work of those parts is what effects the change of the world. In this manner the whole Prajāpati, has become the effect of the five fold work, in accordance with the desires: "Let me have a wife"—again "Let me be born,"—again, "Let me have wealth," again,—“Let me perform

work; for as the cause so is the effect, is a principle even with the common people. Because the moon, having that night entered all living creatures, is possessed of its permanent part, "therefore," on this ground, "let in that night nobody cut off the life of any one endowed with life," let him not destroy a living creature, "not even of a chameleon," for the chameleon, 'as being wicked, is naturally destroyed, since it is considered to forbode bad luck, when it is seen. 'But then, enmity to living beings is prohibited according to the passage of the *Smṛiti*: "Not killing living creatures, except at holy places." Very good, it is prohibited; but yet it must not be said, that the sentence means to make an exception for any other time than the day of the dark night, or an exception for the killing of the chameleon. What then does it mean? "It is intended for the honour," the adoration, "of this deity, viz. the deity of the moon."

That Prajâpati who under the likeness of the year is possessed of sixteen parts, is even this. That "this" is a person who thus knows. His wealth is the fifteen parts, his soul (self) is his sixteenth part. He gets full and wanes even by wealth. It is well known, that the soul is like the nave of a wheel, wealth like its periphery. Therefore, although he suffers the loss of all, if he lives, he is bare of the periphery, as it is said. 15.

"That Prajâpati," bearing the name of the invisible, "who under the likeness of the year is possessed of sixteen parts," must not be thought as absolutely invisible, because he "is even this," he is perceived visibly. Who is that "this?" "He is the person who thus knows," who knows, that Prajâpati whose nature consists of three provisions, is like himself. By the similarity with what is he Prajâpati? The answer is: "His wealth," the wealth in cows, etc., of a person who thus knows, "is the fifteen parts." For the sake of his completeness, "his soul," the individual self, "is his" (the knowing person's) sixteenth part, representing the permanent Kalâ. "He," like the moon, "gets full and wanes even by wealth." "It is well known" in common life, that "the soul," the individual self, "is like the nave of a wheel, wealth like its periphery," represented

by the family, the external part of the wheel, viz. spokes and circumference, etc. Therefore, although he suffers the loss of all of his property, suffers distress, "if he lives," "by the soul," represented by the nave of the wheel, "he is bare of," he has lost "the periphery," the external wealth, the family, as a wheel, deprived of spokes and circumference, as it is said," and the meaning is, if he lives, he is again increasing in wealth, represented by the spokes and circumference. 15.

Again there are verily three worlds, the world of man, the world of the forefathers, and the world of the gods. The world of man is to be conquered by a son, and not by any other work, (or knowledge,) by work the world of the forefathers, by science the world of the gods. The world of the gods is the best among the worlds. Therefore they praise science. 16

It has been explained, how by fivefold work in connection with science, the wealth of the gods, Prajapati is possessed of the nature of the three provisions; it has afterwards been said, how the wealth of a wife, etc., is represented by the family. There (in the former section) it has only generally been understood, that a son, work and inferior science (knowledge of the Vedas with reference to ceremonies), are causes of obtaining the worlds, but the rule of the special connexion a son, etc., with the effect, which is the obtaining of the worlds, has not been understood. To explain the special connexion of the effects with their causes, viz. a son, etc., the present section is commenced. The term "again" has the object to introduce the sentence "there are verily," verily is to show certainly, "three worlds," alone fit to be causes, stated by the S'āstra, neither more nor less. Which are they? The answer is: "The world of man, the world of the forefathers, and the world of the gods." Among them "the world of man" is to be gained by, is the effect of "a son," as cause (how it is to be gained by a son, will afterwards be said) "and not by any other work," or knowledge, as must be supplied here; "by work," alone as for instance the daily burnt offering (Agnihotra) "the world of the forefathers," is to be gained, and not by a son, nor by knowledge,—"by science the world of the gods," not by a son, nor by work. The world of the

gods is the best," the one most deserving of praise, "among the" hree, "worlds." "Therefore they praise science," because it is the cause of it. 16.

Hence again the making over. When *the father* thinks he is to die, then he says to his son: "Thou art Bramha, thou art the sacrifice, thou art the world." The son repeats: "I am Bramha, I am the sacrifice, I am the world." Of all that has been read, is Bramha the identity. Of all the sacrifices that *are to be performed*, is sacrifice the identity. Of all the worlds that are to be conquered, is world the identity. Thus far extends verily all this. All this multitude preserves me from this *world*. Therefore they call a son who is instructed, *Lūkyā*; therefore they instruct him. When he, having such a knowledge, departs from this world, then he enters together with those lives the son. If by him any thing through negligence, remains undone, the son liberates him from all this. Hence the name of a son (*Puttra*). He continues by a son alone in this world. Then those divine, immortal lives enter him. 17.

In this manner the three causes, viz. a son, work, and knowledge, find their application according to the division of the effect, viz. the three worlds which are to be accomplished. But a wife, because it is necessary for the sake of a son and of work, is not a separate cause, and is therefore not separately mentioned. Also wealth, as it is the cause of work, is not a separate cause. It is evident, that knowledge and work are means of conquering the world in consequence of their recovering their own nature. But a son not being of the nature of work, it is not clear, in what manner he is the means of conquering the worlds. "Hence," it is to be explained, in this manner "again," afterwards is commenced, "the making over;" this is the name of the work which is to be *now* related; for the father makes over the duties he has himself to perform, in the manner to be mentioned, to his son; hence this work bears the name of "making over." At what time is this to be done? "When the father thinks, he is to die," by inauspicious signs and the like, "then he says to him (after having

called him) : 'Thou are Brahma, thou art the sacrifice, thou art the the world.' " Thus addressed, he "repeats." That is to say, being instructed before, he knows, I have to do this. In this manner he says the three sentences : " I am Brahma, I am the sacrifice, I am the world." Under the idea, that the sense of the same is concealed, the S'ruti continues for its explation : "Of all that has been read" the remainder of what has been read that is to say, read or not read " is Brahma the identity," is the identity in the term of Brahma. The practice of reading with reference to the Vedas, which was hitherto thy duty, is henceforth thou, Brahma ; which means, must be done by thy agency. In the same manner, "Of all the sacrifices that were to be performed by me," may they be performed by me or not performed, " is sacrifice the identity," is the identity in the term sacrifice. The sacrifices which were to be performed by my agency, are henceforth "thou sacrifice," which means, are to be performed by thy agency. "All the worlds that are to be conquered," by me, whether they are conquered or not conquered, is world the "identity," is the identity in the term "world." Henceforward they are "thou world," to be conquered by thee, henceforward the sacrifice, which it was my duty to perform by reading (the Vedas) offerings and conquering of the worlds, is laid by me upon thee, but I am free from the sacrifice consisting in the bondage of duty. And the son has understood all in this manner, because he was instructed (before). The S'ruti, having considered there the intention of the father, gives this explanation : "Thus far extends verily all this," this is the limit of all the duties of a householder, viz that the Vedas are to be read, the sacrifices to be performed and the world to be conquered. "All this multitude" (for all this burthen, to which I am subject, when taken from me and placed upon you) preserves me, saves me from this world. (The past Abhūnajat in Sanskrit has in the S'ruti the meaning of the future : Pālayishyati). Because a son, who thus knows, is to liberate his father from this world, from the bondage of duty, "therefore they," the Brâhmanas, "call a son who is *thus* instructed, Lokya," which means, good for his father obtaining the worlds. "Therefore they," the fathers, "instruct a son" under the expectation, that he will be their Lokya (procurer of the worlds). "When he," the father, "having such a knowledge," after having delivered to the son the sacrifice of duty, "departs from this world," dies, "then he

enters with those lives the son," pervades him with the speech, mind and life set forth in the text. When the cause of distinction relative to the soul (which cause is ignorance) is removed, the speech, mind and life of the father enter all with their nature as superintended by deities, viz. in their likeness with the earth, the fire and the sun. Together with those lives the father also enters, because the father is transformed into the nature of speech, mind and life; for the father is transformed in such a manner as: "I am the infinite speech, mind and life, extending as far as the distinctions of what relates to the soul, to matter and to the superintendence of deities." Therefore his life is a continuation of the father's, and it is hence properly said, "then together with those lives he enters the son;" for it is said, he becomes the soul (substance) of all and (therefore also) of the son; and the meaning is, the father who has a thus instructed son, continues in this world, is by the likeness with the son not to be thought dead. In this manner it is said in another passage of the S'ruti; "He is made his other soul by holy works." (A. U. B. I, vii. p. 226, M. 4.) Now the text gives the derivation of Putra (son). "If by him," by the father at any time, "any thing through negligence, remains," meanwhile, "undone," which ought to be done, "the son liberates him from all this," which, bearing the nature of duty, was left undone by the father, and which is an obstacle to gaining the worlds,—*he liberates* him, by completing it (Purayitvâ) through his own practice. "Therefore," because he saves the father by completing (Puranena) hence the name of a son (Putra). This is the true notion of a son (Putrasya Putratvam) that by filling (Purayitvâ) the hole of the father he saves *him*. "He," the father "continues," although dead, yet immortal, "by a son," of such a kind, "in this world." In this manner the father conquers (obtains) by the son this world of man and,—not so, however, the worlds of the gods and the forefathers by knowledge and work, but (he conquers them) by assuming their nature alone; for without assuming their own nature, knowledge and work cannot possibly become cause of conquering the world by dependance upon another, as it is the case with a son. "Then," after the father has made over *his duties* "those divine" belonging to Hiranyagarbha, "immortal," whose nature it is not to die, "lives," speech and others, "enter him." How? The answer is given in the next section by the words: "The divine speech, etc.,"

In this manner it has been shown by the S'ruti itself, that a son, work and inferior knowledge have the power of accomplishing the worlds of men, of the forefathers and of the gods. In respect of this some wranglers (the Mimāṃsakās are meant) not knowing the special meanings of the words of the S'ruti, say, that a son and the other causes have the power to effect liberation. To silence them this passage has been given by the S'ruti, commencing with: "Let me have a wife," and all the other fivefold work which accomplishes desire continuing with: "*So far goes the desire*," of a son, etc., and concluding with the application to the special *effects* to be accomplished. Hence it is evident, that the passage of the S'ruti about debt refers to an ignorant person and not to the knowledge of the supreme soul. And it will be said (p. 904): "Of what use is a son to us, to whom the soul is the world." Others, the Bhāṭṭaprapanchika, on the other hand, maintain, that conquering of the worlds of the forefathers and gods is even an exclusion from them. Therefore a person, who by the joint performance of a son, of work and of the inferior knowledge is excluded from those three worlds, obtains liberation by the knowledge of the supreme soul; in this way the cause of a son, etc., successively have the power to effect liberation. To silence them also the other subsequent passage of the S'ruti is engaged in showing the effect, resulting for the father, whose duty is the performance of work, who has the knowledge of the nature of the three provisions and who makes over *the performance of* what has been left undone. But it cannot be said, that the effect is that of liberation, because it has been shown, that by the effect derived from understanding and penance in connection with the three provisions, the provisions are again produced. This follows also from the passage, referring to the decrease (of the provisions). "For what even does not produce it, decreases," also from the nature of the means of the effect in the passage: "The body is the like light," and lastly from the conclusion with the nature of name, form and work, in the passage: "Threefold is this, etc. Nor is it possible to infer from this passage, that the three causes, when united, have the power to effect one's liberation and another's. obtaining the nature of the three provisions, because the passage merely intends to show, that the effect of a son and of the other cause is the obtaining of the nature of the three provisions. 17.

From the earth and the fire the divine speech enters him. That speech is verily divine, by which, whatever he says, comes to pass. 18.

From the sky and the sun the divine mind enters him. That verily is the divine mind, by which he becomes joyful; henceforth he does not grieve. 19.

From the waters and the moon the divine life enters him. That verily is the divine life, which, whether issuing forth, or not issuing forth, is not afraid, again which is not lost. The person who thus knows, becomes the soul of all beings. As that deity, so also he. As all beings preserve that deity, so also preserve all beings a person who thus knows.

Whatever grief the children suffer together with *their children*, remains united with them alone; what is holy approaches him; for sin does not approach the gods. 20.

"From the earth and the fire the divine speech, (divine refers to its superintending deity,) enters him," after he has made over *his duties*; that is to say the divine speech, as characterised by earth and fire, is the last cause of the speech of all; for speech is obstructed by the faults of attachment, etc. with reference to the material elements, and as the faults of a person who has knowledge are removed, it (speech) pervades him, like water and manifestation of a light, on the breaking of what concealed them (for instance a vessel). This is the sense of the words: "From the earth and the fire the divine speech enters him. "That speech is verily divine," free from the faults of untruth and the like, pure, "by which" (divine speech), "whatever he says," either for himself or another, "comes to pass," that is to say, his word is not in vain, is not obstructed. 18.

In the same manner; "From the sky and the sun the divine mind enters him." And, "that is the divine mind," by the purity of its nature, by which he (the father) becomes joyful, happy, "henceforth" moreover, "he does not grieve," because there is no connexion of such a cause as grief (with him.) 19.

In the same manner: "From the waters and the moon the divine life enters him. That verily is the divine life;" viz. of what nature?

the answer is,—“Which, whether issuing forth,” in all the distinctions of life, “or not issuing forth,” in its nature as totality or speciality, or also, issuing forth in all moveable things, and not issuing forth in all immoveable things, “is not afraid,” is not connected with fear, of which unhappiness is the cause, “again, is not lost,” is not destroyed, is not injured. “The person who knows thus,” the before mentioned view of the nature of the three provisions, becomes the soul of all beings,” becomes the life of all beings, becomes the mind of all beings, becomes *their* speech, that is to say, becomes omniscient by being the nature of all; and also omnipotent. “As that deity,” the before mentioned deity, named Hiranyagarbha, “so also” (also shows, that there is no obstacle to his omniscience and omnipotence) “he” *which term* concludes the illustration. Moreover :* “As all beings, “preserve” worship, “that deity,” the deity called Hiranyagarbha with offerings, etc. “So also preserve all beings a person who thus knows,” which means, they worship him always with offerings and the like.

It has been said, “he becomes the soul of all beings.” Now it may be questioned, whether, by his being the nature of cause and effect of all beings, he is not also allied to the happiness and unhappiness of them. This is not the case, because his intellect is unlimited. As to persons whose intellect and nature are limited on being censured, etc. a connexion with unhappiness is evident, as if we say : “I am censured by that man;” but in virtue of *his* being the soul of all, there is no unhappiness from such causes produced, as there is no distinction of intellect with regard to the nature of the soul between the one who is censured and the other who censures, and also, as, like the unhappiness of death, there is no cause. For instance. If any body dies, unhappiness is produced for somebody (showing itself in such words as :) He is my son, my brother, where the cause (of the distress) is a son, a brother. If there is no cause of such a kind, unhappiness is not produced, even should a person behold the death of a person, etc. (who is not related to him). In this manner no unhappiness arises for god whose nature is unlimited, because he

* *Kinha* (moreover) is the text connected with the preceding sentence commencing with “Sa,” I believe, by a clerical error, as in this place it has no meaning, or a meaning which destroys the simplicity of the text.

has not the faults of false knowledge, etc., which produce the unhappiness of pride, etc. This is meant by the words,—“Whatever grief his subjects suffer together with their children,” “the same,” the unhappiness which is the cause of the grief, etc., “remains united with them,” with his subjects, because it is produced from a limited intellect. But what of the universal soul can be united with or disunited from what thing? “What is holy,” what is good,—the desired reward means here holy; for a great many holy actions are done by him, therefore its reward, “approaches him who now occupies the place of Prajâpati.” “For sin does not approach the gods,” and the meaning is, sin, its effect, unhappiness does not approach the gods,” because there is no opportunity for the effect of sin. 20.

Next therefore the deliberation of observance. Prajâpati verily created the actions. When they were created, they vied with each other. With the words,—“I will speak,” speech kept the observance; with the words,—“I will see,” eye; with the words,—“I will hear,” ear; in the same manner the other actions (Karmâni) according to their action. Death, being *there* as fatigue, seized them, he made them his own; having made them his own, he arrested them. Therefore speech gets even fatigued, the eye gets fatigued, the ear gets fatigued, the ear gets fatigued. Again he did not make his own that *life*. They resolved to know that central life. “He verily is amongst us the best, who moving and not moving, not suffers, is not injured. Well then, let us all become of the nature of him.” Thus all of them became of his nature. Therefore they are named by this “Prânâh.” After him, who thus knows, is verily called the family in which he is *born*. Whosoever rivals one who thus knows, after having wasted, dies at last. This is what refers to the soul. 21.

By the words,—“They are all alike, they are all infinite,” (p. 151) the worship of speech, mind and life has been declared in general, that is to say, without their mutual distinction. Must this now be

understood in the mentioned manner, or is there any possible distinction with regard to observance on considering *the case*? The answer is,—“Next therefore,” then *follows* “the deliberation of observance,” of worship, which means the consideration of the action of worship. And the consideration turns upon this, which is it among those organs, whose work is to be conceived under the idea of observance? “Prajápati verily,” after having created *his* offspring, “created the actions,” which means the organs, speech and others (for being capable of action, they are called actions) and the meaning is: He created speech and the other organs. Again “when they were created, they vied,” rivaled, “with each other.” How? “With the words,—I will speak,” let me not rest from my business, speaking, “speech kept the observance.” If there is likewise another, my equal, who does not require rest from his business, let him show his prowess. In the same manner, “with the words,—‘I will see,’ eye; with the words,” I will hear, ear; in the same manner the other actions,” organs, “according to their action.” “Death,” the destroyer, “being *there as* fatigue,” in the form of fatigue “seized them,” took hold of them. How? “He made them,” the organs engaged in their business, “his own,” he appeared under the form of fatigue, and “having made them his own, he” death, “arrested them,” made them cease from their work. “Therefore,” even now, “speech,” having entered upon its work, “gets even fatigued,” is made to cease from its work, seized by death as the form of fatigue. In the same manner “the eye gets fatigued, the ear gets fatigued.” “Again he,” death in the form of fatigue “did not make his own that *life*,” the principal life. “They” the other organs, “resolved,” made up their mind, “to know that central life” which even now not fatigued by him (death) enters upon its work.

“He verily is amongst us the best,” the most praise worthy, the greatest, “who moving and not moving not suffers,” again, “is not injured. Well then” now “let us all become of the nature of him,” of life, that is to say, let us consider ourselves as life. Having “thus” ascertained, “our observances are not sufficient to protect us from death,” “all of them became of his nature,” considering themselves as the nature of life, kept the observances of life. Because by the nature of life, viz, by its nature to move and by its nature to manifest, the other organs get their nature,—namely: without life nothing could

First Chapter. Fifth Brahmana.

move; for only after the action of moving they are observed to engage in their own work,—“therefore they,” speech and the others, “are named by this,” name of life, “Prànâh” (lives). “[After him.]” the wise person, who in this manner knows that all the organs have the nature of life, and are called by the term “life” (Prána) “is verily called the family,” by the people. The family, in which he who thus knows “is born,” gets famous by the name of the wise person, it is his family, as this is the family of Tapatî. “Whosoever thus” in the manner mentioned, “knows” that speech and the other organs have the nature and the name of life, gets a reward of such a kind. Again, “Whosoever rivals,” being his antagonist “one who thus knows,” knows the nature of life, wastes in this body, “after having wasted, dies at last,” not on a sudden. “This is what refers to the soul,” in the mentioned manner, the knowledge of the nature of life. This conclusion is intended to introduce the exposition of what refers to the superintendence of deities. 21.

Next what refers to the superintendence of deities. With the words,—“I will burn,” fire kept the observance, with the words,—“I will heat,” the sun, with the words,—“I will shine,” the moon. In the same manner the other deities according to their divine nature. As this central life amongst those organs, so *appears* Vâju (the air), amongst those deities; for the other deities decline, not Vâju. This Vâju indeed is an unrestrained deity. 22.

“Next what refers to the superintendence of deities,” the thinking as to the deities is described. It is the question, of which special deity is it best to keep the ordinance; All is *here* like the former description about what referred to the soul. “With the words,—“I will burn,” fire kept the observance, with the words,—“I will heat,” the sun, with the words,—“I will shine,” the moon. In the same manner the other deities according to their divine nature.” Here is an illustration, “As this central life,” with reference to the soul, “amongst those organs,” speech and the others, was not seized by death, was not compelled to cease from its work, was not disturbed in its own observance of life, so also not “Vâju amongst those

deities," Agni and others ; "for the other deities," Agni and the rest, like speech etc. with regard to the soul, according to their divine nature, "decline," go down, cease from their work, "not Vāju," goes down as the central life (does not decline). Therefore "this Vāju indeed is an unrestrained deity." The reference to the soul and the superintendence of deities having in this manner been considered, it is ascertained, that the observance of the nature of Vāju (alone) remains unbroken. 22.

Here follows this Sloka,—“Whence the sun rises and where he sets,”—he verily rises from life and sets into life,—“this the gods made their sacred law. This sways to-day, this sways to-morrow.” What they kept then, they will also observe to-day. Therefore let a man follow only one observance ; let him breathe, let him expel. Alas, let death not seize me. If a person follows it, let him strive to accomplish it. Thereby a person gains union and dwelling in the same world with that deity. 23.

“Here” in elucidation of the said meaning “follows this Sloka.” “Whence,” from which wind “the sun rises” (with reference to divine superintendence) and from which life (as regards its reference to the soul) *he rises* by the nature of the eye, again into which wind and life at evening and at the sleeping-time of men he sets, “this the gods made” kept, “their sacred law.” This means, the gods, speech and others, and fire and others, having before considered the observance of life and the observance of Vāju. “This sways to-day, this sways to-morrow.” this will be followed by them at the present and future time. Here the Brahmana explains briefly the meaning of the Mantra. “He,” the sun, “verily rises from life and sets into it” “This the gods made their sacred law ; this sways to-day, this sways to-morrow.” What does this mean ? It is answered by the text : “What,” what observance, observance of life and of Vāju, “they,” speech and the rest, and Agni and the rest, “kept then,” at that time, “the same they will also observe to-day,” the same observance they will keep unbroken. But any observance of speech, &c. gets even broken, as it has been shown, that at the time of their setting they decline into Vāju and life.—It is said elsewhere,—“When man sleeps, then

speech, mind, eye, ear, all become life; when he awakes, then they are born again from life. This is their reference to the soul. Next their reference to divine superintendence. When fire is extinguished, it disappears in Vāyu (air). Therefore it is said, it is lost in it; for it is extinguished in the air. When the sun sets, he enters into the air, into the air the moon *enters*; in the air are placed the quarters. From the air they are born again." Because then the observance is found in speech and the rest, and also in Agni and the rest, because the observance, whose nature is to move, is to be obeyed by all the gods, "therefore let a man follow only one observance." Which is it? "Let him breathe," let him perform the function of breathing (Prāṇa), "let him expel," let him perform the function of expelling (of the descending air); for there is no ceasing of the function of life (Prana) of which the functions of breathing and expelling are here given as examples. "Therefore let a man follow only one observance," abandoning the functions of all the other organs. "Also (this term expresses apprehension) "let not death," as fatigue—"seize me." The meaning is, let a person, who is afraid that he will be seized by death on his abandoning that observance, keep the observance of life. "If a person follows it," once has commenced the observance of life, "let him strive to accomplish it; for if he ceases from the observance, life is despised, and also the gods are; therefore let him accomplish it even. "Thereby" by that observance,—*for* by the obtaining of the nature of life, my functions, for instance speech, etc., and Agni, etc., are in all beings, and (my) soul as life is the moving cause of all,—by the keeping of that observance, "a person gains," obtains "union," identity of nature, "and dwelling in the same world," identity of place, "with that deity," with the deity of life. 23.

Sixth Brāhmaṇa.

This (world) is a triad, name, form and work. The names are speech; the latter is the foundation, for from the same all names spring forth. This is their community; for it is in common to all the names; it is the Brahma of them; for it upholds all names. 1.

"This" manifested world, characterised as cause and effect, further the reward, which consists in obtaining the nature of life (Hiranyagarbha), both of which have been set forth as being included in the idea of ignorance, and lastly the state of the world before its manifestation, which is called "unmanifested" like the seed of a tree, "is a triad." What is this triad? The answer is,—“name, form and work,” that is to say, non-soul, not the soul which is the present, visible Brahma. Therefore the Brahmana, of which the first words are,—“this is a triad,” is commenced for the object, that man should turn from this (world); for the knowledge, resulting from the great sentence,—“I am Brahma,”—to adore the soul alone as the proper place, is without effect for one whose thought is not averted from this (world) which is not the soul—the actions (of the mind) with regard to external objects and the absolute soul being at variance. In this manner it is said in the Katha (4, 1.) “The self-existent subdueth the senses which turn to external objects, not the internal soul, (but) the wise with eye averted (from sensual objects) and desirous of immortal nature, beholds the absolute soul.” Why again falls this world which is manifested and not manifested, and at the same time effect cause and reward, under the notion of name, form and work, why should it not rather be thought by the notion of the soul.

To answer this, it is said,—“The names” in the order in which they are introduced “are speech,” as is called the general term of all sounds. Every sound is even speech; it is speech in consequence of being spoken, the meaning of a sound is merely the general term of sound. “The latter is their foundation,” the special cause, of the special names, as a hill of rock-salt is the cause of (all) the grains of rock-salt. For this reason it is said,—“for from the same,” general term of names, “All names,” as Yajnadatta, Devadatta, according to this or any other division, “spring forth,” are produced, separated, as grains of salt from a rock of salt; and the effect is not different from the cause. In the same manner the special (names) being included in the general term, how can there be a state of generality and of special objects? (To show this it is said),—“This the general term of the sounds, “is their community,” of the special names, community from its being [common, viz. the general term; “for it is common to all the names,” which are different from it, (and) moreover, because the special names are not different (from

it) by having obtained it (the general idea), (for) nothing is perceived to differ from that whose nature it has assumed, as a jar differs not from the earth (of which it is made). How are the special names said to have obtained it (the general idea of speech)? The answer is, because "it," the thing called by the name of speech, "is the *Brahma* of them," their soul; for hence the names of sound. This the text explains: "for this," the general notion of sound, "upholds all names" by giving them its own nature. This, the relation of cause and effect, of the general idea and the special objects and of the communication of the own nature (of one thing to other things) [being proved, it is evident, that the special names are only sound. The same explanation holds good for the two other things. 1.

Further, the forms are objects of the eye; the latter is their foundation, for from the same all forms spring forth; this is their community; for it is common to all the forms. It is the *Brahma* of them; for it upholds all forms. 2.

Further, the works are self (*atmā*); the latter is their foundation; for from the same all works spring forth; this is their community; for it is common to all works; it is the *Brahma* of them; for it upholds all works. Those three are existing, one, that self (*atmā*); that self, one, existing, is the three. This immortal (being) is concealed by existence. Life is verily the immortal being, name and form existence. By them that life is concealed. 3.

"Further, the forms," white, black, etc., "are objects of the eye," are the general idea, named "object of the eye," the general idea of forms, all that may be manifested. "For from the latter all forms spring forth; the same is their community; for it is common to all the forms. It is the *Brahma* of them; for it upholds all forms." 2.

Further all special works, as well such as thinking, seeing, etc., as also such as refer to motion, are said to be contained in the general notion of effect. How? All special works are "self," the body, the general notion; self are called the works of self; for it is

said, that by the self, by the body, people perform their work. Moreover, in the body every work is manifested. Therefore by its being sited there (in the body) "the latter" work, the general idea of work, "is the foundation of them," just the same as before. "Those three," name, form and work, as mentioned before, being in mutual dependence, being the mutual cause of manifestation and being united for their mutual destruction, "are," like the (mutual) support of the three vows of the devotee,* "existing, one." Why is the idea of work connected with the self? It is answered,—"That self," that lump, the combination of cause and effect; in the same manner as in the following passage (B. A. 1, 5, 3); "Thus modified is the soul, the modifications of mind, speech and life, "for so far extend this all, both manifested and unmanifested, as name, form and work."

"The self (soul) one," the combination of effect and cause, "existing," in relation to the soul, the elements and the deities, "is the three," as defined, name, form and work. "This immortal (being)" to be mentioned, "is concealed by existence." The text itself explains the meaning of the preceding sentence, viz, "Life is the immortal being," in its nature as cause, the internal support of work, being the same with the soul, immortal, indestructible. "Name and form are existence:" they have the nature of effects and abide in the body: but life having the nature of cause and being the support of them, "is concealed," not manifested, by them, which are external, corporeal, liable to increase and decrease, and mortal. The fourth† chapter is commenced for the purpose to show, that the soul, the object of knowledge, must be comprehended.

* To subdue his mind, his senses and his speech.

† The fourth chapter of the Brahmana, the second of the Upaniṣad.

SECOND CHAPTER

First Brâhmana.

THERE was a great speaker, Gârgya, the proud son of Balâkâ. He said to Ajâtas'atru, the king of Kâsi,—“Let me explain to thee (the nature of) Brahma.”¹ Ajâtas'atru said,—“For such a word,² I will give thousand (of cows).” (Hearing) “Janaka, Janaka,”³ people verily run (after a man of such a character). 1.

Gârgya said,—“I adore as Brahma the spirit who abides in the sun.”⁴ Ajâtas'atru said,—“Do not boast, do not boast of him. Knowing that, excelling all beings he is their head, their king, I adore that spirit. Whoever thus adores him, excels all beings and becomes their head, their king.” 2.

Gârgya said,—“I adore as Brahma the spirit who abides in the moon.”⁵ Ajâtas'atru said,—“Do not boast, do not boast of him. Knowing, that he is great, clothed in a white dress,⁶ Soma,⁷ (and) king, I adore that spirit. (For him) who thus

1 In the first chapter the difference between knowledge and ignorance has been defined, and ignorance generally described; in the second knowledge, or the science treating on Brahma, is set forth. This is done in the form of a narrative,—in which the Brahman Gârgya represents the imperfect ideas, entertained on the nature of Brahma, while king Ajâtas'atru represents the perfect knowledge of Brahma—with a view of showing, that this knowledge cannot be obtained by mere arguing, in consequence of the subtle nature of its object, and that it requires both a disciple believing in the existence of Brahma and a teacher who has a full knowledge of him. S.'

2 Even for the mere word, whether thou be able or not to explain Brahma.

3 “Janaka is a liberal donor, Janaka is a zealous hearer.” S.'

4 The spirit who abiding in the sun and in the eye has entered the heart through the eye. S.'

5 And in the mind. S' •

6 Because water is the body of life, in the form of the moon. S'

7 As Soma, the moon-plant, in the sacrifice. S'

adores him, is day by day produced and reproduced (the Soma); his food does not decrease." 3.

Gārgya said,—“I adore as Brahma the spirit who abides in lightning.”¹ Ajātas'atru said,—“Do not boast, do not boast of him. Knowing, that he is glorious, I adore that spirit. Whoever thus adores him, becomes glorious; glorious becomes his offspring.” 4.

Gārgya said,—“I adore as Brahma the spirit who abides in the ether.”² Ajātas'atru said,—“Do not boast, do not boast of him. Knowing, that he is full and immoveable, I adore that spirit. Whoever thus adores him, has plenty of offspring and cattle, and his offspring is never removed from this world.” 5

Gārgya said,—“I adore as Brahma the spirit who abides in the wind.”³ Ajātas'atru said,—“Do not boast, do not boast of him. Knowing, that he is Indra, whose strength is indomitable and whose hosts are unconquerable, I adore that spirit. Whoever thus adores him, becomes a conqueror, is unconquerable by foes, and conqueror of his step-brothers.” 6

Gārgya said,—“I adore as Brahma the spirit who abides in the fire.”⁴ Ajātas'atru said,—“Do not boast, do not boast of him. Knowing, that he is a destroyer, I adore that spirit. Whoever thus adores him, becomes a destroyer, and his offspring becomes a destroyer.” 7

Gārgya said,—“I adore as Brahma the spirit who abides in the waters.”⁵ Ajātas'atru said,—“Do not boast, do not boast of him. Knowing, that he is the same,⁶ I adore that spirit. Whoever thus adores him, obtains him as the same, not as not the same. Again from him is born what is the same with him.” 8.

1 In the lightning, in the skin, and in the heart. S'

2 In the ether as element, and also in the ether of the heart. S'

3 In the wind, in the vital air of the body, and in the heart. S'

4 And in the understanding of the heart. S'

5 In the waters, in the semen and in the heart. S'

6 In the S'ruti and Smṛiti. S'

7 A son like himself.

Gārgya said,—“I adore as Brahma the spirit who abides in the looking-glass.”¹ Ajātas’atru said,—“Do not boast, do not boast of him. Knowing, that he is resplendent, I adore that spirit. Whoever thus adores him, becomes resplendent, and resplendent his offspring; he overcomes in splendour all those with whom he meets.” 9.

Gārgya said,—“I adore as Brahma the spirit who, when proceeding, is followed by noise.”² Ajātas’atru said,—“Do not boast, do not boast of him. Knowing, that he is life, I adore that spirit. Whoever thus adores him, obtains the full age in this world; life does not leave him before the (appointed) time.” 10

Gārgya said,—“I adore as Brahma the spirit who abides in the quarters.”³ Ajātas’atru said,—“Do not boast, do not boast of him. Knowing, that he is double and inseparable,⁴ I adore him. Whoever thus adores him, becomes double,⁵ and his followers never part from him.” 11.

Gārgya said,—“I adore as Brahma the spirit who abides in the shadow.”⁶ Ajātas’atru said,—“Do not boast, do not boast of him. Knowing, that he is death, I adore that spirit. Whoever thus adores him, obtains (his) full age in this world; death does not approach him before the time.” 12.

Gārgya said,—“I adore as Brahma the spirit who abides in the soul,”⁷ (in self). Ajātas’atru said,—“Do not boast, do not boast of him. Knowing, that he is possessed of soul,⁸ I

1 In the looking-glass, in other reflective things, and in the heart. S.’

2 Life. . .

3 In the quarters, in the ear and in the heart. S.’

4 Like the As’vins who are the tutelary deities of the quarters.

5 By the number of his servants. A. G.

6 The spirit, abiding in the shadow, externally as darkness and internally, in the heart as ignorance.

7 The spirit, abiding in the soul, in Prajāpati, and in the intellect of the heart. S.’

8 Of much understanding.

adore that spirit. Whoever thus adores him, becomes in this world possessed of soul, and also his offspring." Then Gârgya was silent. 13.

Ajâtas'atru said,—“Does (Brahma) so far extend?” (He answered),—“So far.”—Ajâtas'atru said,—“Brahma is not comprehended by (a knowledge) which so far extended only.”¹ Gârgya said,—“Let me approach thee as disciple.” 14.

Ajâtas'atru said,—“It verily goes against the grain that a Brâhmana should approach a Kshatriya for the purpose of learning (the nature of) Brahma from him. I will explain (him) to thee.” (Thus saying) he took him by the hands and rose. They went to a man who slept. They called him by the name, “Mighty one, clad in white garments, Soma, king.” He did not rise. Squeezing him with the hand, he awoke him. He then arose. 15.

Ajâtas'atru said,—“Where was the spirit whose nature is like knowledge, at the time when he thus profoundly slept? Whence did he come?” Gârgya did not know this.. 16,

Ajâtas'atru said.—“When the spirit whose nature is like knowledge, thus profoundly slept, then the ether,² in the midst of the heart drawing in, together with the knowledge of the senses,³ (their actual) knowledge,⁴ slept therein (in the ether).⁵ When the spirit draws in that (knowledge of the senses), then he sleeps indeed. Then life is drawn in,⁶

¹ Why then sayest thou boasting,—I will teach thee the nature of Brahma?

² The soul in its independent nature. S.'

³ The intellect of the heart in which Brahma is reflected.

⁴ The faculty of the senses of manifesting their respective objects; that is to say, in sleep, intellect withdraws the senses from their objects, and concentrates them in the heart, where intellect itself is absorbed in the nature of the soul.

⁵ The soul within its own self.

⁶ Means here, according to S'ankara, the sense of smelling.

speech is drawn in, the eye is drawn in, the ear is drawn in, (and mind is drawn in). 17.

When he is in the state of dream, then become such (conditions as the following) his worlds, then he becomes like a great king, like a great Brāhman, he proceeds as it were to higher and lower places. As a great king, assembling his followers, sends them about in his kingdom according to his pleasure, so that (spirit resembling knowledge, drawing in) the organs, sends them about in his body according to his pleasure. 18.

Again when he profoundly sleeps, he does not know of any thing. There are 72,000¹ arteries called the good, which from the heart proceed every where to the body. Returning with them he sleeps in the body. As a youth, or a great king, or great Brāhman, sleep, enjoying excessive bliss, so does he (the spirit resembling knowledge) sleep.

As the spider proceeds along with its web, as little sparks proceed from fire, so proceed from that soul all organs, all worlds, all the gods, all beings. The nearest conception of him is this, that he is the truth of truth. The organs are the truth, he is the truth of them."² 20.

Second Brāhmana.³

Whoever knows the young animal with its abode, the upper part of its abode, its pillar (and) its rope, destroys the seven

1 Vid. Pras'na Upanishad. 3. 6.

2 What "the truth of truth" means, will be explained in the two next Brāhmana. S.'

3 The connexion between the former and the present Brāhmana is shown by S'ankara, as follows. The topic of Brahma has been introduced by the words,—“I will explain Brahma,” (p. 180) and declared,—The one Brahma is he from whom the world is produced, of whom it consists and into whom it is dissolved. Of what nature again is the world, which is produced and dissolved? It consists of the five elements, which consist of name and form. Moreover it has been said, the name and form are truth (satya). The truth of the truth, (consisting of the five elements)

inimical brother's sons.¹ The young animal is the central life.² This³ is its abode, this⁴ the upper part of its abode, life⁵ is the pillar, food, the rope.⁶ 1.

The seven (deities who cause (its) indestructibility,⁷ surround it* (the infant) worshipping, *viz.*, Rudra, adores it with the red lines in the eye, Parjanya with the water in the eye, A'ditya with the sight, Agni with the black in the eye, Indra with the white, the earth adores it with the lower, and

is Brahma. Why again are the elements truth? This question is answered in the Bráhmaṇa, whose subject is to show the nature of what has form and what is without form. On account of their having form and not having form, the elements, consisting of effect and cause are truth and thus also the organs (Fránāh . To define the nature Sattva of the elements, consisting of cause and effect, the two next Bráhmaṇas are commenced. This Upanishad is to be explained, for Brahma is determined as the truth of the truth by the determination of the reality Sattva of effect and cause. There in the former Bráhmaṇa it has been said,—“The organs are truth; he is the truth of them” Here by the connexion of the Brahma Upanishad in this manner,—“Which are the organs, of which nature their objects, and which the Upanishads,” he determines the nature of the causes, the same, as well, gardens, etc. seen on a road, are determined.

1 For the sons of a brother may be inimical or friendly. Here the attachment to the objects of the senses is denoted by the brother's sons. The senses are the the seven orifices by which objects are perceived, the attachment produced by them are the brother's sons. S'.

2 The subtle body, dwelling in the midst of the body; subject to it are the organs; it is a babe, because it is unwitted, while the senses are keen with regard to their objects. S'.

3 The body. S'.

4 The head with its seven orifices. S'.

5 Life, means, according to S'ankara, the strength produced by food, according to others, respiration.

6 By which the young animal is bound to the pillar.

7 Thus I rendered “Akhsiti” after S'. They cause indestructibility of food.

8 The babe, when dwelling in the upper part of the abode it rises to the eye S'.

the heavens, with the upper eye-lash. The food of him is not destroyed who thus knows it. 2.

This is said in the following memorial verse,—“There is a Soma-cup, whose mouth is below, and whose foot is above; therein is put glory of various kinds. On its margin there are seven Rishis, and speech is the eighth, as holding communication with Brahma.” The Soma-cup whose mouth is below and whose foot is above, is the head; for it is like a cup with mouth below and foot above. “Therein is put glory of various kinds.” With the various kinds put (therein),¹ it (the memorial verse) means the vital airs.² On its margin there are seven Rishis. “With the Rishis it means the vital winds.” “Speech is the eighth, as communicating with Brahma;” for speech as the eighth communicates with Brahma.³ 3.

These (ears) are Goutama and Bharadvāja, this (ear) is Goutama, the other Bharadvāja. These (eyes) are Vis’vámित्र and Jamadagni; this is Vis’vámित्र, the other Jamadagni. These (nostrils) are Vasistha and Kasyapa; this is Vasistha, this Kasyapa; speech is Attri; for by speech food is consumed; for Attri is verily derived from the root Attih (to eat, consume); he is the consumer of all. All becomes the food of him who thus knows him. 4.

Third Bráhmaṇa.

There are two modes⁴ of Brahma,⁵ what has form, and what has no form,⁶ the one mortal, the other immortal, again

1 As the Soma-juice in the cup. S’.

2 The vital airs by which the senses are moved to the performance of their functions.

3 Brahma is the whole of sounds, and speech has communication with it, by pronouncing it. A’ G.

4 I use mole here in the sense of “accidental modification of substance.”

5 Brahma the supreme soul, who in his absolute nature, is without those two modes. S’.

6 At the time that their differences are not evolved. Their differences are stated afterwards. S’.

finite the one, and the other infinite,¹ again the one existing and the other beyond one. 1.

What has form,² is what is different from the air and the ether;³ this is mortal, this is finite, this is visible. The essence of what has form, what is mortal, finite and visible, is the being that heats (the sun); for he is the essence of what exists. 2.

Again what has no form is the air and the ether; this is immortal, this is infinite, this is beyond. The essence of what has no form, what is immortal, infinite and beyond, is the spirit who (abides) in this universe.⁴ This refers to the divine relation. 3

Now the relation to the soul. What has form is different from the air and from the ether in the midst of the body.⁵ This is mortal, this is infinite, this existing. The essence of what has form, what is mortal, finite and existing, is the eye;⁶ for this is the essence of what exists. 4.

Now what has no form is the air, and the ether in the midst of the body. This is immortal, this is infinite, this is beyond. The essence of what has no form, what is immortal, infinite, and beyond, is the spirit (Purusha) in the right eye; for he is the essence of what is beyond. 5.

1 Sthitancha yachehā, explained by Ś' sthitam parichchhinnam gati-purvakam sthānu, yachcha, yātiti yadvyaupyaparichchhinnam, what is stationary, limited, what after motion has the tendency to stand, and what moves, therefore what is pervading, unlimited.

2 What is formed of parts, a compound. S'.

3 Namely, the other three elements, earth, water and light.

4 Hiranyagarbha.

5 That is to say, three elements, light, water and earth, as constituents of the body, independent of the earth and air. S'.

6 Because by the eye the whole body assumes substance, and because the eyes were first produced, in accordance with the passage, "A'ditya (the sun), becoming eye, entered the eyes." S.

The form of this spirit¹ is, as cloth dyed by turmeric,² as the smoke colour of sheep-wool, as the red colour of the Indragopa insect, as the bright colour of the fire-flame; as the white colour of the lotus, as the lightning shines forth at one moment, thus are the modifications of the desires of that spirit.) The glory of him who thus knows, shines forth at one moment. After this therefore the definition (of Brahma),—He is not this, he is not this, etc.³—There is another name, different from that (definition),—“He is not this, he is not this,” viz., the truth of truth. The organs are the truth, he is the truth of them. 6.

*

*Fourth Brahmana.*⁴

“Maitreyi,” said Yājñavalkya,⁵ “Behold, I am desirous of raising myself from the order⁶ (of house-holder); therefore, let me divide (my property) amongst thee and Katyāyani there.” 1.

Maitreyi said,—“If, O Venerable, this whole world with all its wealth were mine, could I become immortal thereby?” Yājñavalkya said,—“Like the life of the wealthy thy life might

1 The subtle spirit, the spirit, who is the cause of manifestation.

2 As cloth, dyed by turmeric, so is the desire of that spirit in contact with special objects.

3 If it is asked, how by those negations the “truth of truth” is defined the answer is,—by the prohibition of any allegation which may be made with regard to the nature of Brahma, name, form, action, quality, etc. must be denied of Brahma; for there is no distinction in Brahma; if he is defined, this definition refers only to qualities which are alleged of him; but his own nature, can in no manner be determined, except by stating, that every attribute is denied of him.

4 It is the object of this Brāhmana to show [that the state of a Sannyāsi, viz the retiring from the world to the forest and the renunciation of all ceremonies, is indispensable for the knowledge of Brahma. S]. The same conversation between Yajnavalkya and his wife Maitreyi is, with slight variations, repeated in the 5th Brāhmana of the 4th chapter.

5 A Rishi, Yājñavalkya by name S.

6 To the higher stage of a Sannyāsi.

become ; by wealth, however, there is no hope of (obtaining) immortality." 2.

Maitreyi said,—“Of what use would be wealth to me, if I did not become thereby immortal. Tell me, O Venerable, any (means of obtaining immortality) of which thou knowest." 3.

Yājñavalkya said,—“Behold, (thou wast) dear to us before, (and now) thou sayest what is dear. Come, sit down ; I will explain to thee (the means of obtaining immortality) ; endeavour to comprehend my explanation." 4.

He said,—“Behold, not indeed for the husband's sake the husband is dear,¹ but for the sake of the self,² is dear the husband. Behold, not indeed for the wife's sake the wife is dear, but for the sake of the self, is dear the wife. Behold, not for the son's sake the sons are dear, but for the sake of the self are dear the sons. Behold, not for property's sake property is dear, but for the sake of the self is property dear. Behold, not for the Brahma's sake the Brahma is dear, but for the sake of the self is the Brahma dear. Behold, not for the Kshattra's sake the Kshattra is dear, but for the sake of the self the Kshattra is dear. Behold, not for the worlds' sake the worlds are dear, but for the sake of the self are dear the worlds. Behold, not for the gods' sake the gods are dear, but for the sake of the self are dear the gods. Behold, not for the Védas' sake the Védas are dear, but for the sake of the self are dear the Védas.³ Behold, not for the elements' sake the elements are dear, but for the sake of the self are dear the elements. Behold, not for the sake of the universe the universe is dear, but for the sake of the self is dear the universe. Behold, the self (átmá) is verily to be seen, heard, minded (and) meditated upon. Behold, O

1 To the wife.

2 A'tmá, the self, the soul ; for the self of the wife, for her own soul.

3 The last sentence is omitted in the Sanskrit text, published by the Asiatic Society.

Maitréyi, by seeing, hearing, minding, knowing the self, all this (universe) is comprehended. 5.

The Brahma should disown a person,¹ who considers the Brahma (cast) as something different from (his) self (ātma); the Kshattrā should disown a person who considers the Kshattrā (cast) as something different from (his) self; the worlds should disown a person who considers the worlds as something different from (his) self; the gods should disown a person who considers the gods as something different from (their) self; the elements should disown a person who considers the elements as something different from (their) self; the universe should disown a person who considers the universe as something different from (its) self. This (own) self is this Brahma, this Kshattrā, these worlds, these gods, these elements, is this universe.—6.

As a person, when a drum (unseen by him) is beaten, is unable to perceive the sounds proceeding from it (as sounds of a drum), but on the perception of the drum the sound of a drum beaten is perceived,—7.

As a person, when a shell (unseen by him) is blown, is unable to perceive the sounds, proceeding from it (as sounds of a shell) but on the perception of the shell the sound of a shell blown is perceived,—8.

As a person, when a lute (unseen to him) is played, is unable to perceive the sounds proceeding from it, but on the perception of the lute the sound of a lute played is perceived,²—9.

As from fire, made of damp wood, proceed smoke, sparks, etc.³ of various kind, thus, behold, is the breathing

1 A person belonging to the Brāhminical caste.

2 S'ankara supplies the above comparisons with,—so is the identity of Brahma with the individual soul only apprehended by general and special knowledge.

3 Dhumāh (smoke) the plural denotes, according to S., smoke, sparks, ashes, etc.

of this great being the Rig-Veda, the Yajur Veda, the Sâma Veda, the Atharvâṅgīraṣa, the narratives (Itihâsa,) ¹ the doctrines on creation (Purâna), the science (Vidyâ), the Upanishads, the memorial verses (Slokas), the aphorisms (Sutras), the explanation of tenets (Anuvyâkhânâni,) the explanation of Mantras, (Vyâkhyânâni,) all these are his breathing. 10.

As the only site of all the waters is the sea, thus is the only site of every touch the skin, thus the only site of every taste the tongue, thus the only site of every smell the nose, thus the only site of every colour the eye, thus the only site of every sound the ear, thus the only site of every determination the mind, thus the only site of every knowledge the heart, thus the only site of every act the hands, thus the only site of every pleasure the organs of generation, thus the only site of every evacuation the anus, thus the only site of every motion the feet, thus the only site of every Veda speech. 11.

As a piece of salt, when thrown into water, is dissolved into mere water, and none is capable of perceiving it because from whatever place a person might take (water), it would have the taste of salt (but be no piece of salt), thus, behold, this great being, which is infinite, independent and mere knowledge. Springing forth together with those elements, ²

1 S. asserts, that the Itihâsa, etc. are the eight topics, of the Brâhmanas, viz., Itihâsa, narrative, as for instance, that of U'rvasi, and Pururavasa; Purâna, doctrines on creation, as for instance "this was before;" Vidyâ the science of the gods, for instance, "he knows" Upanishads, doctrines about adoration, for instance, "the soul, therefore let it be adored; Slokas, Mantras, occurring in the Brâhmanas, as "there follow these Slokas; Sutras, sentences, which give the pith of a thing, as "the soul, therefore it should be adored;" Anuvyâkhyânâni explanation of Mantras; Vyâkhyânâni, praise in honour of a deity, etc.

2 I give here, in a somewhat different language, some of the images, which S'ankara uses in explanation of this passage. As the appearance of the sun and moon in water is a mere reflection, and nothing real, or as the appearance of red in a white crystal is a mere reflection from a

(he)¹ is destroyed when they are destroyed. After death, no conscience remains; ² "Maitreyi I hold." Thus said Yâjñavalkya. 12.

Maitreyi said,—“With a good (Brahma) thou hast bewildered me, O Venerable, by the saying,³—After death no conscience remains.” Yâjñavalkya said,—“Behold, I verily do not create bewilderment, behold, this (Brahma) is sufficient for knowledge.” 13.

For where⁴ there is duality,⁵ as it were, there sees another,⁶ another thing, there smells another another thing, there hears another another thing, there speaks another of another thing, there minds another another thing, there knows another another thing; but how does one to whom all has become mere soul (âtma), smell any thing, how see any thing, how hear any thing, how speak of any thing, how mind any thing, how know any thing? How should he know him by whom he knows this all; behold, how should he know the knower?” 14.

red substance and nothing real;—for on removing the water, the sun and moon only remain, not their reflections, or on removing the red substance, the whiteness of the crystal continues unchanged,—thus the elements and the individual souls are reflections of the one soul upon ignorance, and nothing real; for on removing the ignorance by knowledge the soul alone remains, while those reflections cease to exist.

1 He, the individual soul, or as S'ankara has it, the division of a particular soul.

2 For him who has the true knowledge of the eternal soul.

3 Because this seems contradictory to the former statement, that Brahma is the fulness of knowledge.

4 In the individual soul, produced by the substrate of ignorance as the totality of causes and effects. S'.

5 Difference from the supreme soul.

6 Any individual soul.

7 The argument which S'ankara advances in support of this doctrine is essentially as follows,—Every effect requires a cause; or, without cause there is no effect; therefore, if there is ignorance, there is the assumption of effect, cause and reward as the effect of ignorance; but

Fifth Brāhmaṇa.

The earth is honey² for all beings, for the earth are all

this assumption is not made on a knowledge of Brahma ; for if all is soul or Brahma, there is, beside the soul, neither cause, nor effect, nor reward. A knowledge of a cause can take place, if there is a difference between the cause and the object of knowledge, and there may be an enquiry on the subject of the knowledge (the knowing soul) and the object of the same, but not of the soul. If the latter be the cause, such a knowledge (the knowledge of the knowing subject, the soul) would be either produced by the soul itself, or by something else. Not the first ; for the soul is not an object of the soul, not by something else ; for there is nothing else but the soul, and there is therefore no object of its knowledge.

1 S'ankara explains the connexion between the present and the preceding Brāhmaṇa as follows :—The Maitreyi Brāhmaṇa has been composed for the purpose to state that that which is independent of ceremonies and the cause of immortality, is worthy of explanation. This is the knowledge of Brahma, pertaining, as has been declared, to all the duties of a Sannyāsi. Moreover, since by the knowledge of the soul the whole universe is known, and the soul is dearer to every one than everything else, “the soul should be beheld.” “It is to be heard, to be minded, to be pondered upon.” The different modes of beholding the soul, have been stated before. To be heard is the soul, by means of the teacher, to be pondered on by means of disquisition, and disquisition, has been explained. The proposition, “the soul is this all,” is proved by the argument, that the one soul is the only cause of the generality, of the production and of the dissolution of the world, and as this may be doubtful, the present Brāhmaṇa, is composed to remove any doubt regarding it. Because the whole world, earth, etc. is in the mutual dependence of support and supported, it is dependent upon one cause of generality, production and dissolution. Or with other words, after the proposition (Pratiñā) “soul alone is this all,” has been proved by the argument, that the soul is the cause of the creation, preservation and dissolution of the world, the conclusion (Nigamana) of the proposed meaning is again made in the Madhubrāhmaṇa, conformably to the definition of logicians, that the conclusion in a syllogism is the repetition of the proposition, after the argument has been stated.

2 Vid. Chānd. Up., 3, 1—5, where a similar comparison is made.

beings honey.¹ Both the immortal, luminous spirit² (abiding) in the earth, and the immortal, luminous spirit, who exists in the body according to his relation to the soul (are honey for all beings and all beings are honey for them.) This³ is that soul, this⁴ is immortal, this is Brahma, this all. 1

The waters are honey for all beings; for the waters are all beings honey. Both the immortal, luminous spirit (abiding) in the water, and the immortal, luminous spirit, abiding in the semen according to his relation to the soul (are honey for all beings and all beings are honey for them.) This is that soul, this is immortal, this is Brahma, this all. 2.

The fire is honey for all beings; for the fire all beings are honey. Both the immortal, luminous spirit, (abiding) in the fire, and the immortal luminous spirit, abiding in speech according to his relation to the soul (are honey for all beings, and all beings are honey for them.) This is that soul, this is immortal, this is Brahma, this all. 3.

The wind is honey for all beings; for the wind all beings are honey. Both the immortal, luminous spirit (abiding) in wind, and the immortal, luminous spirit, who is life according to his relation to the soul (are honey for all beings, and all beings are honey for them.) This is that soul, this is immortal, this is Brahma, this all. 4.

A'ditya is honey for all beings; for A'ditya all beings are honey. Both, the immortal, luminous spirit, (abiding) in that A'ditya, and the immortal, luminous spirit, abiding in speech

1 As the bees collect honey from every kind of flowers, which again serves as nourishment for the bees, so all the beings are nourishment for the one earth, are changed into its very substance, and again the earth is nourishment for all beings; it is changed into all; that is to say they are mutually dependent; there is no real difference between them; they are the same,—Brahma.

2 The Sanskrit term is Puruṣa.

3 This (ayam) this fourfold division, viz the earth, all beings, the spirit abiding in the earth, and the spirit abiding in the body. S'.

4 This (idam) the knowledge, whose object is the fourfold division. S'.

according to his relation to the soul (are honey for all beings, and all beings are honey for them.) This is that soul, this is immortal, this is Brahma, this all. 5.

The quarters are honey for all beings ; for the quarters all beings are honey. Both the immortal, luminous spirit, (abiding) in the quarters, and the immortal, luminous spirit abiding in the ear according to his relation to the soul, (are honey for all beings, and all beings are honey for them. (This is that soul, this is immortal, this is Brahma, this all. 6.

The moon is honey for all beings ; for the moon all beings are honey. Both, the immortal, luminous spirit (abiding) in the moon, and the immortal, luminous spirit, abiding in the mind according to his relation to the soul (are honey for all beings, and all beings are honey for them.) This is that soul, this is immortal, this is Brahma, this all. 7.

The lightning is honey for all beings ; for the lightning all beings are honey. Both, the immortal, luminous spirit (abiding) in lightning, and the immortal, luminous spirit, abiding in the light (sky) according to his relation to the soul (are honey for all beings, and all beings are honey for them.) This is that soul, this is immortal, this is Brahma, this all. 8.

The thunder is honey for all beings ; for the thunder all beings are honey. Both, the immortal, luminous spirit, (abiding) in thunder, and the immortal, luminous spirit, abiding in sound and note according to his relation to the soul (are honey for all beings, and all the beings are honey for them.) This is that soul, this is immortal, this is Brahma, this all. 9.

The ether is honey for all beings ; for the ether all beings are honey. Both, the immortal, luminous spirit, (abiding) in the ether, and the immortal, luminous spirit, abiding as ether in the heart according to his relation to the soul (are honey for all beings, and all beings are honey for them.) This is that soul, this is immortal, this is Brahma, this all. 10.

Justice is honey for all beings ; for justice all beings are

honey. Both, the immortal, luminous spirit (abiding) in justice, and the immortal luminous spirit, produced in justice according to his relation to the soul, (are honey for all beings, and all beings are honey for them.) This is that soul, this is immortal, this is Brahma, this all. 11.

Truth is honey for all beings ; for truth all beings are honey. Both, the immortal, luminous spirit, (abiding) in truth, and the immortal, luminous spirit, produced in truth according to his relation to the soul, (are honey for all beings, and all beings are honey for them). This is that soul, this is immortal, this Brahma, this all. 12.

Mankind is honey for all beings ; for mankind all beings are honey. Both, the immortal, luminous spirit, (abiding) in mankind, and the immortal, luminous spirit, produced in mankind according to his relation to the soul, (are honey for all beings, and all beings are honey for them.) This is that soul, this is immortal, this Brahma, this all. 13.

The soul is honey for all beings ; for the soul all beings are honey. Both, the immortal, luminous spirit, (abiding) in the soul, and the immortal, luminous spirit who is that soul (are honey for all beings, and all beings are honey for them). This is that soul, this is immortal, this Brahma, this all. 14.

This soul is verily the lord of all beings, the king of all beings. As all spokes are fastened in the nave and the circumference of the wheel,¹ thus also all beings, all gods, all worlds, all organs, all souls, are fastened in that soul. 15.

This honey Dadhich,² the son of Atharvana, explained to

¹ See a similar comparison, 2 Mund, 2, 6.

² The tale, alluded to in the text, is contained in the Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa, in the part which treats on the Pravargya sacrifice, and is given by S'ankara. Its drift is, as follows, — Dadhich, the son of Atharvana, explained to the two As'vins, the physicians of the gods, the Madhu Brāhmaṇa. When they came to him for instruction, he told them, that Indra had threatened him to cut off his head, if he repeated the Madhu Brāhmaṇa to anybody else. The As'vins promised to save him from the consequence of

the two As'vins. Beholding their deed the Rishi¹ said,—“O ye men, I will manifest your cruel deed² (undertaken) for your advantage, as Tanyatu³ (manifests) rain (from a cloud). The honey which Dadhin', the son of Atharvana, explained to you through the head of the horse, (is this honey).” 16.

This honey explained Dadhin', the son of Atharvana, to the two As'vins. Beholding this deed, the Rishi said,—“O As'vins, ye placed a horse-head on Dadhin', the son of Atharvana. To keep his promise, he explained to you, O Destroyers, the honey of Tvastar (A'ditya) and also the honey, which is to be concealed.”⁴ 17.

This honey explained Dadhin, the son of Atharvana, to the two As'vins. Beholding their deed, the Rishi said,—“(He)⁵ created the bodies (purah) of bipeds (and then) the bodies of quadrupeds. At first, (purah) being a bird,⁶ he entered as Purusha the bodies (purah). This Purusha is called thus, because he sleeps in all bodies (Puris'aya).” From him nothing is concealed (within), from him nothing is concealed (without). 18.

This honey explained Dadhin, the son of Atharvanā, to the two As'vins. Beholding this deed, the Rishi said,—“He

Indra's anger. They would place his head somewhere else, and mean while put a horse's head on his body; when Indra should cut off the head, they would replace it by his own. He consented, and explained to them the Madhu Bráhmāna by means of the head of a horse which they had placed upon his body instead of his own, and on Indra cutting off the horse-head, they restored to him his own. This tale, says S'ankara, is to illustrate the superiority of the knowledge of Brahma; for the knowledge, possessed by Indra is difficult even for the gods, to gain, and was gained but with great trouble by the As'vins.

1 The Mantra. S.

2 The cutting off the head of Dadhin.

3 Parjanya.

4 The honey of Tvastar is knowledge, referring to rite; the honey to be concealed, the knowledge of Brahma. S'.

5 Vid. Katha U. 5 10.

6 Parame'svara. S'. That is to say, being of subtile body.

became to every nature of every nature ; therefore to manifest the nature of him, Indra¹ appears of manifold nature by his Mâyahs ; for his hundred and ten senses are attached (to the body as horses² to a car), it (the soul) is the senses ; it is ten, it is many thousands, nay infinite, it is Brahma who has not a Before nor an After, nor a Beside, nor a Without ; this is the soul, Brahma, the perceiver of all.³ Such is the doctrine.

Sixth Brâhmana.

Next follows the school.⁴ Pautimâshya succeeded Gaupavana,—Gaupavana, Pautimâshya,—Pautimâshya, Gaupavana,—Gaupavana, Kaus'ika,—Kaus'ika, Kaundinya,—Kaundinya, S'ândilya,—S'ândilya, Kaus'ika and Gautama,—Gautama, 1.

A'gnive's'ya,—A'gniv's'ya, Sândilya and Anabhimlâta,—A'nabhimlâta, A'nabhimlâta,—A'nabhimlâta, A'nabhimlâta,—A'nabhimlâta, Gautama,—Gautama, Saitava and Prâchi'na-yogya,—Saitava and Prâch'inayogya, Pârâs'arya,—Pârâs'arya, Bhâradvâja,—Bhâradvâja, Bhâradvâja and Gautama,—Gautama, Bhâradvâja,—Bhâradvâja, Pârâs'ârya,—Pârâs'ârya, Vajavâpâya,—Vajavâpâya, Kaus'ikâyani,—Kaus'ikâyani. 2

Ghritakaus'ika,—Ghritakaus'ika, Pârâsâryâya,—Pârâsâryâya, Pârâs'arya,—Pârâs'arya, Jâtu'karnya,—Jâtu'karnya,

1 Parames'vara. S.

2 The word " Hari," means in Sanskrit "sense" as well as "horse," and denotes here both of them.

3 This passage may also be translated,—This Brahma is without a Before, without an After, without a Beside, without a Without, is the soul (the individual soul) ; Brahma is the enjoyer of all.

Or,—This is Brahma, who is without a Before, without an After, without a Beside, without a Without, it is this soul (the individual soul), it is Brahma, the enjoyer of all (the universal soul).

4 Two more lists of teachers are given in the Upanishad, viz. 4, 6, and 6, 5.. S'ankara observes about the present list, that is the list of the Madhu Kânda and given for the praise of the knowledge of Brahma. The school itself means the succession of teachers for the four preceding chapters of the Brâhmana, or the two first chapters of the B. A. U.

A'surâyana and Yâska,—A'surâyana, Sraivani,—Sraivani, Aupajandhani,—Aupajandhani, A'suri,—A'suri, Bhâradvâja,—Bhâradvâja, A'tre'ya,—A'tre'ya, Mânti,—Mânti, Gautama,—Gautama, Gautama,—Gautama, Vâtsya,—Vâtsya, Sândilya,—Sândilya, Kais'orya Kâpya.—Kais'orya Kâpya, Kumârahârîta,—Kumârahârîta, Gâlava,—Gâlava, Vidarbh'i Kaundînya,—Vidarbh'i Kaundînya, Vatsanapât Bâbhava,—Vatsanapât Bâbhava, Pathâh Saubhara,—Pathâh Saubhara, Ayâsya A'ngirasa,—Ayâsya A'ngirasa, A'bhu'ti Tvâs'tar,—A'bhu'ti Tvâs'tar, Visvarupa Tvâstar,—Visvarupa Tvâstar, the As'vins,—the As'vins, Dadhin' Atharvana,—Dadhin' Atharvana, Atharvana Daiva,—Atharvana Daiva, Mrityu Prâdhvasana,—Mrityu Prâdhvasana, Pradhvasana,—Prâdhvasana,—Ekarishi,—Ekarishi, Viprachitti,—Viprachitti, Vyashti,—Vyashti, Sanâru,—Sanâru, Sanâtana,—Sanâtana, Sanaga,—Sanaga, Parame'shti,—Parame'shti, Brahmâ,¹—Brahmâ is the self-existent; salutation to Brahmâ.

THIRD CHAPTER.

*First Brâhmana.*²

JANAKA, the king of the Vide'has, performed the sacrifice, named Bahudakshina.³ There were assembled the Brâhmans

1 Paramesthî, Virât, and Brahmanî denotes Hiranyagarbha. S'.

2 The present Kânda, or the Yâjñavalkya Kânda, treats the same subject as the Madhu Kânda; but it is no repetition, for while the latter exhibits the knowledge of Brahma in the form of mere enunciation, the former establishes it by argument. The narrative is given in praise of the knowledge of Brahma, and also to show liberality as a means conducive to the knowledge.* S'.

3 Bahudakshina is either a sacrifice of this name, which has been explained in another S'âkha, or the As'vamedha sacrifice, as in the latter great donations are required. S'.

of the Kurus and the Panchâlas. Janaka, the king of the Videhas, had a great desire to know, who among those Brâhmanas knew best the Ve'das ; for this purpose he tied a thousand cows (in a stable) ; the horns of each of them were surrounded with ten Pâdahs (of gold).¹ 1.

He said to them,—“O venerable Brâhmanas, whoever amongst you is the best knower of Brahma, shall drive home those cows.” The Brâhmanas did not venture (to come forward). Then said Yâjnavalkya to his Brahma student,—“O gentle one, drive home those (cows).” “(As you command), O knower of the Sâma Ve'da,”² with these words (the disciple) drove them home. The Brâhmanas became angry (thinking),—How dare he call himself amongst us the best knower of Brahma ? There was then As'vala, the Hotar³ of Janaka, king of the Vide'has. He asked him,—“Art thou in very deed amongst us the best knower of Brahma, O Yâjnavalkya ?” He said,—“We bow to him who is the best knower of Brahma ; we are even desirous of getting the cows.” Hence the Hotar A'svala undertook to question him. 2.

He said,—“Yâjnavalkya, all this is pervaded by death, all this is subject to death. By what means overcoming the grasp of death is the sacrificer liberated ?” (He replied)—, “By speech which is fire in the shape of the priest, called Hotar. The speech of the sacrificer,⁴ is verily the Hotar. This speech⁵ is this fire ; this (fire) is the Hotar, this (fire

1 A Pâda, is according to S'ankara, equal to the 4th part of a Pala, or equal to a Suvarna of gold, which, according to Wilson, is equal to about 176 grains Troy.

2 That is to say, knower of the four Vedas, as the Sâma Veda was to be studied after the three other Vedas.

3 The Ritvig, one who knows the Rig Veda, or he who arranges the sacrifices.

4 With reference to the Sacrifice. S'.

5 With reference to the deities. S'.

of the Hotar) is liberation,¹ this (liberation) absolute liberation."² 3.

He said,—“Yājñavalkya, all this is pervaded by day and night,³ all this is subject to day and night. By what means, overcoming the grasp of day and night, is the sacrificer liberated?” (He replied),—“By the eye, which is A'ditya (the sun) in the shape of the priest called Adhvaryu. The eye of the sacrificer is verily the Adhvaryu. This eye is this A'ditya, this (A'ditya) is the Adhvaryu, this (Adhvaryu) is liberation, this (liberation) absolute liberation.” 4.

He said,—“Yājñavalkya, all is pervaded by the light and dark halves of the lunar month;⁴ all this is subject to the light and dark halves of the lunar months. By what means, overcoming the grasp of the light and dark halves of the lunar month, is the sacrificer liberated?” (He replied),—“By the vital breath, which is the wind in the shape of the priest, called the Udgâtar. The vital breath of the sacrificer is verily the Udgâtar. This vital breath is this wind, this (wind) is the Udgâtar, this (Udgâtar) is liberation, this (liberation) absolute liberation.” 5.

He said,—“Yājñavalkya, this atmosphere is without found-

1 Cause of liberation. S'.

2 Absolute liberation is here the gaining of the state of speech and of the deity of fire. S'.

3 The cause of the continual change of such rites as the Dars'a and Purnamâsa, is time; for although time is included in work, yet, independent of the performance of work, time, before and after work, the idea observed to change the causes of rites, for which reason the liberation from time must be separately explained. S'.

4 Although time, as containing lunar days, is included in time, characterized by day and night, and although the sun is the Ruler of day and night, yet this is only the case in general, but not with regard to days and nights, where there is an increase or decrease which are ruled by the moon, and in this respect a liberation from time as represented by lunar days, is necessary. S'.

dation, as it were ; by what approach¹ does (man) approach then the place of heaven?" (He replied),—"By the mind which is the moon in the shape of the priest, called the Brahma. The mind of the sacrificer is verily the Brahma ; mind is this Brahma, this (moon) is the Brahma, this (Brahma) is liberation, this (liberation) absolute liberation." So far the absolute emancipation (from death). Next the means.² 6

He said,—“Yājñavalkya, by how many Riks³ of the Rîg Vêda does this Hotar in this sacrifice to-day perform the praise? (He replied),—"By three."—"By what three?" "By those, to be recited before (the sacrifice), by those to be recited for the sake of the sacrifice, and by those to be recited for the sake of praise." "What does he conquer by them?" "All that bears life."⁴ 7.

He said,—“Yājñavalkya, how many oblations⁵ does this Adhvaryu offer to-day in this sacrifice?" (He replied),—"Three." "Which are these three?" "The oblations which flame upwards ; the oblations which make a great noise ; the oblations which fall downwards."⁶ "What does he conquer by them?" "By the oblations that flame upwards, he conquers the world of the gods ; for the world of the gods (deva) shines (dipya) as it were ; by the oblations which make a great

1 In 3 5, the liberation of the sacrificer from death has been declared, but not the means by which he effects it. These means are explained in the present section. S'.

2 Means are either all the appliances necessary for the performance of sacred rites, or the knowledge of those means. S'.

3 A Rîg does not mean here a single verse of the Rîg Veda, but it refers to certain kinds of Rîg-Verses, which may include any number of Mantras.

4 The three worlds, according to S, since they are the supporters of life, and the three worlds correspond with the three kinds of Riks.

5 Oblations, fire offerings.

6 In the oblations, flaming upwards, butter ; in those making a great noise, meat ; and in those falling downwards, milk of the Soma juice is offered.

noise, he conquers the world of the forefathers ; for the world of the forefathers is very noisy,¹ as it were ; by the oblations which fall downwards, he conquers the world of man ; for the world of man is down below, as it were." 8.

He said,—“ Yājñavalkya, by how many deities² does this Brahmá, (seated on the chair) to the right, protect to-day this sacrifice ?” (He replied)—, “ By one.” “ Which is the one ?” “ The mind ;³ the mind is infinite,⁴ infinite are the Visve-devas ; he conquers thereby the world of the Infinite.” 9.

He said,—“ Yājñavalkya, how many hymns of praise⁵ will the Udgâtar sing to-day in this sacrifice ?” (He replied),—“ Three.” “ Which are these three ?” “ Those to be recited before (the sacrifice,) those to be recited for the sake of the sacrifice, and thirdly, those to be recited for the sake of praise.” “ Which are those (three) according to their relation to the soul ?” “ The vital air that goes forwards (respiration) is those to be recited before,⁶ the vital air that goes downwards those to be recited for the sake of sacrifice,⁷ the vital air that equalises those to be recited for the sake of praise.” “ What does he conquer by them ?” “ By the Mantras to be recited before, he conquers the world of man, by those to be recited for the sake of the sacrifice, the world of the atmosphere, by those to be recited for the sake of praise, the world of the heavens.” Hence the Hotar As'vala became silent. 10.

1 The noise refers to the lamentations of those who are punished for their crimes, S'.

2 The plural instead of the singular according to S', is either used to connect this question with the former ones, or to deceive Yājñavalkya.

3 For by the mind is Brahma meditated upon.

4 This means, that the modifications of the mind are infinite.

5 Riks either of the Rig or Sâma Veda.

6 Both going upwards.

7 As the wind going downwards causes a noise.

Second Brāhmaṇa.

Then asked¹ him A'rtabhāga,² from the family of Jarat-kāra,—“Yājñavalkya,” said he, “how many fetters³ are there, and how many auxiliaries to them?” (He replied),—“Eight fetters and eight auxiliaries.” “Which are the eight fetters and the eight auxiliaries?”¹

The vital air that goes forwards⁴ is a fetter; it is enhanced by the vital air going downwards,⁵ which is its auxiliary; for by the vital air that goes downwards, smell is perceived. 2.

Speech is a fetter; it is enhanced by the word which is its auxiliary, for by speech words are pronounced. The tongue is a fetter; it is enhanced by taste which is its auxiliary; for by the tongue various kinds of taste become manifest. 4.

The eye is a fetter; it is enhanced by colour which is its auxiliary; for by the eye colours are seen. 5.

The ear is a fetter; it is enhanced by sound which is its auxiliary; for by the ear sounds are heard. 6.

The mind is a fetter; it is enhanced by desire which is its auxiliary; for by mind desires are formed. 7.

1 The absolute liberation from death in the relation of the latter to time and work, has been explained in the preceding Brāhmaṇa. What then is the nature of death itself? Death is an attachment, produced from the natural ignorance of man, as to the material world and to the soul. Death is therefore a bond, and the senses and their objects by which death is characterised, are called chains and their enhancers, and it is the object of this Brāhmaṇa to show the liberation from death, as characterised by the sensual chains and their enhancers, the sensual objects. S'.

2 The son of Ritubh'ga.

3 The terms in the text are “graha” and “ati-graha,” graha, by which something is seized and atigraha, which aids in the seizure, by which the seizure becomes stronger.

4 The vital air that goes forwards i. e. here the sense of smell, from its connexion with the present topic. S'.

5 The vital air that goes downwards is here the sensation of smell. S'.

The hands are a fetter ; it is enhanced by action which is its auxiliary ; for by the hands actions are done. 8.

The skin is a fetter ; it is enhanced by touch which is its auxiliary ; for by the skin the various kinds of touch become known. These are the eight fetters and the eight auxiliaries."

He said,—“Yâjnavalkya, all this is the food of death. Which then is the deity whose food is death (himself) ?” (He replied),—“Fire verily is death ; the same is the food of the water ; (thereby) death again is conquered.” 10.

He said,—“Yâjnavalkya, when this spirit (Purusha) dies, do then the organs¹ ascend from him ?”² Yâjnavalkya said ;—‘ No, by no means, no, by no means ; there³ united they are dissolved in him ;⁴ he becomes swollen, he becomes full of wind, when blown upon : the dead sleep.”⁵ 11.

He said,—“Yâjnavalkya, when this spirit dies, then what does not leave him ?” (He replied),—“The name. The name indeed is infinite, infinite are the Visvédévas ; he conquers thereby the world of the Infinite.” 12.

He said,—“Yâjnavalkya,⁶—when the speech⁷ of the spirit departed is dissolved into fire, the vital air into the wind, the eye into the sun, the mind into the moon, the ear into the quarters, the body into earth, the soul⁸ into the ether, the

1 The fetters above mentioned, as speech, and their auxiliaries are the impressions of words, etc.

2 From him who knows Brahma.

3 In him who knows Brahma.

4 In the supreme Brahma ; they become of the same nature with him.

5 There is no actual death ; when the bonds are destroyed, the liberated does not proceed any where.

6 In 10 and 11, the state, which is obtained by the liberated, has been mentioned. What then does become after death of him who is not liberated ? The answer is given in the present section.

7 By speech, the vital airs, etc., according to S'. the tutelary deities are here to be understood, and not the organs, because they do not depart.

8 The soul (âtma) means here the place of the soul, the ether of the heart.

hairs of the body into annual herbs, the hairs of the head into trees, blood and semen into the waters, where then does this spirit remain?"—He replied,—“Take, O gentle A’rtabhâga, my hand, (and let us go to a lonely place, there); we shall know (the answer of) this question; this our (question) cannot be (decided) in a crowded place.”—Going there they deliberated. What they said there, was work,¹ what they praised there, was work. By holy work verily a person becomes holy, unholy by unholy.” Hence A’rtabhâga from the family of Jaratkâra became silent. 13

*Third Brâhmana.*²

Then asked him Bhujya, the son of Lahya,—“O Yâjñavalkya,” said he, “wandering (once) in the country of the Madras for the sake of studying the Vêdas, we came to the house of Patanchala of the family of Kapi. His daughter was possessed by a Gandharva.³ We asked him,—‘Who art thou?’ He answered,—‘I am Sudhanvat, of the family of A’ngirasa.’ When asking him about the boundaries of the world, we said to him,—‘Where are the Pârikshitas? where are the Pârikshitas?’ I (now) ask thee, O Yâjñavalkya, where are the Pârikshitas?” 1.

1 Work as the material cause of man again assuming a body, etc.

2 This Brâhmana, according to S., is to show, that the rites have only wordly effects, and that absolute liberation is thereby impossible. The highest among all rites is the performance of the horse-sacrifice, in its double form, either as an actual sacrifice, accompanied with knowledge, or as a symbolical sacrifice by mental representation. The effect resulting from the horse-sacrifice, is, either individual, *viz.* the obtaining of the nature of fire and other deties, or universal, as referring to the deity of universe, *viz.* the obtaining of the nature of Hiranyagarbha, the first-born, that is to say, by neither of those effects absolute liberation from the world, or identity with Brahma is obtained.

3 A being of superhuman power. By saying, that he has his knowledge from such a being, Bhujya means to assert, that his knowledge must be superior to that of Yâjñavalkya, as not derived from such a source. S.

He [(Yājñavalkya) said,—“Verily he (the Gandharva), said,
—They (the Pariskṛitas) went where the performers of the
As'vamedha-sacrifice go.” “Where then go the performers
of the As'vamedha-sacrifice?” “This world¹ extends to thirty-
two days (of the journey of the car of the sun; the earth
extends twice as far everywhere; the ocean extends twice as
far as the earth everywhere. There² as far as the edge of
a razor, or the wing of a fly (extends), so far extends the
ether in the midst. Indra,³ in the shape of a falcon sur-
rendered them (the Párikṣitas, to the wind; the wind
placing them upon himself⁴ carried them there, where the
performers of the As'vamedha-sacrifice abide. In this manner
he (the Gandharva) praised the wind; therefore the wind is
indeed the individuality, the wind the totality. Whoever
thus knows, conquers the second death.” Hence Bhujya,
the son of Lakṣa, became silent. 2.

Fourth Bráhmaṇa.

Then asked⁵ him Ushasta, the son of Chakra,—“Yājña-
valkya,” said he, “do explain to me that Brahman who is

1 This world is, according to S. the space, enclosed by the moun-
tains of the rising and the setting sun.

2 There, according to S.'s explanation, means at the aperture of
the two halves of the mundane egg. To this end of the world leads
a road of the length, above described, and through the aperture, which
is the ether, the performers of the horse-sacrifice go, to be united with
the wind that surrounds it.

3 Parames'vara. S'.

4 Making them like himself.

5 The connexion between the present question and the two pre-
ceding ones is thus stated by S'. It has been declared that, seized by
the fetters and their auxiliaries, *viz.* the senses and their objects, which
are produced by virtue and vice, man roams about in the world, again
and again shaking off those fetters, and again and again assuming them.
The highest elevation to be gained by virtue has also been explained,
that is to say, the acquirement of the same nature with the two-fold
nature of Īranyagarbha, *viz.*, with his nature as totality or with his

a witness and present,¹ that soul, which is within every (being)." (He replied),—"It is thy soul which is within every (being)." "Which soul is within every one, O Yájnavalkya?" "That which breathes by the breath, is thy soul* which is within every (being); that which descends by the descending air, is thy soul which is within every (being); that which goes everywhere by the air going everywhere, is thy soul which is within every (being); that which ascends by the ascending air, is the soul which is within every (being); this thy soul is within every (being)." i.

Ushasta, the son of Chakra, said,—“As some one may say: This is a cow, this is a horse, thus is this (Brahma) described by thee.” Do (now) explain to me that Brahma who is a witness and present, that soul which is within every (being)." "It is thy soul which is within every (being)." "Which soul is within every (being), Yájnavalkya?" "Thou couldst⁴ not behold the beholder of the beholding; thou

nature as separated within individual existences. The present question is to enquire, whether he who, seized by the senses and their objects, assumes one body after the other, exists or not, and if he exists, what is his nature, that is to say it shows, how to distinguish the soul from every other thing as the indispensable means of liberation; for the nature of the soul being comprehended, liberation ensues from the above described bondage

1 Witness and present, the first, according to S'. means "not obstructed by any thing," and the second "without attributes."

2 The soul, whose nature is knowledge. S'.

3 To show Brahma by such signs as respiration, etc. is the same, as if some body who engages to define a cow, etc. defines it merely by signs, saying for instance, the animal which goes there is a cow; that is to say, thy definition is an improper one.

4 Yájnavalkya declines to give a definition of Brahma in the way, as it is given of a jar, etc. And his reason for declining it, is that such a definition is contradictory to the nature of Brahma. For the nature of Brahma consists in the agency described as beholding, etc. The soul is the beholder of the beholding. The beholding, hearing, knowing, etc. is therefore twofold, twofold, the common one and that to

couldst not hear the hearer of the hearing; thou couldst not mind the minder of the minding; thou couldst not know the knower of the knowing. This thy soul is within every (being); every thing different from it, is transient." Hence Ushasta, the son of Chakra, became silent. 2.

Fifth Brāhmaṇa.

Then asked him Kahola, the son of Kushitaka,—“Yājñavalkya,” said he, “do explain to me that Brahma, who is a witness and present, that soul, which it is within every (being).”¹ (He replied),—“It is thy soul, which is within every (being).” “Which is (the soul), O Yājñavalky, that is within every (being)?” “(It is the soul) which conquers hunger, thirst, grief, delusion, old age, (and) death. When Brahmanas

which it in reality applies. The common beholding, etc. is a modification of the internal organ by means of its connexion with the eye, etc. This is an effect, [and] has therefore a commencement and an end; but the beholding, etc. of the soul, the beholding of the beholding, has, by its own nature, no beginning and no end.

1 In the first three Brāhmaṇas the bondage of the soul together with its cause has been declared. In the fourth the existence of the so bound soul and its independence on every other thing has been set forth. The fifth Brāhmaṇa is to show the knowledge of the soul in connexion with the renunciation of the world as the cause of the liberation of the soul from bondage. In this and the preceding Brāhmaṇas the question, “Explain to me that Brahma, etc.” is the same, and it might therefore be justly asked, whether the two questions refer to one and the same soul, or to two, the supreme and the individual souls. The latter case appears the correct one on the first glance; for if it is one and the same soul, the second question seems useless; on a closer consideration, however, this view must be abandoned; for one and the same whole of causes and effects is possessed of soul merely by one soul. The difference between the present and the preceding questions is this that in the latter the soul is described, as far as it has existence and is independent of the body, while in the former the particular knowledge, in connexion with the renunciation of the world, is described, by which the liberation from that bondage takes place S’.

know this soul,¹ then elevating themselves from the desire of obtaining a son,² from the desire of wealth, and from the desire of gaining the worlds, they lead the life of wandering mendicants; for the desire of a son, is also the desire for wealth; the desire for wealth³ is also the desire for the worlds; for both are even desires. Therefore knowing wisdom let the Brāhmaṇa arm himself with strength.⁴ Knowing wisdom and strength⁵ the thinker,⁶ knowing the thinking and the not thinking of Brahma, will become a (true) Brāhmaṇa." "By what (work) will the Brāhmaṇa live?" "He will remain such an one by one (work).⁷ Any (state) different from this (state of a Brāhman) is perishable." Then Kahola, the son of Kṛṣhitaka, became silent. 1.

1 Know the soul, that is to say, their own soul as the supreme Brahma.

2 The desire of being united with a wife for the purpose of obtaining a son, by whom they were able to conquer the world. S'.

3 Wealth is twofold, human and divine wealth. Human wealth supplies the means to perform rites; by these rites, if accompanied with knowledge, the world of the forefathers is gained. Divine wealth is knowledge; by rites, connected therewith, the world of the gods is gained, and the same also by mere knowledge. From this knowledge also an elevation is necessary to obtain perfect liberation from the world; for in reality that knowledge is ignorance. S.

4 Wisdom, Pándityam, the knowledge of Brahma, strength, such as results from the knowledge of Brahma. -

5 The thinker, Muni, explained by S', mananāt Muni, that is a Yogi.

6 Not thinking and thinking, thus I have translated literally, different from S's explanation, who explains "Amaunam," the knowledge of soul and the removing a belief of non-soul, and "Maunam the ultimate effect from removing a belief in the non-soul.

7 The sense is, for him who has acquired the true knowledge of Brahma, every work is indifferent; he is above work.

Sixth Bràhmana.

Then asked¹ him Gârgi, the daughter of Vachaknu,—“Yâjnavalkya,” said she, “all this (earth) is woven and re-woven on the waters;² upon what then are the waters woven and re-woven?” (He replied),—“On the wind,³ Gârgi.” “On what then is woven and re-woven the wind?” “On the worlds of the atmosphere,⁴ Gârgi.” “On what then are woven and re-woven the worlds of the atmosphere?” “On the worlds of the Gandharvas, O Gârgi.” “On what then are woven and re-woven the worlds of the Gandharvas?” “On the worlds of A'ditya, O Gârgi.” “On what then are woven and re-woven the worlds of A'ditya?” “On the worlds of the moon, O Gârgi.” “On what then are woven and re-woven the worlds of the moon?” “On the worlds of the stars, O Gârgi.” “On what then are the worlds of the stars woven and re-woven?” “On the worlds of the gods, O Gârgi.” “On what then are woven and re-woven the worlds of the gods?” “On the worlds of Indra, O Gârgi.” “On what then are woven and re-woven the worlds of Indra?” “On the worlds of Prajâpati, O Gârgi.” “On what then are woven and re-woven the worlds of Prajâpati?” “On the worlds of Brahma, O Gârgi.” “On what then are woven and re-woven the worlds

¹ In the last two Brâhmanas it has been declared that, the soul is within all; the next three Brâhmanas are to give a more exact definition of this. A'. G.

² This is the case, because the earth every where from without and within is pervaded by the water; otherwise it would be scattered every where like a handful of pounded rice. Here applies this argument, all that is an effect, that is finite and gross, is pervaded by some thing, which is a cause, which is infinite and subtle; and this commences from the five elements up to the soul. S'.

³ Instead of “on the wind,” the answer “on the fire” should be here expected; but says S'. the fire has no existence of its own, independent of water and earth, and is therefore not mentioned separately.

⁴ The worlds of the atmosphere are composed of the five elements. S'.

of Brahma." "Gārgi," said he, "do not ask an improper question,¹ in order that thy head may not drop down. Thou askest the deity which is not to be questioned. Do not question, O Gārgi." Thence Gārgi, the daughter of Vāchaknu, became silent. 1.

Seventh Brāhmaṇa.

Then asked him² Uddālaka, the son of Aruna,—“Yājñavalkya,” said he, “in the country of the Madras we abode in the house of Patanchala of the family of Kapi for the sake of studying the science of offering. His wife was possessed by a Gandharva. We asked him (the Gandharva), ‘Who art thou?’ He said, ‘Kabandha, the son of Atharvana.’ He said to Patanchala, of the family of Kapi, and to (us) priests, ‘O Kāpya, knowest thou that Thread by which this world, and the other world and all beings³ are bound together?’ Patanchala, of the family of Kapi, said,—‘I do not know it, O Venerable.’ He said to Patanchala, of the family of Kapi, and to (us) priests,⁴—‘Knowest thou, O Kāpya, that inner Ruler who within rules this world and the other world, and all beings?’ Patanchala, of the family of Kapi, said, ‘I do not know (this), O Venerable.’ He said to Patanchala, of the family of Kapi, and to (us) priests, ‘O Kāpya, whoever knows the Thread and the Inner Ruler, knows Brahma, knows the worlds, knows the gods, knows the Vedas, knows the elements,⁵ knows the soul, knows all.’ (Then the Gandharva) said (all about the Thread and the Inner Ruler) to them. Therefore do I know this. If thou, O Yājñavalkya, ignorant of the Thread and the Inner Ruler, hast taken away the Brahma cows,⁶ thy head will certainly drop down.” “I know

1 Do not ask an improper question, because it cannot be decided by argument, but only by the Śāstra. S’.

2 Patanchala’s pupils.

3 From Brahmá downwards to inanimate matter, S’.

4 Patanchala’s pupils

5 Or the beings.

6 The cows destined for the best knower of Brahma.

verily,¹ Gautama, the Thread and the Inner Ruler." "Any one may say, this, I know, I know; but tell the manner, in which thou knowest." 1.

He said,—“The wind, O Gautama, is the Thread; by the wind as by a thread are this world, the other world, all beings bound together, O Gautama. Therefore, O Gautama, it is said of a dead man, that his members are relaxed; for by the wind, O Gautama, as by a thread, they are bound together.” “This is so, O Yājñavalkya, (now) explain the Inner Ruler.” 2.

“He who dwelling in the earth is within the earth, whom the earth does not know,¹ whose body is the earth, who within rules the earth, is thy soul, the Inner Ruler, Immortal. 3.

“He who dwelling in the waters is within the waters, whom the waters do not know, whose body are the waters, who within rules the waters, is thy soul, the Inner Ruler, immortal 4.

“He who dwelling in the fire is within the fire, whom the fire does not know, whose body is the fire, who within rules the fire, is thy soul, the Inner Ruler, immortal. 5.

“He who dwelling in the atmosphere is within the atmosphere, whom the atmosphere does not know, whose body is the atmosphere, who within rules the atmosphere, is thy soul, the Inner Ruler, immortal. 6.

“He who dwelling in the wind is within the wind, whom the wind does not know, whose body is the wind, who within rules the wind, is thy soul, the Inner Ruler, immortal. 7.

“He who dwelling in the heavens is within the heavens, whom the heavens do not know, whose body are the heavens, who from within rules the heavens, is thy soul, the Inner Ruler, immortal.” 8.

He who dwelling in the sun, is within the sun, whom the

1 The deity of the earth.

sun does not know, whose body is the sun, who from within rules the sun, is thy soul, the Inner Ruler, immortal.

He who dwelling in the quarters, is within the quarters, whom the quarters do not know, whose body are the quarters, who from within rules the quarters, is thy soul, the Inner Ruler, immortal. 10.

He who dwelling in the moon and stars, is within the moon and stars, whom the moon and stars do not know, whose body are the moon and stars, who from within rules the moon and stars, is thy soul, the Inner Ruler, immortal. 11.

He who dwelling in the ether, is within the ether, whom the ether does not know, whose body is the ether, who from within rules the ether, is thy soul, the Inner Ruler immortal. 12.

He who dwelling in the darkness, is within the darkness, whom the darkness does not know, whose body is the darkness, who from within rules the darkness, is thy soul, the Inner Ruler, immortal. 13.

He who dwelling in the light, is within the light, whom the light does not know, whose body is the light, who from within rules the light, is thy soul, the Inner Ruler, immortal.

This is (his) relation to the gods. Next of (his) relation to the elements. 14.

He who dwelling in all elements, is within the elements, whom the elements do not know, whose body are the elements, who from within rules the elements, is thy soul, the Inner Ruler, immortal. This is (his) relation to the elements. Next of (his) relation to the soul. 15.

He who dwelling in the vital air,¹ is within the vital air, whom the vital air does not know, whose body is the vital air, who from within rules the vital air, is thy soul, the Inner Ruler, immortal. 16.

He who dwelling in speech, is within speech, whom speech.

1 In smell, accompanied by the air of respiration. S.

does not know, whose body is speech, who from within rules speech, is thy soul, the Inner Ruler, immortal. 17.

He who dwelling in the eye, is within the eye, whom the eye does not know, whose body is the eye, who from within rules the eye, is thy soul, the Inner Ruler, immortal. 18.

He who dwelling in the ear, is within the ear, whom the ear does not know, whose body is the ear, who from within rules the ear, is thy soul, the Inner Ruler, immortal. 19.

He who dwelling in the mind, is within the mind, whom the mind does not know, whose body is the mind, who from within rules the mind, is thy soul, the Inner Ruler, immortal. 20.

He who dwelling in the skin, is within the skin, whom the skin does not know, whose body is the skin, who from within rules the skin, is thy soul, the Inner Ruler, immortal. 21.

He who dwelling in knowledge, is within knowledge, whom knowledge does not know, whose body is knowledge, who from within rules knowledge, is thy soul, the Inner Ruler, immortal. 22.

He who dwelling in the seed,¹ is within the seed, whom the seed does not know, whose body is the seed, who from within rules the seed, is thy soul, the Inner Ruler, immortal. Unseen he sees, unheard he hears, unminded he minds, unknown he knows. There is none that sees, but he, there is none that hears but he, there is none that minds, but he, there is none that knows, but he.² He is thy soul, the Inner Ruler, immortal. Whatever is different from him, is perishable." Hence Uddālaka, the son of Aruna, became silent. 23.

Eighth Brāhmaṇa.

Then³ the daughter of Vachaknu said,—“O venerable

¹ In procreation. S'.

² Vid. Br. A' 3, 4, 2, Pras'na U. 419, and Katha U. 6, 12, Mund' 3, 8, Taitt. 2, 4, Talav. U. 1, 3.

³ This Brāhmaṇa is to show the present, visible Brahma as independent of any attributes. S'.

Brâhmans, I wish to ask him (further) two questions. If he answers them, then indeed none of you will ever defeat him in argument concerning Brahma." (They replied),—"Ask (him), O Gârgi." 1.

She said,—“As the king of the Kâsis or of the Videhas, the offspring of heroes, when he has bound the string to the stringless bow, rises in sight with two foe-piercing arrows in his hand, so I will rise before thee with two questions. Do thou make answer to me.”—"Ask, O Gârgi." 2:

She said,—“What is above the heavens, O Yâjnavalkya, what is beneath the earth, what is between, and what is these two, heavens and earth, and what is called the past, the present and the future,—upon what is all this woven and rewoven?” 3.

He said,—“What is above the heavens, O Gârgi, what is beneath the earth, what is between, and is these two, heavens and earth, and what is called the past, the present, and the future,—all this is woven and rewoven on the ether.” 4.

She said,—“I bow to thee, O Yâjnavalkya, who has explained this (question) to me; be prepared for the other.”—"Ask, O Gârgi." 5.

She said,—“What is above the heavens, what is beneath the earth, what is between, and what is these two, heavens and earth, and what is called past, present, and future,—upon what is all this woven and rewoven?” 6.

He said,—“What is above the heavens, O Gârgi, what is beneath the earth, what is between, and what is these two, heavens and earth, and what is called past, present, and future—is woven and rewoven on the ether.” “Upon what then is the ether woven and rewoven?” 7.

He said,—“It is called by the Brâhmans² the indestructible one, O Gârgi. (This) is not of a gross body, it is not.

1 The second question, which is the same with the first, is intended firmly to establish the truth declared before. S'.

2 The Brâhmans are here such as know Brahma. S'.

subtile, not long, not wide, not red,¹ not viscid,² not shadow, not darkness, not air, not ether, not adhesive,³ not taste, not smell, not eye, not ear, not speech, not mind, not light, not life, not entrance,⁴ not measure, not within, not without. It does not consume any thing, nor does any one consume it.⁵ 8.

“By the command of this indestructible (being), O Gârgi, sun and moon stay upheld in their places,⁶ by the command of this indestructible (being), O Gârgi, heavens and earth stay upheld in their places; by the command of this indestructible (being), O Gârgi, minutes, hours, days and nights, the half months, the months, the seasons, the years stay upheld in their places; by the command of this indestructible (being),⁷ O Gârgi, the eastern rivers⁸ flow from the snowy mountains (to the eastern quarter), the western⁹ to the western quarter, and the others to the quarters, (ordained for them). By the command of this indestructible (being), O Gârgi, men praise the giver, gods follow the sacrificer, (and) fore-fathers the oblation. 9.

“Whoever, ignorant of this indestructible (being), O Gârgi, in this world performs offerings, adores the gods (and) practises austerities even many thousands of years, consumes at last the (fruit of his works). Whoever, ignorant of this indestructible (being), O Gârgi, departs from this world, becomes a miser¹⁰ again; whoever, knowing this indestructible (being), O Gârgi, departs from this world, is a (true) Brâhman. 10.

1 Prâsna U. 4, 9, Mund 1, 5.

2 Like fire. S'. 3. Like water. S'. 4 Like lac. S'.

5 Not entrance, to whom there is no entrance, unapproachable.

6 All these negatives are to establish the conviction, that Brahman has no attributes. Vide. Vaj S. U. 8. Katha U. 3, 15. Mund 1, 6.

7 Katha U. 6, 2. Tâitt U. 2, 8. 8 The Gangâ, etc.

9 The Sindhu, etc. S'.

"This indestructible (being), O Gārgi, although unseen sees, unheard hears, unminded minds, unknown knows. There is none that sees, but he, there is none that hears, but he, there is none that minds but he, there is none that knows but he.¹ On this indestructible (being), O Gārgi, the ether is verily woven and re-woven." 11.

She said,—“O venerable Brāhmanas, highly respect this (my word) and acquit yourself towards him (Yājñavalkya) with salutation. None among you will ever become his conqueror in argument concerning Brahma.” Hence the daughter of Vachaknu became silent. 12.

Ninth Brāhmaṇa.

Then asked² him Vidagdha, the son of S'akala,—“How many gods are there, O Yājñavalkya?” He (answered),—“This can be learnt from the Nivit;³ as many (gods) as are mentioned in the Nivit of the Vais'vadeva (Śāstra, (so many are there) (*vis*) three and three hundred, and three and three thousand (3,306).”⁴ He said,—“Om! How many gods are there, O Yājñavalkya?” “Thirty-three.”—He said,—“Om!

1 Pras'na. 4, 8. Hd. Talavakāra U. I, 4—8.

2 After it has been stated, that the earth, the other elements, etc. by their successively more and more subtile nature are, one to another, in the state which has been called “woven and re-woven,” Brahma has been declared to be within all. (Brāhm.) 4-6.). It has been farther stated, that Brahma has the attribute of “Ruler” in the divisions of the thread which pervade the whole manifested world, for all that is manifested requires, to be understopd, the Ruler as its cause. The present Brāhmaṇa undertakes now to show, how the nature of Brahma as a witness, and as present, can be comprehended by the maximum and minimum numbers of the gods. S'.

3 The title of a set of Mantras, defining the number of duties. S'.

4 This is no doubt the amount of the number of the text, according to the explanation of S'ankara; the number given in the Tikā 3,336 is probably owing to the mis-apprehension of a copyist who added “trins'at” (30.)

How many gods are there? He said,—Six." He said,—“Om! How many gods are there, O Jājnavalkya?” “Three.” He said,—“Om! How many gods are there, O Yājnavalkya?” “Two.” He said,—“Om! How many gods are there, O Yājnavalkya?” “Adhyardha.”¹ He said,—“Om! How many gods are there, O Yājnavalkya?” “One.” He said,—“Om! Which are these three and three hundred, and three and three thousand.” 1.

He said,—“This is even for their glory; there are (in reality) thirty-three gods.” “Which are those thirty-three?” “Eight Vasus, eleven Rudras, twelve A'dityas. These are thirty-one; besides Indra and Prajāpati. These are thirty-three.” 2.

“Which are the Vasus?” “The fire, the earth, the wind, the atmosphere, the sun, the heavens, the moon, and the stars. These are the Vasus, for upon them this all is founded; this means Vasu, therefore they are called Vasus.” 3.

“Which are the Rudras?” The ten organs (Prāṇāḥ) in man, and the soul as the eleventh. When they leave this body after death, they weep. Therefore, because they weep (Rodayanti), they were called Rudras.” 4.

“Which are the A'dityas?” “The twelve months of the year are the A'dityas; for taking all this² they pass. Because taking all this they pass (ādadānā yanti), therefore they are called A'dityas.” 5.

“Who is Indra, who is Prajāpati?” “The cloud is Indra, the sacrifice is Prajāpati.” “Which is the cloud?” “The lightning.” “Which is the sacrifice?” “The animals.” 6.

“Which are the six?” “The fire (Agni), the earth, the wind, the atmosphere, the sun and the heavens;³ for they are six; for this all is six.” 7.

¹ Adhyardha, which is more than half, half of two would be one; to distinguish it from the next, this term appears to have been chosen; see the explanation, given in 9.

² All this, the age of man and the fruit, derived from works. S'.

³ In this number the moon and the stars are omitted.

"Which are the three gods?" "The three worlds,¹ for within them all those gods are (comprehended)." "Which are the two gods?" "Food and life." "Which is the Adhyardha?" "He who purifies."² 8.

"Here it is objected,—He who purifies, is one even; how then is he Adhyardha?"³ "Because all obtains increase in him,⁴ therefore is he Adhyardha." "Which is the one god?" "Life; this is called Brahma, this what is beyond."⁵ 9.

"Whoever knows that spirit (Purusha), whose abode is the earth,⁶ whose place (of sight)⁶ is the fire, whose light is the mind,—as the highest locality of every soul, is in truth the one who knows." "I know indeed, O Yájnavalkya, that spirit, the highest locality of every soul, of whom thou speakest. He is the spirit who abides in the body." "Say, O Sákalya, which is the deity of the same?" He said, "Immortality." 10.

"Whoever knows that spirit, whose abode is desire, whose place (of sight) is the heart,⁷ whose light is the mind, as the highest locality of every soul, is in truth one who knows." "I know indeed, O Yájnavalkya, that spirit, the highest locality of every soul, of whom thou speakest. He is the spirit, whose nature is desire." "Say, O Sákalya, which is the deity of the same?" He said,—“Women.” 11.

"Whoever knows that spirit whose abode are colours, whose place (of sight) is the eye, whose light is the mind, as the highest locality of every soul, is in truth one who knows."

1 Earth and fire together are here considered as one god, the atmosphere and the wind as the second, and the heavens and A'ditya (the sun) as the third god. A'. G.

2 The wind.

3 The objection seems to be made from the literal meaning of Adhyardha, which is "half."

4 Adhyárdhnotadhi ridhim prápnōti.

5 Vid. 2, 3, 1.

6 Place (of sight) lokah, lokayati aneneti. S'.

7 The heart, intellect. S'.

"I know indeed, O Yâjñavalkya, that spirit, the highest locality of the whole soul, of whom thou speakest. He is the spirit in the sun."¹ "Say, O Sâkalya, which is the deity of the same?" He said,—“Truth.” 12.

"Whoever knows that spirit, whose abode is the ether, whose place (of sight) is the ear, whose light is the mind,—as the locality of the whole soul, is in truth one who knows." "I know, O Yâjñavalkya, the spirit, the locality of the whole soul, of whom thou speakest. He is the spirit who abides in the ear, to whom all hearing is subject." "Say, O Sâkalya, which is the deity of the same?" He said,—“The quarters.” 13.

"Whoever knows the spirit, whose abode is darkness, whose place (of sight) is the heart, whose light is the mind,—as the highest locality of the whole soul, is in truth one who knows." "I know indeed, O Yâjñavalkya, the spirit, who is the highest locality of the whole soul, of whom thou speakest. He is the spirit, whose nature is shadow." "Say, O Sâkalya, which is the deity of the same?" He said,—“Death.” 14.

"Whoever knows the spirit, whose abode are the colours, whose place (of sight) is the eye, whose light the mind,—as the highest locality of the whole soul, is in truth one who knows." "I know, O Yâjñavalkya, the spirit, who is the highest locality of the whole soul, of whom thou speakest. He is the spirit who abides in the looking-glass." "Say, O Sâkalya, which is the deity of the same?" He said,—“The breath.” 15.

"Whoever knows the spirit, whose abode are the waters, whose place (of sight) is the heart, whose light the mind, as the locality of the whole soul, is in truth one who knows." "I know, O Yâjñavalkya, the spirit, who is the highest locality of the whole soul, of whom thou speakest. He is the spirit who

abides in the waters." "Say, O Sâkalya, which is the deity of the same?" He said,—“Varuna.” 16.

“Whoever knows the spirit, whose abode is in the semen, whose place of sight is the heart, whose light is the mind, as the highest locality of the whole soul, is in truth one who knows.” “I know indeed, O Yâjñavalkya, that spirit, as the highest locality of the whole soul, of whom thou speakest. He is the spirit who abides in the sun” “Tell, O Sâkalya, which is the deity of the same?” He said,—“Prajâpati.” 17.

Yâjñavalkya said,—“O Sâkalya, these Brâhmins have made thee cinders.” 18

Sâkalya said,—O Yâjñavalkya, (does this thy boast), that thou hast defeated these Kuru and Panchâla Brâhmins in argument, (arise from a conceit that) thou knowest Brahma?” “I know the quarters with their deities and their localities.” “If thou dost know the quarters with their deities and localities—19.

Which deity art thou in the eastern quarter?” “The sun.” “Where is the sun located?” “In the eye.” “Where has the eye its locality?” “In colours; for by the eye colours are seen.” “Where is the locality of colours?” He said,—“In the heart; for colours are produced by the heart; the heart therefore is the locality of colour.” Thus is it, Yâjñavalkya. 20.

“Which deity art thou in the southern quarter?” “The deity of Yama.” “Where is the locality of Yama?” “In sacrifice.” “Where is the locality of the sacrifice?” “In the bestowal of gifts.”¹ “Where is bestowing of gifts?” In faith; for if a man have faith, he gives gifts; faith therefore is the locality of bestowal of gifts.” “Where is the locality of faith?” “In the heart,” he said; “for by the heart he

¹ To the officiating priests, from whom the sacrificer purchases the sacrifice. S'.

knows faith; the heart therefore is the locality of faith."

"Thus is it, O Yājñavalkya. 21.

Which deity art thou in the western quarter?" "The deity of Varuna." "Where is the locality of Varuna?" "In the waters." "Where is the locality of the waters?" "In the semen." "Where is the locality of the semen?" "In the heart; for it is said of a son, who resembles (his father), he is dropped from (his) heart, as it were, he is made of (his) heart, as it were; the heart therefore is the locality of the semen." "Thus is it, O Yājñavalkya. 22.

Which deity art thou in the northern quarter?" "The deity of Soma." "Where is the locality of Soma?" "In the initiatory rite."¹ "Where is the locality of the initiatory rite?" "In truth; for we say concerning a person, who has performed the initiatory rite,—speak the truth; the heart therefore is the locality of the initiatory rite." "Where is the locality of truth?" "In the heart," said he; "for by the heart man knows truth; the heart therefore is the locality of truth." "Thus is it, O Yājñavalkya. 23.

Which deity art thou in the polar quarter?"² "The deity of Agni." "Where is the locality of Agni?" "In speech." "Where is the locality of speech?" "In the heart." "Where is the locality of the heart?" 24.

Yājñavalky said,—“O Ahallika,³ if thou believest at any time that the heart is in any other place than in our (body), if the same is in any other place than in our (body), then why do the dogs not eat it, or the birds not tear it?”

“Where art thou and where is self⁴ located?” “In the

¹ A rite previous to the sacrifice. This may be also rendered, “In the initiatory Mantra,” the Mantra which the sacrificer receives previous to the sacrifice.

² The quarter which is above those who dwell on the mountain Meru. S'.

³ Ahallika, ahani liyate, a being who disappears in the day time, a ghost. S'.

⁴ Atma means here the body. S'.

vital air that goes forwards." Where is the location of the vital air that goes forwards?" In the descending air." "Where is the location of the descending air?" "In the circulating air." "Where is the location of the circulating air?", "In the ascending air." "Where is the location of the ascending air?" "In the equalising air. This soul, which is neither this, nor that, nor aught else, is intangible, for it is not to be laid hold of; it is not to be dissipated, for it cannot be dissipated; it is without contact, for it does not come into contact; it is not limited; it is not subject to pain, nor to destruction.—There are eight abodes, eight places (of sight), eight deities, and eight Purushas. Whoever understands those Purushas in their division,¹ and again in their union,² has overcome (the world). I ask thee about the Purusha in the Upanishads. And thou explain not him to me, thy head will fall off." S'akalya knew him not, so his head fell off. Moreover robbers took away his bones, mistaking them for some thing else.³ 26.

Then he said,—“O venerable Bráhmans, let any one among you who wishes it, question me, or do you so all together. Or I will question any one among you who desires it; or I will question you altogether.” The Bráhmanas dared not. 27.

He questioned them by these Slokas,—“As the tree is identical with the lord of the forest,⁴ so is the Purusha identical with truth. His hair is the leaves, his skin the external bark. From his skin blood flows, as sap from the bark; therefore if he be hurt, blood proceeds from him, as sap from a wounded tree. The parts of flesh are the layers⁵ (of

1 In their eight-fold division. S'.

2 As they are united in the heart. S'.

3 While his body was being carried for the performance of the funeral rites by his disciples to his house. S'.

4 “Vanaspati,” lord of the forest, is another name for “tree.”

5 This evidently refers to the outer woody layer or alburnum.

Yājñavalkya, do thou give us the explanation." "Verily, speech¹ is the place, the ether, the site, the knowledge! In this view² let one meditate on him (Brahma.)" What knowledge,³ O Yājñavalkya?" He said,—“Verily, speech, O king of kings. By speech, O king of kings, a friend is made known; (so are made known) the Rig-Veda, the Yajur Veda, the Sāma Veda, the Atharvans and Angiras, the narratives, the doctrines of creation, the science, the Upanishads, the memorial verses, the aphorisms, the explanation of tenets, the explanation of Mantras,⁴ the fruits of sacrifices, of offerings, of bestowing food, of bestowing drink, this world and the other world and all beings. By speech, O king of kings, is Brahma known; speech, O king of kings, is the supreme Brahma. Speech does not desert him who with this knowledge meditates on that (Brahma), all beings approach him;⁵ having become a god, verily he goes to the gods!” “I will give thee a thousand cows, big as elephants” said Janaka, the king of the Videhas. Yājñavalkya said,—“My father admonished me—where one does not instruct, one should not take (gifts).” 2.

“Let us hear, what another has taught thee.” “Udanka,

The other (the king) said,—“If this is the case, then is *Brahma one-footed*.” “(The idea of) Brahma is without effect, if he be meditated upon as having only three feet, *O king and kings*.” “If so, then explain the matter to me according to thy knowledge, O Yājñavalkya.” S.’s explanation agrees in sense, although not in detail, with the second version, above given.”

1 Speech, the speech of Brahma, represented by the deity of speech. S’.

2 By this knowledge, being the fourth foot of the Brahma of the Upanishad. S’.

3 This question means, is it knowledge itself, or the cause of knowledge? Is it distinguished from Brahma, as his place and foundation are, or is it not distinguished from him? And the answer implies, that it is not distinguished. S’.

4 Vid. p. 179, where the above terms have been explained.

the son of S'ulbasa, told me, life is Brahma." "As one having an excellent mother, father and teacher, the son of S'ulbasa taught, life is Brahma; for of what use is a person who has no life? He no doubt, taught thee his place and site." "He did not teach me that Brahma is only one-footed, O king of kings." "Then, O Yājñavalkya, give us the explanation." "Life is even the place, the ether, the site, that which is dear to us! In this view let one meditate on him." "What dear object, O Yājñavalkya?" He said,—“Verily life is the dear object, O king of kings. For love of life, O king of kings, one desires what is not desirable, seizes on what is not to be seized; for the desire of life, O king of kings, arises dread of being killed¹ wherever one goes. Life, O king of kings, is the supreme Brahma. Him who that knowing meditates on that (Brahma), does life not desert, him all beings approach; having become a god, he even goes to the gods!” “I will give thee a thousand cows, big as elephants,” said Janaka, the king of the Videhas. Yājñavalkya said,—“My father admonished me—where one does not instruct, one should not take (gifts).” 3.

“Let us hear, what another has taught thee.” “Barkhu, the son of Vrishna, taught me, the eye is Brahma.” “As one having an excellent mother, father and teacher, the son of Vrishna taught, the eye is Brahma; for of what use is one who does not see? He, no doubt, taught thee his place and site.” “He did not teach me that Brahma is only one-footed, O king of kings.” “Then, O Yājñavalkya, give us the explanation.” “Verily the eye is the place, the ether, the site, the truth! In this view let one meditate on him.” “Which truth, O Yājñavalkya?” He said,—“The eye, O king of kings. When one who sees with the eye, is asked, O king of kings, hast thou seen? (Should) he answer, I have

1 From robbers, etc.

seen, then that (which he has seen) is truth.¹ The eye, O king of kings, is the supreme Brahma. The eye not deserts him who with this knowledge meditates on that (Brahma); all beings approach him; having become a god, verily he goes to the gods." "I will give thee a thousand cows, big as elephants," said Janaka, the king of the Videhas. Yājñavalkya said,—“My father admonished me—where one does not instruct, one should not take (gifts).” 4.

“Let us hear, what another has taught thee.” “Gardabhivipita, of the family of Bharadvāja, taught me, the ear is Brahma.” “As one having an excellent mother, father and teacher, Bharadvāja taught, the ear is Brahma; for of what use is he who does not hear? He, no doubt, taught thee his place and site.” “He did not teach me that Brahma is only one-footed, O king of kings.” “Then, O Yājñavalkya, give us the explanation.” “Verily the ear is the place, the ether, the site, the infinite! In this view let one meditate on him.” “What infinite, O Yājñavalkya?” He said,—“Verily the quarters are infinite, O king of kings. Therefore, O king of kings, none comes to the end of any quarter whichsoever; for the quarters are infinite. The quarters, O king of kings, are the ear; the ear, O king of kings, is the supreme Brahma. The ear not deserts him, who with this knowledge meditates on that (Brahma), all beings approach him; having become a god, verily he goes to the gods.” “I will give thee a thousand cows, big as elephants,” said Janaka, the king of the Videhas. Yājñavalkya said,—“My father admonished me—where one does not instruct, one should not take (gifts).” 5.)

“Let us hear, what another has taught thee.” “Satyakāma the son of Jabālā, taught me, the mind is Brahma.” “As one having an excellent mother, father and teacher, the son of Jabālā taught, the mind is Brahma; for of what use is he who has no mind? He, no doubt, taught thee his

1 And thus the eye differs from the other senses, for instance from the evidence of words where doubt may arise.

place and site." "He did not teach me that Brahma is only one-footed, O king of kings." "Then, O Yājñavalkya, give us the explanation." "The mind is the place, the ether, the site, happiness! By this let one meditate on him."

"Which bliss, O Yājñavalkya?" He said,—“Verily the mind, O king of kings. By the mind, O king of kings, one has a desire after a wife; through her a son similar (to oneself) is born; he (the son) is bliss. The mind, O king of kings, is the supreme Brahma. Mind not deserts him, who with this knowledge, meditates on that (Brahma), all beings approach him; having become a god, verily he goes to the gods.” “I will give thee a thousand cows, big as elephants,” said Janaka, the king of the Videhas. Yājñavalkya said,—“My father admonished me—where one does not instruct, one should not take (gifts). 6.

“Let us hear, what another has taught thee.” “Vidagdha, of the family of S'ākalya, taught me the heart is Brahma.” “As one, having an excellent mother, father and teacher S'ākalya taught, the heart is Brahma; for of what use is he who has no heart. He, no doubt, taught thee his place and site.” “He did not teach me that Brahma is (only) one-footed, O king of kings.” “Then, O Yājñavalkya, give us the explanation.” “Verily the heart is the place, the ether, the site, the locality!” “Which locality, O Yājñavalkya?” He said,—“The heart, O king of kings, is the place of all beings; the heart, O king of kings, is the site of all beings; in the heart, O king of kings, are all the beings cited. The heart, O king of kings, is the supreme Brahma. Heart not deserts him who with this knowledge meditates on that (Brahma), all beings approach him; having become a god, verily he goes to the gods.” “I will give thee a thousand cows, big as elephants,” said Janaka, the king of the Vidēhas. Yājñavalkya said,—“My father admonished me—where one does not instruct, one should not take (gifts). 7.

*Second Brāhmaṇa.*¹

Janaka, the king of the Videhas, (rising) from (his) throne, approached (Yājñavalkya) with humility saying,—“I bow to thee, O Yājñavalkya, do thou instruct me.” He said,—“As one who is going to travel a great distance, takes a chariot or a boat, so art thou prepared in mind (for the knowledge of Brahma) by those Upanishads;² thus art thou venerable, wealthy; thus hast thou read the Védas, and art instructed in the Upanishads.³ (I now ask thee), when liberated from this (body), where art thou to go?” “I know not, O Venerable, where I am to go.” “Then I will tell thee, where thou art to go.” “Say, O Venerable.” 1.

Indha⁴ is verily the name of that Purusha who dwells in the right eye. Him whose true name is Indha, they call Indra, by an indirect name; for the gods like indirect names, and dislike to be named directly.⁵ 2.

Again, that which in the shape of a Purusha dwells in the

1 In the antecedent Brāhmaṇa have been mentioned some modes of meditation as conducive towards the knowledge of Brahma; the present Brāhmaṇa is to set forth the states of waking, etc. as means of attaining the knowledge of Brahma. A'. G.

2 The term “Upanishads” means here of course not the knowledge of Brahma, but certain meditations with regard to Brahma which have been explained in the antecedent Brāhmaṇa.

3 But though thou art furnished with all these appliances, yet thou hast not attained the highest object of man, unless thou have the knowledge of Brahma. S'.

4 It is intended to show the fourth (or supreme) Brahma by recapitulating what has been said before with reference to Brahma considered as Vis'wa, (or the soul, endowed with a gross body), as Taijasa, (or the soul, endowed with a subtle body) and as Prājña (or the soul endowed with a causal body). A'. G.

5 Vide a similar passage in the Aitar. U. 1, 3, 14.

left eye, is his wife, the Virāt.¹ The union of them² is the ether within 'the heart';³ again their food is the red lump within the heart; again their place of retreat is the net-work⁴ within the heart; again the road to be travelled⁵ on is the artery which rises upwards from the heart. As a hair a thousand times divided thus do its (the body's) veins, called the good,⁶ become which are located within the heart. Proceeding by these (veins) that (food) proceeds. There is, as it were, nourishment yet more subtle than that. From this corporeal soul (is nourished the higher soul.)⁷ 3.

1 Vais'wanara, although one, is, in the present sentence and in the preceding section, represented as a couple *vis.* Indra and Indrāni for the purpose of meditating upon him. A'. {G. That A' is right, is evident from the term Virāt, another name of Vais'wanara, which refers to both Indra and Indrāni and points out the idea according to which they are to be comprehended as one.

2 The union of Indra and Indrāni, which in the state of waking is called Vis'wa (Vais'wanara Virāt), bears in the state of dream the name of Tajjasa. A'. G.

3 The union of them (as Tajjasa) takes place in the ether of the heart, and the heart is here the lump of flesh on which they subsist. To understand this, it is necessary to know the different kinds of food for the different parts of the body. Food undergoes a double modification by the process of digestion, a gross and a more subtle one. The product of the former is carried off by excretion. The product of the latter is again modified by the digestive heat and converted into two juices. The one juice of mean subtilty, consisting of the five elements, nourishes the gross body by its change into blood, etc. The other juice is very subtle, and contributes the red lump which, after it has entered the five blood-vessels of the heart, supplies the sustenance of the subtle body of Indra (as Tajjasa), when united with Indrāni in the heart. S'.

4 It is like a net-work from the countless number of apertures between the subtle blood-vessels. S'.

5 The road from the place of waking to the place of dream. S'.

6 Vid. Aitt. U. 1, 3, 14.

7 Or, there is yet (a higher soul) than the one mentioned, whose food (the food of the higher soul) is more subtle. The corporeal soul is Vais'wanara, and the higher, Tajjasa.

Its¹ eastern quarter are the vital airs that go to the east, its southern quarter the vital airs that go to the south, its western quarter the vital airs that go to the west, its northern quarter the vital airs that go to the north, his ascending quarter the ascending vital airs, his descending quarter the descending vital airs, all quarters of all vital airs. This soul which is neither this, nor aught else, which is intangible²—for it cannot be laid hold of,—not to be dissipated—for it cannot be dissipated—, without contact—for it cannot come into contact—, not limited, not subject to pain nor to destruction; this fearless³ (soul), O Janaka, is obtained by thee," thus said Yājñavalkya. Janaka, the king of the Videhas, said,—"May that fearless (Brahma) become thy town, O Yājñavalkya, which thou, O Venerable, hast taught us. I bow to thee; let this kingdom of the Videhas and this myself be thine."⁴ 4.

*Third Brāhmaṇa.*³

Yājñavalkya,⁵ went to Janaka, the king of the Videhas.

1 Tajjasa, whose abode is in the heart, when supported by subtle life, becomes life (Prāna), that is to say, the Prāna which is called Prājña (the soul of imperfect knowledge, or the third state of the individual soul, corresponding to the third state of the universal soul, which is called I's'wara, the Ruler). This refers to him who knows, and who from the state of Vais'wanara has gradually obtained the state of Tajjasa and of life (Prāna). S'.

2 One who thus knows, attains gradually the general soul. When he has identified the individual soul with the universal soul, he obtains the fourth Brahman by such negations as he is not this, he is not that. S'. Vid. Br. A' 3, 9, 26.

3 Fearless, because it is beyond any cause of fear, as birth, death, etc. S'.

4 Vid. Chh. U', 3, 12, 6. and Katha Up. 1, 27-29.

5 In his introduction to the present Brāhmaṇa, showing its connexion with the preceding section, S' recapitulates the principal points of the third chapter. The visible and present Brahman is also the supreme Brahman whose nature is knowledge, which is evident from such

He bethought him, I will not say aught. (It happened that formerly), when Janaka, the king of the Videhas, and Yājña-

passages as. "There is none that sees but he," (3, 8, 11). This (Brahma), after he has entered the body, is divided according to the functions of speech, etc. In the Madhukāṇḍa, in the part relating the conversation of Ajātasatru, Brahma is conceived, by the attributes of dominion and enjoyment of life, etc. (2, 3, 17, as something different from life, etc.). Again in the question of Ushasta, representing him under the attributes of life, etc. (3, 4), he is comprehended in a general manner by such words as, "That which breathes by breath, etc., (l. c.), and in the full power of his nature by the words, "He is the beholder of the beholding." If it is now asked why he should enter upon a worldly state, which is not his true nature, the answer is), The worldly state of him is the attribute of the supreme one (ignorance). As it is an effect of ignorance, if a rope, a desert place, a mother-of-pearl shell, the ether, etc., be respectively considered as a snake, as water, silver, impure, etc., as this is an effect of ignorance, and not their own nature (so is it an effect of ignorance, if a worldly state be attributed to the soul.) (Brahma) who is without attribute and attainable by word (or mind), must be defined by negations, as "He is not this, he is not that, etc, and is (affirmatively) comprehended as the visible present soul (3, 5), pervading all, as the indestructible Brahma (3, 8), as the Inner Ruler (3, 7) as the Purusha of the Upanishads (3, 9, 26), as the Brahma whose nature is knowledge and bliss (4, 1). This Brahma is again conceived under the name of Indha (4, 2) as the soul, nourished by subtile food (Vais'wanara; (again) as the soul of the subtile body (lingātma, Taijasa) nourished by food, more subtile than that (of Vais'wanara). Greater than this or both, Vais'wanara and Taijasa) is the soul of the world, having the attribute of life. From this again is distinguished by knowledge the soul of the world, having the attribute of life, by the words,—"He is not this, he is not thus, as a snake, etc., (is distinguished by knowledge) from a rope, etc., and thus the visible and present Brahma (the fourth) who is within all, is comprehended, (4, 1). In the same manner has Janaka obtained the fearless Brahma by the succinct instruction of Yājñavalkya according to the doctrine of the S'ruti. There (4, 2), are the states of waking, dream, profound sleep and of the fourth mentioned for another purpose (for the purpose of showing the gradual liberation of the soul from the attachment to the world as the effect of those kinds of meditation, A.

valkya had held converse together about the fire-offering,¹ that Yājñavalkya had given him (permission to ask) a boon. The boon he chose was, to question (Yājñavalkya) according to his pleasure. He granted that boon to him. The king of kings first asked him,²—"Yājñavalkya, of what light is this Purusha?"³ He said,—“Of the light of the sun, O king of kings. By the light of the sun (man) sits down, walks about, performs his work and returns (home).” “It is even so, O Yājñavalkya.”

“Of what light, O Yājñavalkya, is this Purusha, when the sun has set.” “The moon is even his light. By the moon-light he sits down, walks about, performs his work and returns (home).” “It is even so, O Yājñavalkya.” 3.

G.) *viz.*, Indha (4, 2, 2), he, whose nourishment is subtile (4, 2, 3), all life (4, 2, 4) and “He is not this, he is not that,” (e. l.) In the present Brāhmana (Brahma) is to be comprehended by means of the states of waking, dream, etc, through the operation of profound discussion, as the fearless; the existence of the soul (is to be comprehended) by removing any doubt arising from dispute, its nature (to be comprehended) as independent, pure, similar with light, of omnipotent power as infinite bliss and as being without duality. For this purpose, the present Brāhmana is commenced.

1 And Yājñavalkya was gratified by the king's knowledge.

2 *i. e.* On the present occasion, the introductory episode of the boon and right to the questions being concluded.

3 Purusha, the being, who consists of the combination of causes and effects and has head, hands, etc. Of what light, means, by what light as cause does not discharge the business of life. S'. S'. makes here some very good reflections about the nature of this light, whether it is external or internal, separated or not separated from the body; but they are rather S's reflections than those of the Upanishad, and we will therefore omit them. The progression from one idea to another in the Upanishad is very clear, *viz.*, any light which is found in external nature is incapable of being the cause of the intellectual functions of man, for it ceases to act certain times; the light by which man acts, must therefore be something distinct from any of them.

"Of what light, O Yājñavalkya, is this Puruṣa, when the sun has set and the moon has set." "The fire is even his light. By the fire-light he sits down, walks about, performs his work and returns (home)." "It is even so, O Yājñavalkya." 4.

"Of what light, O Yājñavalkya, is this Puruṣa, when the sun has set, the moon has set, and the fire is at rest?" "Speech¹ is even his light. By the light of speech he sits down, walks about, performs his work and returns (home). Therefore, O king of kings, at a time,² when one can not distinguish his own hand, he restores there, whence speech proceeds."³ "It is even so, O Yājñavalkya" 5.

"Of what light, O Yājñavalkya, is this Puruṣa, when the sun has set, the moon has set, the fire is at rest, and speech is at rest?" "Soul⁴ (Ātmā) is even his light. By the light of the soul he sits down, walks about, performs his work and returns (home)." 6.

"Which soul?"⁵ "That soul which among the organs has

1 Speech means here sound, the object of the sense of hearing. When this sense is enlightened, reflection is produced in the mind. By the mind effort to obtain external things is made; for by the mind one sees, one hears. S'.

2 When it is dark from clouds, or when every other light has ceased to shine. S'.

3 Where sound rises, be it the neighing of horses or the braying of donkeys, etc. Speech serves here only as an illustration and includes the other senses. S'.

4 Different from the whole of the causes and effects in the body and its parts, manifesting the effects and causes, like the sun and other external lights, and not manifested by any thing else. It is light which is within, and at the same time independent of effects and causes. It is not perceived by the eye or any other organs like the sun, but inferred from its effects, S'.

5 Although it has been proved, that the soul has an existence, independent (of the gross body, and abides within (the body), yet, seeing that (the sun, etc.) which assist (the body in the operation of its functions), is of the same kind (with the body), there may proceed the delusion that

the nature of knowledge, which abides in the heart, and is the Purusha who is light.¹ He,² being the same³ (with the

the soul which is light may also be of the same nature with the body, etc., there being no difference between the kinds of assistance), and from the want of distinction question may arise, is the soul one of the organs or some thing different from them? Or in other words, though it is proved, that the soul is different from the body, yet all the organs partake of the nature of knowledge, and since no distinction is apprehended between the soul and the organs, the question of the text is necessary, "which soul." S'.

1 The whole sentence may be explained, according to S', in a three-fold manner

a The first part contains the question, "Which soul?" and the second, the answer to it, "The Purusha who among the organs has the nature of knowledge and is the light of the heart."

b Or "Which is the soul among the organs that has the nature of knowledge?" The answer in this case is, "The Purusha who is light alone, abiding in the heart."

c Or "Which is the soul that among the organs has the nature of knowledge and is the Purusha, who is light alone, abiding in the heart?"

S'ankara prefers the first explanation. "Has the nature of knowledge" means, according to him, resembles knowledge or intellect (buddhi, and "heart" the intellect which has its place in the organ of the heart.

2 He, the Purusha. The Purusha who is light alone, who manifests all and is not manifested by anything else, cannot be comprehended in the state of waking, since none of the organs is an object of perception, and since from the confusion, arising from the united action of so many causes and effects of the senses, the soul in its nature as light alone cannot be shown. The Upanishad, therefore explains it by means of the state of dream. S'.

3 Being the same, or similar This refers to the "heart," as is clear from the topic and from the relations which the soul has to the heart (or intellect). As light, manifesting red, green, etc., colours, becomes itself red or green, so the Purusha, manifesting intellect manifests thereby the whole body, and by this intellect he becomes also like every other thing S'.

heart), migrates¹ to both worlds.² He, as it were, thinks; he, as it were, moves;³ for having become dream,⁴ he quits this world,⁵ (he quits) the forms of death.⁶ 7.

This Purusha,⁷ when born,⁸ when assuming a body, is allied to sins;⁹ when rising upwards, when dying, he lays aside the sins.¹⁰ 8.

There are even two places of this Purusha, this place, and the place of the next world; the place of dream,¹¹ which is between them is the third. Abiding in this middle place,

1 The cause of his migration is his similarity with intellect; on his own accord such a migration does not take place. He migrates by leaving his present body and entering another and another in endless succession. S'.

2 Both worlds, the future and the present world.

3 He as it were thinks, that is to say, in reality he does not think or reflect; for reflection does not belong to his nature, S'. (and is the effect of his being considered under the attribute of intellect).

4 He becomes all that intellect becomes, and intellect assuming the state of dream, the Purusha also assumes it. S'.

5 This world, characterised by the functions practised during waking. S'.

6 Death means, work, ignorance, etc.; his forms, causes and effects. S'.

7 As the Purusha in this body, when assuming the state of dream, quits the forms of death, and remains in his own light, so when born..... he is allied to sins S'.

8 When born, when assuming the state of the soul within a body. S'.

9 Sins mean causes and effects, depending upon vice and virtue. S'.

10 He lays them aside, he becomes free from them. As the Purusha, abiding in one and the same body, in consequence of his similarity with intellect, by assuming and laying aside causes and effects in the form of sin, continually migrates from the state of waking to that of dream and vice versa, so by assuming and laying aside those causes and effects he continually migrates through birth and death to this and to the other world, until he is finally liberated. It is therefore evident, that the soul which has the nature of light, is different from sins, as causes and effects, because it is joined to and separated from them.

11 Dream is not a world, but only the union of two worlds, as the place between two villages is not a village itself. S'.

(man) sees¹ both places, this and the place of the other world. In proportion to the endeavour² with which one is (striving to obtain) the place of the other world, does he accordingly see sin³ or bliss. When he sleeps, (when, putting on a rudiment (only) of this world which consists of all elements,⁴ himself prostrating (his body), himself raising a building⁵ by force of his own splendour and manifestation, he sleeps—then becomes this Purusha unmingled light. 9.

No chariots⁶ are there,⁷ no horses, nor roads; then he creates chariots, horses and roads. No pleasures are there, no joys, nor rejoicings; then he creates pleasure, joys and rejoicings. No tanks are there, no lakes, nor rivers; then he creates tanks, lakes and rivers; for he is the agent.⁸ 10.

Here apply, these S'lokas,⁹ "In dream, prostrating¹⁰ the

1 How then is it proved, that there is another world, different from the place of union, or dream? The answer is, because Purusha sees in dream both the present and another world.

2 The endeavour being considered as the seed from which the tree of the body rises.

3 Sin, the effect of sin, unhappiness. He sees them in the shape of impressions, received in a former world. What is the proof of this? Because he sees in dream many things, not to be perceived in this birth; for dream means not a perception of things seen before, which is called remembrance. Therefore, beside the places of waking and dream, there exists those two worlds. S'.

4 Which consists of all elements (sarvāvan), admits of double explanation. Sarvam avati, he preserves all, or sarvāvān-sarvavān, which contains every thing. And this element is again the cause of creation.

5 A dream-like body.

6 What has been said before that the Purusha in dream is life alone, is here expressed in another manner. A'. G.

7 There, in dream, where there are no objects of the senses as in waking. 'S'.

8 He is the agent for the dream-land. S'.

9 Slokas means here Mantras, (memorial verses). They apply here, that is to say, to the view, that the Purusha is light alone.

10 Annihilating the action.

